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This thesis addresses the factors which lead the Russian government to increase natural gas 
prices for Ukraine in 2006.  Through the use of methodological individualism, an explanation 
which links system, state, and individual levels of analysis is constructed.  The system level 
variables concerned include global energy prices and the increasing importance of Turkmen 
natural gas to Russia and other regional gas consumers.  State level variables, include changes 
in Russia‟s patrimonial society (changing source of rents, increased authoritarianism); and 
increasing state control over Russia‟s natural gas industry.  Changes in these conditioning 
factors influence individuals‟ beliefs about their preferred source of rents, and the nature of 
their rent seeking and distributing. The resulting actions bring about variations in Russia‟s 
natural gas price for Ukraine.  This framework is tested over three time periods (1995-1999, 
2000-2004, 2004-2008) selected based on the nature of the conditioning variables over those 
years. Evidence from these case studies suggests that the above mentioned factors played a 
large role in the Russian government‟s decision. Further, it is concluded that methodological 
individualism offers a way to bring together system, state, and individual levels of analysis 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Since the turn of the century most discussions about Russian foreign policy eventually 
turn to energy, specifically oil and natural gas.  Consequently, the 2006 cutoff of gas exports 
to Ukraine is almost always mentioned.  This supply cutoff, unlike others in the 1990‟s, is 
given more attention because it led to noticeable disruptions of supplies to European states.  
The cutoff stemmed from the Russian government‟s decision to sharply raise the price of 
natural gas exports to Ukraine, and the Ukrainian government‟s refusal to accept the new 
prices.  With the aim of explaining the cutoff from the Russian point of view, the main 
question this project attempts to answer is: what brought about the steep price increase for 
natural gas shipments from Russia to Ukraine in 2006? This question offers an opportunity to 
look at an event in Russia‟s foreign policy that has great practical importance, and is also 
theoretically interesting and challenging.    
This project makes a contribution to the literature concerning the practical implications 
of the Russia-Ukraine natural gas dispute in 2006, and to the literature concerning multi-level 
analysis in international relations theory.  In terms of this issues practical importance, a better 
understanding of what brought about the Russian price increases can shed light on the role that 
natural gas plays in Russia‟s foreign policy.  In terms of international relations theory, this 
project serves as an example of how methodological individualism can be used to bring 
together individual, state, and system level variables when explaining events in international 
politics. 
This chapter will begin with a discussion of the 2006 cutoff and provide some 
background information on the European and Eurasian natural gas trade.  This will be 
2 
 
followed by a discussion of the theoretical challenge this research question poses, the 
mechanisms based approach employed in this projects answer to overcome this challenge, and 
some of the key components of the explanation proposed.  
The Dispute and Context 
Ukraine paid relatively low prices for Russian gas imports until 2006 when it 
eventually faced pressures to pay increased prices.  Ukraine paid $50 USD per 1000 cm 
(thousand cubic meters) of natural gas imported from Russia from as early as 1999, but in the 
final days of 2005 Gazprom attempted to increase the price of Russian natural gas to $230 
USD per 1000 cm.
1
  The conflict began in March 2005 when the Ukrainian government 
suggested that it might increase the transit fee charged to Russia for shipping gas to Europe.  
These actions led the Russian side to reconsider other aspects of the 2002 contract which 
governed gas trade between the two states, specifically price.
2
  Gazprom followed in June 
2005 by suggesting that it would raise prices over the next three years to bring the prices that 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) customers paid in line with the prices paid by 
states in Europe.  This statement was matched by the passage of a bill in the Russian Duma 
which called on CIS customers to begin paying higher prices for gas imported from Russia.
3
  
From this point onwards the Russian government insisted that the price paid by Ukrainian 
importers should rise to $160 USD per 1000 cm in 2006.  Ukraine claimed that it was only 
able to pay $80 USD per 1000 cm in 2006.
4
 This resistance from the Ukrainian government 
                                                          
1
 Simon, Pirani, “Ukraine’s Gas Sector,” Oxford Institute Of Energy Studies, June 2007, 28, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/NG21.pdf, Accessed January 15 2009.  Also see: Andreas Heinrich, “Gazprom’s Pipeline 
Policies: The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis Of January 2006,” (Paper Presented at International Conference on International 
Relations in Eastern Europe, Berlin, Germany March 16-18 2006), 10. 
2
 Andreas Heinrich, “Gazprom’s Pipeline Policies: The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis Of January 2006,” (Paper Presented at 
International Conference on International Relations in Eastern Europe, Berlin, Germany March 16-18 2006), 6. 
3
 Ibid., 7. 
4
 Jonathan Stern, “The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis of January 2006” Oxford Institute of Energy Studies, Jan 16 2006, 6, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/comment_0106.pdf, Accessed April 8 2008. 
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led the Russian side to threaten supply disruptions, and to raise the potential export price to 
$230 USD per 1000 cm.
5
  After the Russian government cutoff gas supplies to Ukraine due to 
its refusal to pay the new prices, Ukraine continued to siphon gas from the pipelines transiting 
Ukrainian territory, leading to supply shortfalls in Europe.
6
  A deal was eventually reached 
whereby Ukraine bought a mixture of Russian and Central Asian gas through an intermediary 
(partially owned by Gazprom), which purchased gas from Gazprom and Gazprom subsidiaries 
and then sold it to Ukraine for $95 USD per 1000 cm.
7
   
Figure 1.1 European and Eurasian Natural Gas Infrastructure8
 
E.U. Natural Gas Market 
 Natural gas makes up roughly 25% of the E.U.‟s total energy mix. 
9
 This number is 
expected to increase over the next 20 years by roughly 10%, making growth in natural gas 
                                                          
5
 Andreas Heinrich, “Gazprom’s Pipeline Policies: The Russian Ukrainian Gas Crisis Of January 2006,” (Paper Presented at 




 Ibid., 9-10. 
8 Energy Information Agency, “Country Analysis Briefs: Ukraine,” August 2007, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Ukraine/NaturalGas.html, Accessed May 12 2009. 
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consumption greater than that of any other currently available fuels.
10
  Given the inability of 
North Sea reserves to meet this growing demand, Europe‟s dependence on imported natural 
gas is expected to increase from its current 50% reliance on imports, to more than 80% 
reliance on imports over the next 20 years.
11
  This has heightened the E.U.‟s sensitivity to 
issues surrounding security of supply.  Currently, the E.U. is reliant on the Russian Federation 
for more than a quarter of its imported gas. While the exact figures vary, Russia is expected to 
supply the E.U. with roughly 70% of its imported natural gas by 2020.
12
  These factors have 
placed issues surrounding access to natural gas at the heart of discussions surrounding E.U. 
energy security.  Given Russia‟s role as a crucial exporter and Ukraine‟s role as a major transit 
route, these two states are found at the heart of most discussions surrounding E.U. access to 
natural gas. 
Russia 
Russia holds roughly 26% of the world‟s proved natural gas reserves while holding a 
share of 21% of global production and 28% of the world‟s total exports.
13
 These statistics 
suggest that Russia is the most important gas exporting country in the world.  Furthermore, 
natural gas exports provide crucial budget revenues and cheap internal gas prices can serve as 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
9
Gawdat Bahgat, “Europe’s Energy Security: Challenges and Opportunities,” International Affairs, 82 no. 5 (2006), 3. 
10




Christain von Herschhausen, Berit Meinhart, Ferdinand Pavel, “Transporting Russian Gas to Western Europe,” Energy 
Journal, 26 no. 2, (April 2005), 52. 
13
Reports and Publications, “British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2007”  British Petroleum, 22. 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_rev
iew_2007/STAGING/local_assets/downloads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2007.pdf, Accessed on 
June 7 2008. 
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Natural gas exports from the Russian Federation are now controlled by the state 
controlled multinational corporation Gazprom, and decisions regarding export, transportation, 
and investment are essentially controlled by the government.
15
   
Though Russia‟s position as an important natural gas supplier is evident, the state also 
faces challenges regarding diminishing increases in production, and a lack of investment in 
the industry which is necessary to sustain production and exports at their current rates.  
Though Russia has increased its gas production since 2002, the rate of the increase has been 
low and is declining.
16
  The major production fields of Western Siberia (Yamburg, Urengoy, 
and Medvezhe) which provide much of the gas exported to the E.U., Ukraine, and Belarus are 
all in decline, and investment is required to slow this decline.  Investment is also required to 
start extraction from large fields on the Yamal Peninsula, which can take advantage of already 
existing pipeline infrastructure.
17
  This slowdown of production increases has meant that 
without imports and then re-exports of gas from third parties, Gazprom will be unable to meet 
its domestic and international contractual obligations. 
Russia sends roughly 60% of its total natural gas exports to states of the E.U.
18
, and 
given the constrains posed by the inflexibility and cost of pipelines required for export, there 
is little alternative short term demand for these supplies.  Couple this with the fact that E.U. 
                                                          
14
Filippos Proedrou, “The EU-Russia Energy Approach Under the Prism of Interdependence,” European Security, 16 no. 3, 
(Sept/Dec. 2007), 333. 
15
Ken Koyama, “The Energy Dimension in Russian Global Strategy,” The James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice 
University (October 2004), 13-14. 
16
Fiona Hill, Florence Fee, “Fuelling The Future: Prospects for Oil and Gas,” Demokratizatsya, 10 no. 4 (Fall 2002), 471. 
17Jonathan Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 6-10. 
18
Filippos Proedrou, “The EU-Russia Energy Approach Under the Prism of Interdependence,” European Security, 16 no. 3 
(Sept/Dec. 2007), 335. 
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states pay the highest prices for Russian gas exports and it becomes clear that Russia needs the 
E.U. market.
19
  Important to this study is the fact that more than 80% of Russian exported gas 
to Europe must traverse Ukrainian pipelines.  This makes E.U. supplies vulnerable to supply 
disruptions as a result of breakdowns in Russia‟s relationship with Ukraine, and makes an 
explanation of these breakdowns important for empirical reasons. 
Ukraine: a gas bridge to Europe 
Ukraine, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, has attempted to diversify its gas 
supplies to become less reliant on Russian production.  In the mid 2000's imports from Russia 
totalled between 20-25 bcm (billion cubic meters) per year, while 35-37 bcm were provided 
by Central Asian countries, primarily Turkmenistan, and 18-20 bcm were produced 
domestically.
20
  This diversification has not limited the role of Russia in gas exports to 
Ukraine as Russia‟s Gazprom controls all the export pipelines out of Central Asia leading to 
Ukraine; however, until recently the Ukrainian government has been able to negotiate bilateral 
arrangements regarding prices with Turkmenistan.  The trade between Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine, facilitated by Russia, has been characterized by the use of intermediary companies 
which buy Turkmen gas from Gazprom, use Gazprom pipelines to ship the product, then sell 
that gas to Ukraine.  These intermediaries, until recently, have been able to operate outside the 
direct control of Gazprom and the Russian government.  
Russia and the E.U. are reliant on Ukraine for transit of natural gas.  The Ukrainian gas 
transit system is majority controlled by Naftogaz, which is majority owned by the Ukrainian 
                                                          
19
Filippos Proedrou, “The EU-Russia Energy Approach Under the Prism of Interdependence,” European Security, 16 no. 3 
(Sept/Dec. 2007), 335. 
20
Simon, Pirani, “Ukraine’s Gas Sector,” Oxford Institute Of Energy Studies (June 2007), 28, 





  The Trans-Ukrainian pipeline network ranks among the world‟s largest and 
serves users inside and outside the E.U. including Romania, the Balkans, Turkey, Slovakia, 
Poland, and Hungary.
22
  Many of these states pass some of that gas onto users further west, 
predominantly Germany, France, and Italy.  In all, from 2000 to 2005, 37,800 km of pipelines 








Turkmenistan plays a substantial role in Russia‟s gas dealings with former Soviet 
states, Ukraine in particular.  Turkmenistan has the world‟s twelfth largest natural gas proved 
reserves, and had exports in 2007 of 58 bcm per year, making it the seventh largest gas 
                                                          
21Simon, Pirani, “Ukraine’s Gas Sector,” Oxford Institute Of Energy Studies (June 2007), 73, 





24 Offnews.info, “This is not all about Moscow, Germany has a stake as well,” 
http://www.offnews.info/verArticulo.php?contenidoID=2694, Accessed May 26 2009. 
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exporter in the world.
25
  While Russia depends on Ukraine for natural gas transit to Europe, 
Russia‟s role is reversed in the case of Turkmenistan, and it becomes the transit state 
controlling the only major
26
 export channels for Turkmen natural gas.  The Central-Asia-
Centre (CAC) pipeline system, built during the Soviet period, is the principal export route for 
Turkmen gas.  Though several alternative pipeline routes have been proposed, specifically the 
Trans-Afghan pipeline project and the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, the unstable future of 
the Afghan security situation, and the unsettled legal status of the Caspian Sea, have 
respectively stopped these alternative routes from materializing.  Turkmenistan‟s ability to 
supply enough gas to meet the needs of these pipelines and fulfil their agreements with the 
government of Russia is uncertain at best.  
Coordinating the Russian-Turkmen-Ukrainian natural gas trade has proven difficult 
during the post Soviet period.  The Russian government‟s desire to control Turkmen resources 
and use them to maximize the profitability of Russian gas exports to Europe has been 
apparent,
27
 as has been its desire to keep Turkmen export prices to Russia low.
28
  This has 
been a difficult hurdle for the Turkmen government to overcome as their only major recourse 
has been to cutoff supplies.  The use of intermediary companies rather than direct dealings 
with Gazprom has further complicated the issue concerning trade with Ukraine. 
Intermediaries in Russian Ukrainian Gas Trade 
As outlined above, Ukraine does not get all of its natural gas imports from Russia. 
Ukraine currently relies on imports from Turkmenistan to meet over half of its domestic 
                                                          
25
 CIA World Fact Bbook, “Turkmenistan,” CIA,  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2183rank.html, Accessed June 8 2008. 
26
 There is also a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Northern Iran which can transit roughly 10 bcm per year. 
27
 David Victor, Amy M. Jaffe, Mark H. Hayes, Natural Gas and Geopolitics From 1970 to 2040 ( New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 224. 
28





  This creates a transit problem as the only way to transit gas from 
Turkmenistan to Ukraine is through Gazprom controlled pipelines.
30
  The question of why an 
intermediary company is needed has been hotly debated as Gazprom alone seems capable of 
facilitating gas trade between Turkmenistan and Ukraine.  The rationale for the intermediary 
companies runs along two tracks.  The first track suggests that due to the heavily politicised 
nature of Gazprom, private intermediaries are better suited for debt collection and better able 
to enforce commercial rules and decisions without risking heightened political tensions.
31
  The 
second track suggests that the main goal of these intermediary companies is to create, capture, 
and distribute resource rents.
32
 These companies have come and gone but their ownership 
structures have always been opaque, and their deals in many cases are questionable from both 
economic and sometimes legal perspectives.
33
  For the purposes of the framework presented in 
the next chapter the economic and legal legitimacy of these company‟s actions is less 
important than the variation in the control Gazprom has had over them, and their involvement 
in the trade between Russia, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine. 
Corruption and The Russia-Ukraine Natural Gas Trade 
The corrupt nature of Russia‟s business climate poses many challenges for researchers.  
Where rent distribution is concerned since, as Wallderan suggests, corruption is a core feature 
                                                          
29
 Global Witness, “It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukrainian Gas Trade,” Global Witness Publishing: Washington 
DC. (April, 2006), 21, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/479/en/its_a_gas._funny_business_in_the_turkmen_ukraine_g, 






 Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Transimperialism and its Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, 30 no. 2 (Spring 2007), 
111. 
33
 Global Witness, “It’s a Gas: Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukrainian Gas Trade,” Global Witness Publishing: Washington 
DC. (April 2006), 32, 
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/479/en/its_a_gas._funny_business_in_the_turkmen_ukraine_g, 
Accessed May 8 2008. 
10 
 
of Russia‟s patrimonial system
34
 it can be difficult to track the flow of rents.  There is no 
accounting of under-the-table transactions, bribes paid, or profits illegally moved into foreign 
accounts.  Nonetheless, Russia has consistently ranked very low on Transparency 
International‟s Corruption Perception Index since 1996, frequently ranking amongst the most 
corrupt third of countries appearing in the survey.
35
  Other states of concern in this project fare 
little better on this index, with Ukraine also ranking in the bottom third of the list from 1998 to 
present, and Turkmenistan, which only appeared on the list in 2005, ranking consistently 
lower than Russia or Ukraine.
36
  Further, the intermediary companies discussed above are 
generally shrouded in secrecy.  These intermediary companies play an important role in the 
Russia-Turkmenistan-Ukraine natural gas trade, and while some information is available 
about their ownership, it is generally difficult to discern who controls these companies, and 
who benefits from their activities.  If these companies‟ purpose is to capture rents, as many 
leading corruption experts suggest
37
, not knowing who controls the companies can be 
problematic. 
 With this said, the goal of this project is not to untangle the web of corruption that 
almost certainly ensnares the Russian natural gas industry; rather, it focuses on illustrating as 
well as possible the patterns of rent capture and distribution, and the role this pattern played in 
natural gas price hikes for Ukraine, given the information available.  Where issues of 
privatization (1995-1999) are concerned, more information has been made available over 
time, which allows some of the corrupt dealings that took place during privatization to be 
                                                          
34
Celeste A. Wallander, “Russian Transimperialism and its Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, 30 no. 2 (Spring 2007), 
116. 
35 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 1996-2008, 








highlighted.  Moving into the new century, much less information is available about the 
clandestine destination of resource rents under the Putin administration.  This being the case, 
rather than speculating on the corrupt dealings of natural gas industry officials this paper 
focuses on overt indications of natural resource rent capture and distribution by the Russian 
state during the period 2000 to 2009.  This is not ideal, as surely some information 
surrounding corruption in Russia‟s natural resource sectors could shed additional light on the 
issue at hand; however, in order to avoid too much speculation this project not cepts 
corruption in the capture and distribution of natural resource rents, but does not seek to detail 
or explain it in relying instead on aspects of government spending.  This government spending 
could in some cases be classified as corrupt in nature but not in all cases. 
The Deterioration of Ukrainian-Russian Relations in the Period Prior Up to the Price 
Increase 
The natural gas price increases that are the focus of inquiry of this research project are 
often attributed to the shift in Ukrainian foreign policy expected and perceived after Viktor 
Yushchenko came to power on the heels of what has become known as the Orange 
Revolution.  The presidential elections that took place in Ukraine in late 2004 pitted a Kremlin 
favourite, Viktor Yanukovych, against the western-backed opposition candidate Yushchenko.  
After the second round of the election it appeared initially that Yanukovych had been 
victorious by a slim margin, and he was declared the winner by the Ukrainian Central 
Electoral Commission.  Yushchenko‟s supporters, claiming that rampant election fraud 
brought Yanukovych to power, took peacefully to the streets demanding that the result be 
voided, and that another election round should take place.
38
  After votes in the Ukrainian 
                                                          
38 BBC News, “Timeline: Battle for Ukraine,” January 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4061253.stm, Accessed 
April 4 2009. 
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parliament nullified the second round of voting, and paved the way for a third round, protests 
were scaled down and a new round of election campaigning began.  In the third round of 
voting on December 26, Yushchenko garnered close to 52% of the votes and on January 11 
2005 he was declared the winner by the Ukrainian Electoral Commission.
39
  
 Since Putin strongly supported Yanukovych, even in the face of Ukrainian and western 
condemnation of the apparent election fraud that brought him victory in the second round of 
the election, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Orange Revolution marked a low point 
in Russian-Ukrainian relations.  Combine this with the fact that Yushchenko openly 
championed closer ties with European states and the United States, while Yanukovych was 
certainly perceived to be pro Russia in his foreign policy approach, and it is impossible to 
deny that the Kremlin came up with the short end of the stick after the dust settled.  Further, 
Yushchenko‟s election victory certainly marked a European and Western oriented foreign 
policy shift for Ukraine. 
 Since the initial demand for an increase in the price of natural gas exported from and 
through Russia to Ukraine came less than a year after this deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian 
relations, the Orange Revolution probably played some role in the Russian government‟s 
decision to raise prices.  Even under the pro-Kremlin president Leonid Kuchma, however, 
Ukrainian officials openly announced their desire to join NATO in 2002
40
, and talks took 
place with the European Union regarding Ukrainian membership as early as 1999.
41
 Thus 
                                                          
39
BBC News, “Timeline: Battle for Ukraine,” January 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4061253.stm, Accessed 
April 4 2009. 
40
Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Elke Krahmann, Mark Webber, Jolyon Howorth, “One in All in? NATO’s Next Enlargement,” 
International Affairs, 78 no. 4, (Oct., 2002), 713. 




Yushchenko‟s intentions to join these institutions do not represent a clear break from the 
policies of his supposedly pro-Kremlin predecessor.  Further, Ukraine was a member of the 
United States dominated „coalition of the willing,‟ which took on the task of invading Iraq and 
removing Sadam Hussein from power in 2003.  Ukraine sent more than 1,600 troops to the 
region, in the face of the Russian government‟s opposition to the operation.  These actions 
represent a certain pro-Western orientation on the part of President Kuchma, and raises 
questions about the degree to which Yushchenko‟s election would alter Ukraine‟s basic 
foreign policy course.   
The moderately pro-Western foreign policy orientation of Yushchenko‟s predecessor, 
when considered in conjunction with gas price increases for states apparently still loyal to the 
Kremlin (Belarus), bring in to question the role that the Orange Revolution played in the 
Russian government‟s decision to increase natural gas export prices to Ukraine.  For these 
reason the foreign policy orientation of Ukraine will not be considered in the following 
explanation.  This will allow for other factors to come to light which surely had a bearing on 
the decision of the Russian government, illustrating that even in the absence of the Orange 
Revolution, and a more Western oriented foreign policy, prices increases for Ukraine would 
almost surely have been introduced. 
The 2006 Russia-Ukraine Gas Dispute: a Challenge for International Relations Theory 
A cursory inquiry into what brought about the 2006 cutoff would likely yield an 
explanation that suggests the price increase was the Russian government‟s punishment for a 
drift in Ukrainian foreign policy toward institutions such as NATO and the E.U., and away 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/99/944&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en, Accessed April 3 2009. 
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from Russia, especially after the so-called Orange Revolution of 2004-2005. This explanation 
is favoured foremost by the media.     While this explanation is simple and popular, it fails to 
capture other noteworthy trends in Russian politics and foreign policy that also contributed to 
this event.  These trends include Russia‟s historically patrimonial society, the increased rent 
generating potential of natural gas extraction and export, changes in the personnel managing 
the Russia‟s natural gas industry, the Russian government‟s increasing control over the natural 
gas industry, and the increasing importance of Turkmen gas exports in the regional natural gas 
mix.  These factors conveniently represent the three levels of analysis generally considered to 
be important in international relations theory: the individual, the state, and the system.  Some 
of these issues are touched on in the academic literature discussing the nature of Russia‟s 
foreign policy and political economy.  Many of these works touch on the 2006 cutoff, but the 
analysis is generally fleeting, and multi-level analysis is rare.  The challenging part of 
providing an explanation for the cutoff is bringing these multiple levels of analysis together in 
a coherent fashion. 
For international relations theorists the question of which level of analysis to study, 
and when, has been a lingering one.  Though there have been calls for greater attention to 
theory synthesis
42
 and some attempts at unifying the individual, state, and system levels of 
analysis into theories and frameworks,
43
 these attempts have been limited, and have not been 
applied to the 2006 Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis.  While this paper deals with the price 
increase due to its empirical importance, it also attempts to build a framework that takes all of 
these levels of analysis into account when explaining the Russian government‟s decision to 
                                                          
42
 Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,” International Organization, 42 no. 3 
(Summer 1988), 427-460. 
43
 Gideon Rose, “Neo-Classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy,” World Politics 51 no. 1 (October 1998), 144-172. 
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raise natural gas export prices to Ukraine in 2006.  In this pursuit, the mechanisms which 
bring together macro level events such as increasing global energy prices and changes in the 
Russian state‟s capabilities will be investigated, while the actions of individuals will be 
explored using the logic of methodological individualism. 
The Virtues and Challenges of Methodological Individualism 
Before moving forward the meaning of the word mechanism in the context of this 
study should be clarified.  A mechanisms based approach assumes that a correlation between 
events and variables is insufficient to fully explain an event.   Put another way, if there is a 
non random relationship is observed between A and B, there must also be a mechanism M 
which brings about the relationship, and this is of great significance in the social sciences.
44
  
Essentially, to provide as detailed and accurate an explanation as possible of one event 
bringing about another it is important to specify the “social cogs and wheels that have brought 
the relationship into existence.”
45
 
 How methodological individualism relates to this paper‟s overall argument will be 
dealt with more in the next chapter; for now the concept itself will be explored.  The 
application of this approach to political science was laid out by Headstrom and Swedburg in a 
1996 article entitled “Social Mechanisms.”
46
 According to Headsrom and Swedburg, 
“methodological individualism is motivated by the core idea . . .[that]. . .  understanding is 
obtained or enhanced by making explicit the underlying generative mechanisms that link one 
state or event to another . . .”
47
   At its core the principle of methodological individualism 
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assumes that individuals are the causal agents in the social sciences.
48
  This makes 
identification of individual‟s intentions, beliefs and preferences, along with the causes and 
consequences of their action, essential to any attempt at a mechanism based explanation.
49
  
For this approach to be successful, well reasoned assumptions regarding the preferences and 
intentions of individuals that cannot be observed, other than through their effects, must be 
made.
50
  This can certainly be a difficult process as it is impossible to climb inside the 
thoughts and feelings of an individual and determine the exact cause of his/her actions.  In this 




 Headsrom and Swedburg, go on to offer a more illustrative conception of social 
mechanisms and the use of methodological individualism which highlights three specific types 
of mechanisms.  First is the “situational mechanism” which links a social structure to the 
beliefs, desires, and opportunities of individuals (condition → belief).  This covers the 
transition from the macro level event to its manifestation at the micro or individual level.  The 
second mechanism, the “individual action mechanism,” shows how individuals‟ desires, 
beliefs, and opportunities generate specific actions (belief → action).  This mechanism covers 
why individuals act the way they do.  The third mechanism is the “transformational 
mechanism” which shows how the actions of individuals come together and transform into 
collective outcomes (action → outcome).  This covers the transition from the actions of 
individuals (micro level) to collective macro outcomes.
52
  This approach‟s relationship to the 
question at hand will be further identified in the next chapter.  For now, however, it can be 
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seen that this approach offers a way to bring together the different levels of analysis generally 
used in international relations theory. 
 The mechanisms outlined above are not themselves variables.  The mechanisms 
represent the relationships between variables and in some ways are reliant on the same 
variables, but they do not vary as the variables do in this explanation.  The variances in the 
variables, especially condition, are what influence the outcomes these mechanisms, which 
retain their initial character throughout, produce, and are what bring about changes in beliefs, 
actions, and outcomes. 
This paper will provide a mechanism based explanation for the Russian government‟s 
price increases.  The thrust of the argument is that the macro level event, the Russian 
government‟s decision to increase the price for which it exports natural gas to Ukraine, is 
determined by a number of other macro level phenomena.  These phenomena include: the 
patrimonial authoritarian nature of Russia‟s political structure; a change in the object of rent 
seeking and distribution in this patrimonial situation; increased state control over the natural 
gas industry; and the increasing regional importance of Turkmen gas.  It is further argued that 
devoting greater attention to the causes and consequences of human action and reaction is the 
best approach to take to explain these macro level phenomena and how they influenced the 
Russian government‟s decision to raise prices.  The remainder of this chapter will discuss the 
key variances in the condition of Russia‟s political and economic organization, the patrimonial 
nature of Russian society and the nature of rents in the Russian context.  These variances can 
be highlighted as the two major changes which are keys to the explanation of the Russian 
government‟s price increases for natural gas exports to Ukraine.  
18 
 
Patrimonialism and Rents in Russia 
 Patrimonialism simply defined is a political system based on the capture of rents by a 
patron to be distributed to clients in return for political support.
53
  The history of 
patrimonialism in Russia has been discussed by a number of authors.  Hedlund suggests that 
the lasting outcome of post-Soviet economic reform in Russia has been a “return to traditional 
Muscovite games of neglasnost and vicious in-fighting over seats close to the tsar, coupled 
with remuneration for „service‟ that takes place via a host of informal clandestine channels.”
54
  
The result is a political system in which linkages are vertical and rewards for political support 
are best ensured through close links to domestic elites, most prominently the President.  
Wallander suggests that Russia‟s current domestic political configuration rests on the creation 
and distribution of rents in return for political support.  Under this system “the patron remains 
in power by rewarding clients, and the clients are rewarded by supporting their patron.  The 
patron requires support from his clients, and he must access and distribute rents for that 
support.”
55
  While these are characterizations of the state of Russian patrimonialism after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union other authors, most prominently Richard Pipes, have 
highlighted the patrimonial nature of the Soviet and pre-Soviet systems of rule.
56
  Though 
patrimonial rule is characteristic of Russian politics and appears to have changed very little 
since the Soviet collapse, the source of rents has varied since Russian independence, as has the 
authoritarian nature of the ruling regime.  It is this variance in the source of rents, and the role 
the state plays in capturing and distributing them, that are of great consequence to this project. 
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Rents in the Russian Context 
 There are many definitions of rents.  For this project two simple definitions of rents are 
used.  Where natural resources (specifically natural gas) are concerned one definition comes 
from the Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes article “Resource Rents and the Russian Economy 
(2005).”
57
 Gaddy and Ickes take rents to equal revenue received from sales minus the cost of 
production (assuming that production is efficient, there is free market entry, and taking into 
account a “normal” return on investment including labour).
58
 Taking into account the lack of 
free entry into the market and chronic inefficiency in the Russian natural gas industry the rents 
generated are likely greater than this definition allows for.  These two authors suggest that 
rents generated by the extraction and sale of natural resources can be distributed over five 
categories.  These categories consist of excess cost of production, price subsidies, formal tax, 
informal tax, and after tax profit.
59
   
Rents can also be distributed in the form of property and such distributions took place 
throughout the 1990‟s.  In a March 2000 working paper produced for the World Bank, Ethan 
Kapstein and Branko Milanovic illustrate a formula whereby rents are equal to the market 
price of an asset minus what it is actually sold for.
60
  They further highlight the balancing act 
that Yeltsin played in the 1990‟s, essentially distributing property and tax concessions to 
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business elites in return for electoral support, while decreasing transfers to pensioners and 
government employees.
61
   
While obviously different in form, these two definitions illustrate the key characteristic 
feature of rents; profits above and beyond what could be attained under a perfect market 
situation.  Macro level events such as increased demand for natural resources or revolution 
can influence the form in which rents are available, which will in turn alter the actions of rent 
seekers and distributers.   For the President to capture rents it is imperative that the state 
control the segment of the economy in which those rents are generated. 
The Way Forward 
 This chapter has introduced the question of why the Russian government drastically 
increased natural gas export prices to Ukraine at the beginning of 2006.  Through discussion 
of the nature of the European and Eurasian natural gas markets, with specific reference to 
Russia, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and the E.U., the context in which the Russian government‟s 
decision took place has also been presented.  Furthermore, corruption in the Russian natural 
gas industry and the deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations prior to the gas crisis, have 
been briefly discussed. The answer this study proposes has been touched on, along with a brief 
discussion of the mechanisms based approach and the logic of methodological individualism, 
that will be employed in this project.  The next chapter will deal more thoroughly with the 
answer to this question, specifically referring to its theoretical background, the role 
mechanisms play in the explanation, the assumptions it rests on, and the method for testing the 
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framework.  The third chapter will survey the existing academic literature that has offered 
explanations for this development.  The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters will explore the 
explanation provided in Chapter Two with reference to three time periods: 1995-1999, 2000-
2004, and 2005-2008.  The final chapter will consider some of the implications of this study‟s 
findings for international relations theory, and for the Russian natural gas industry and its 



















Framework and Methodology 
This chapter will begin by outlining the assumptions and theoretical background that 
underpin the brief explanation of price increases presented in the first chapter.  The focus will 
then shift to the situational, individual action, and transformational mechanisms, as well as the 
factors influencing these mechanisms, specifically with respect to natural gas export prices 
charged to Ukraine.  Further, this chapter will touch on other ideas in international relations 
theory literature which are illustrative of each of the outcomes the mechanisms mentioned in 
Chapter One produce. Finally, the case study methodology which will be used to test the 
theory will be justified, and the evidence being used will be discussed. 
Identifying Mechanisms  
 According to Headstrom and Swedberg, a mechanism based explanation must meet 
three criteria.  First, it must be based on the principle of direct causality.  This principle 
essentially strives to detail the relationship among phenomena in the best as possible fashion.  
Second, it must be based on the principle of limited scope.  This is the idea that the social 
sciences should not try to establish universal laws but rather seek explanations aimed at 
explaining a limited range of phenomena.  Third and finally, it must be based on the principle 
of methodological individualism.  This principle essentially holds that it is individuals and not 
macro level variables that play the role of actors in the social sciences, and it is the actions of 
individuals which bring about macro level phenomena.  The three mechanism discussed in the 
23 
 
first chapter is a corollary to this last principle and maps the way forward for this 
explanation.
62
   
 While the principle of direct causality is somewhat loosely defined by Headsrom and 
Swedberg, an attempt at opening the “black box” is surely exemplified in this project‟s 
approach.  While the chain of macro level events identified as important  to this project 
correlate well with the Russian government‟s export price increases, assumptions regarding 
the rent seeking tendencies of individuals provide deeper insights beyond macro level black 
box variables.  This is more like shrinking the black box than opening it, as it is still necessary 
to make assumptions regarding individual preferences.  Further, while an explanation of the 
change in The Russian government‟s natural gas pricing for Ukraine in 2006 requires an 
explanation that more generally covers Russian natural gas export pricing to Ukraine over 
time, not simply in 2006, the scope of the overall project is still rather limited.  Finally this 
project looks at individuals as causal agents, and attempts to explain macro level phenomena 
through the study of individual action, the essence of methodological individualism. 
Situational Mechanism and Conditions 
 As discussed earlier the situational mechanism links social structure to the beliefs, 
desires, and opportunities of individuals.  Wallander lays out the essential structure of Russian 
society quite succinctly, suggesting: 
The political system is based on the political control of economic resources in order to 
enrich those within patron-client clans. The patron remains in power by rewarding 
clients, and the clients are rewarded by supporting their patron. The patron requires 
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support from his clients, and he must access and distribute rents for that support. . . Each 
of these individuals‟ clients in turn has his own set of clients, who are in turn patrons of 
their own clans, and so on, creating a complex web of relationships that sustain political 
power and distribute patronage rents.
63
 
The changes in the conditions guiding individual actors in Russia are the main cause of the 
initial decrease and eventual increase in the cost of natural gas exported from Russia to 
Ukraine.  The patrimonial nature of Russian society varied between 1995 and 2008 in four 
ways.  First, the source of rents changed from property to rents generated by the extraction 
and sale of energy resources.  Second, from 2000 onward Russia‟s ruling regime became more 
authoritarian.  Third, the state‟s ability to control the natural gas industry decreased from 1995 
to 1999, while it increased from 2000 to 2008.  Fourth, Turkmen natural gas grew in 
importance and competition for access to this gas increased from 2005 to 2008.  It is these 
variations that caused outcomes in the Russian natural gas industry which affected the Russian 
government‟s natural gas export prices to Ukraine.  Attention to the individual action 
mechanism will illustrate why, but first the changes in the conditions influencing the 
situational mechanism mentioned above should be given further attention. 
Global Oil Prices, Russian Natural Gas, and Rents 
While there is no “global market price” for natural gas, Russia and other states often 
price their natural gas exports in reference to world oil prices.  Different producers index their 
gas prices in reference to a variety of fuel baskets; what is important for our purposes here is 
simply the fact that a decline in oil or alternative fuel prices will usually bring about a decline 
in the price of natural gas over the medium term.  The late 1990‟s saw oil prices decrease 
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substantially, bottoming out in 1999 due to depressed demand likely stemming from the 
economic crisis across Asia and the former Soviet Union.  1999 saw increases, but barely 
enough to bring prices back to pre-1995 levels.  Russian natural gas pricing at the German 
border followed a similar pattern.  A comparison of the pricing history of the two 
commodities over time will illustrate the point. 
Russian Natural Gas Prices at German Border 1994-2008 (figure 2.1)
64
 
World Oil Prices 1994-2008 (figure 2.2)65
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It can be seen quite clearly by comparing figures 2.1 and 2.2 that Russia‟s natural gas prices 
for Europe follow the same general trend as world oil prices.  This is important as it illustrates 
the low value of natural gas in the late 1990‟s.  Oil prices were down so there was little 
upward pressure on natural gas prices.   
With lower prices there are obviously fewer rents to capture.  Conversely, when prices 
are high natural gas can generate more rents.  Thus an external systemic force causes variance 
in the situational mechanism.  When prices are low there are fewer rents to distribute, and in a 
patrimonial society this means that other rents must be found.  During the 1990‟s, when 
natural gas prices were low, Yeltsin distributed rents in the form of property, as state property 
was plentiful and there was internal and external support for privatization.  When Putin came 
to power at the turn of the century, oil and natural gas prices rebounded and their rent 
generating possibilities increased.  Putin in turn sought to capture and distribute these rents. 
Three further changes in the situational mechanism are important to this project‟s 
argument.  First, the authoritarian nature of Russia‟s ruling regime varied somewhat between 
Yeltsin‟s term as president and Putin‟s term.  While Yeltsin‟s power was constrained 
somewhat by influential business elites, independent regional leaders, and a relatively 
powerful parliament, upon his accent to President Putin was able to marginalize these groups 
and secure a more vertical power structure with increased power for the President. 
Second, from 1995 to 1999, since individuals were seeking and distributing rents in the 
form of property, the Russian state lost control over some of the natural gas industry and the 
markets which it served.  With increasing energy prices at the turn of the century this trend 
was reversed and those controlling the state successfully sought to increase the state‟s control 
over the natural gas industry.  This is not only a change in the conditions influencing the 




situational mechanism, but also a result of the individual action mechanism and the 
transformational mechanism, given the increased rent generating potential of natural gas. 
Third, another systemic force closely, but not wholly, linked to increasing global 
energy prices altered the situational mechanism.  This was the increasing regional importance 
of Turkmen natural gas after 2004.  Although, as the case studies that follow will show, the 
importance of Turkmen gas grew throughout the early 2000‟s, competition for access to this 
gas increased later in the decade.  When combined with other changes to the situational 
mechanism discussed above, this factor becomes very important in explaining the Russian 
government‟s natural gas price increases for Ukraine. 
Individual Action Mechanism: Beliefs and Actions 
 Before the discussion of individual action continues it is important to note that the 
individuals being discussed, and not just the individuals‟ actions, varied over time.  At the turn 
of the century Vladimir Putin replaced Boris Yeltsin as president of the Russian federation, 
and the individuals who controlled Gazprom during Yeltsin‟s rule were replaced.  This is of 
great consequence as one might expect individuals to act differently, especially in a 
patrimonial society, when the person that appoints them is different and has different goals.  It 
might be more telling of the impact of the changes to the situational mechanism if the 
individuals doing the acting did not vary over time; however, that is not what took place, and 
thus this paper must proceed taking this into account.   
Although the individuals do vary, their actions are similar in two ways.  First, both 
appear to seek rents based on what is most available and lucrative.  There were ample rents for 
the president to distribute in the form of property during the 1990‟s, and the gas industry 
officials at the time sought these rents during privatization, and distributed them further to 
28 
 
their own clients.  During Putin‟s rule, privatization was put on hold and natural resources 
began to generate greater rents due to higher prices and greater demand.  Putin and those he 
appointed to control the natural gas industry, specifically Gazprom officials, acted to 
maximize the state‟s share of those rents.   
Second, appointees appear to have supported the President, their patron.  Yeltsin was 
able to purchase electoral support in 1996 by distributing property to Russia‟s business elites 
in return for political support, and privatization was only made possible through concessions 
to powerful Soviet managers who had connections to the State Duma.  Putin made little secret 
of his belief that the state should play a major role in Russia‟s natural resources industry, and 
his appointees to Gazprom supported and pursued this goal.  Further, at the request of the 
President, they stayed removed from opposition politics.  These two patterns remain fairly 
constant over time and appear to be consistent with respect to different individuals, though 
Yeltsin and his appointees were seeking and distributing different rents than Putin and his 
team.  The variation in the object of rent seeking and distribution brought about a variation in 
Russian policy outcomes.  
Rational Choice Institutionalism 
 The individual action mechanism shows how individuals‟ beliefs, desires, and 
opportunities bring about specific actions.
66
 Given the difficulty of determining the beliefs and 
desires that form the preferences of individuals, the individual action mechanism requires 
assumptions to be made about those preferences. This project‟s explanation rests on 
assumptions about individuals first and foremost.  In the vein of rational Choice 
institutionalism it is assumed that individuals have a given set of preferences.  Further, it is 
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assumed that individuals act to maximise these preferences.  Two more assumptions are 
borrowed from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism regarding the structure of the 
political system.  First, political decision making is assumed to consist of a series of collective 
action dilemmas.  It should be said that even in Putin‟s Russia it takes one to speak and one to 
listen.  Second, institutional rules play an important part in political outcomes.
67
  Though 
inherently corrupt, a patrimonial system has a structure and therefore rules.   
The patrimonial structure described in the situational mechanism section is not an 
institution in the formal sense; rather, it is a system of associations among individuals 
governed by loose rules.  These rules in turn will influence the actions of individuals.  
Interestingly, Wallander‟s conceptualization of patrimonial authoritarianism offers some clues 
concerning the nature of individual preferences in this type of system.  This will be the subject 
of discussion below. 
Preferences  
 While individual preferences are obviously difficult to enumerate, in a patrimonial 
system it could be assumed that rent maximization is a key preferences for both patrons and 
clients.  The drive for rent maximization will, in turn, cause patrons to seek state control over 
rent generating activities, and clients to seek to maximise their share of the rents being 
distributed from the top by supporting their patron.  So at least three main preferences for 
individuals can be highlighted based on the patrimonial nature of Russian society: 1) patrons 
and clients will both seek to maximize the rents they control; 2) patrons will seek to maximize 
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rents through increasing state control over rent generating sectors of the economy; and 3) 
clients will seek to maximize their rents by supporting their patron.   
Transformational Mechanism: Actions and Outcomes 
 The transformational mechanism is evident when a number of individuals act and 
interact with one another, and it shows how individual action produces collective outcomes.
68
 
The transformational mechanism identified in this project consists of the collective actions of 
rent seekers.  The actions of individuals, conditioned by their preferences for rent seeking, 
result in transformations at the macro level.  When the situational mechanism is defined by 
patrimonialism through the distribution of property, and a less authoritarian system, this 
should lead to weakened state control over the natural gas industry, and when Turkmen gas is 
less important regionally the outcome should be lower prices for Ukrainian natural gas 
imports from Russia.  When the situational mechanism is defined by patrimonialism through 
the distribution of resource rents and a more authoritarian system the results should be 
increased state control over the natural gas industry.  When combined with the increased 
regional importance of Turkmen gas the outcome is eventually an increase in the Russian 
government‟s export price for natural gas to Ukraine.   
Summary of Mechanisms 
 The way forward for examining the Russian government‟s decision to increase the 
price for natural gas it exports to Ukraine is now clear.  The questions that must be asked are: 
1) what is the nature of the situational mechanism over time?; 2) How did individuals act 
based on the situational mechanism, assuming, as one might in a patrimonial society, a 
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preference for rent seeking?; 3) What impact did the collective action of individuals have on 
Ukraine‟s natural gas prices? 
 
Methodological Individualism and International Relations Theory 
 This project attempts to provide the answer to an empirical question, but as stated from 
the outset, it also hopes to show how methodological individualism can bring together the 
levels of analysis most prevalent in international relations theory and the study of foreign 
policy.  This section will deal with theories in international relations that address the issues at 
the heart of the mechanisms identified above.  
Levels of Analysis and The Three Images – Approaches in International Relations Theory 
The father of Neo-Realism, Kenneth Waltz, best described the level of analysis 
question in international relations in his renowned work Man, The State and War through the 
use of three images.  It is useful to start by situating the problem being studied in relation to 
these images.  The three images include: 1) human behaviour (first image); 2) internal 
structure of states (second image); 3) the structure of the system (third image).
69
  The first 
image interprets the causes of action in the area of foreign policy as derived from human 
behavior.
70
  The second image looks for causes of action in foreign policy as products of state 
organization.
71
  The third image looks to the international state system and power distribution 
amongst actors in the system for explanations of outcomes in international relations. The 
question the third image approach seeks to answer is not why states adopt certain foreign 
policies, but why the outcomes of state-to-state interactions take the form that they do.
72
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Waltz, when attempting to build a theory of international politics in the third image, 
suggests that “a theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a 
different level of generality.”
73
  A mechanisms based approach using the logic of 
methodological individualism brings this claims truth into question, and for the purpose of a 
richer explanation this project‟s explanation looks to Putnam who suggests “it is fruitless to 
debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations or the reverse.  The 
answer to that question is clearly „both, sometimes.‟”
74
  Milner argues that “domestic politics 
and international relations are inextricably interrelated.”
75
  In this light the explanation 
provided here focuses on not only the external system which colours Russian foreign policy 
formulation and execution, but also the integration of the first and second images of the 
individual and the state respectively.  This project is about explaining a Russian foreign policy 




In international relations theory the idea that state organization affects a state‟s foreign 
policy is exemplified by the work of Katzenstien.  He suggests that the purpose of a state‟s 
foreign economic policy is to “establish basic compatibility between domestic and external 
policy objectives.”
76
  He also contends that “ruling coalitions” made up of dominant social 
classes and political power brokers “find their institutional expression in the party system and 
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in a variety of institutions a step removed from electoral politics.”
77
  These ideas suggest that 
as the nature of Russia‟s domestic politics and political economy change so should its foreign 
economic policies.  This informs this project‟s view that change in the situational mechanism 
will change outcomes in Russian foreign policy making. 
 
Individuals in International Relations 
 Classical Realism as put discussed by Morgenthau in his work Politics Among 
Nations, has been among the most influential first image interpretations of international 
relations.  Simply, but powerfully, the main thrust of Morgenthau‟s argument is that 
individuals seek power, and this is exemplified by his first principle of political realism, which 
states that “political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature.”
78
 
In a similar vein, according to Allison foreign policies are determined by who is 
making the decisions, what each decision maker‟s  stand is on a specific issue, each decider‟s 
relative influence, and how the bargaining game combines decision makers, their stands, and 
influence in order to bring about government decisions and actions.
79
  For the purposes of this 
project, Allison‟s ideas are important as they highlight the effect changes in individual 
decision makers can have on policy outcomes.  The main thrust of Allison‟s “Bureaucratic 
Politics” model was that as individuals come together to form policy, differing stands, relative 
influence, and the rules of the game tend to bring about unintended results for all parties.  This 
is not the outcome in this framework.  While Allison focused on the “pulling and hauling” of 
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individuals in the decision making process which bring about resultants, there is very little 
pulling and hauling in the case of Russian gas policy formation in 2005.   
After the removal of Yeltsin-era officials under Putin and their replacement with 
Putin‟s clients, policy outcomes tended to be dictated in a top down manner from the president 
to the presidentially appointed bureaucrats that implement the policies.  Allison‟s treatment of 
individuals in foreign policy formulation is important to this explanation as it emphasizes that 
different individuals may act differently in similar situations.  As the case studies below will 
illustrate this is not, however, characteristic of the situations described in this project. 
State Capabilities and Foreign Policy 
 Katzenstein, like the Neoclassical Realists, views “state power” as a key variable in 
explaining foreign policy strategies.
80
  State power is reflected in domestic structures (as 
discussed above), and the instruments at the disposal of a government to deal with a specific 
problem affect the chosen solution.  Recently, the idea that the strength of a country‟s state 
and its relationship to society bear on foreign policy outcomes has been put forward by 
Zakaria.
81
  Zakaria suggests that foreign policy is made by the nation‟s government, not a 
nation itself, and it is therefore important to study state power rather than simply national 
power.  State power is the portion of national power that the government can extract for its 
purposes, and “reflects the ease with which central decision makers can achieve their ends.”
82
 
In the context of this study, the state power variable is very important.  As will be seen 
in Chapters Five and Six, after the election of Vladimir Putin and the appointment of his 
loyalists to top positions within the Russian gas industry, the role of the state in natural gas 
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exports increased and so did the policy instruments and capabilities at the government‟s 
disposal in the area of natural gas exporting.  With increased capabilities it could be assumed 
that price setting for exports to Ukraine would become easier. 
Shifting Relative Power 
The idea of power has a long tradition in the field of international relations theory.  
Realists of every generation have used power as an organizing principle for explanations of 
international political actions and interactions.  It must be said that while individual and state 
power are percieved in many ways by many scholars, relative power for Waltz, for 
Neoclassical Realists, and for this framework is conceived of as the material capabilities of a 
state relative to other states.
83
  When considering natural resource power, in this case natural 
gas, this pertains to variances in prices along with volumes produced and exported relative to 
other states and relative to the demand from importers.  The shift in relative power discussed 
here will be illustrated in the following chapters.  At this point it is important to note first that 
natural gas prices, tied to global oil prices, varied substantially between 1995 and 2008, and 
that demand Europe and Eurasia has increased throughout the past decade while Russia‟s 
share of supply has gone down.  Further, some of Russia‟s share of supply has been captured 
by certain states of Central Asia, particularly Turkmenistan.  This constitutes a shift in the 
structure of the European-Eurasian natural gas trade, and affects Russia‟s relative power in the 
regional natural gas market. 
The Framework Summarized  
Before moving on, it is now worth presenting a summary of this explanation‟s 
theoretical background.  This paper argues that there are three primary mechanisms which 
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drive price increases as well as decreases in Russia‟s natural gas export prices to Ukraine.  
These are the situational mechanism, the individual action mechanism, and the 
transformational mechanism.  It is further argued that while individuals‟ rent seeking 
preference, encompassed in the individual action mechanism, remains unchanged, changes in 
the situational mechanism, specifically a move from patrimonialism based on rents gained 
through cheap property to patrimonialism based on natural resource rents, and the increasingly 
authoritarian nature of Russia‟s ruling regime will provoke different reactions from individual 
rent seekers.  This will also alter the transformational mechanism, leading to more state-
centric outcomes.  This will have an effect on state control of the natural gas industry.  When 
combined with the increasing importance of and competition for Turkmen gas, the collective 
action of Russian rent seekers (specifically in the natural gas industry) led to Gazprom‟s 
purchase of most of Turkmenistan‟s exportable natural gas, and price increases for Ukraine.  
The key differences between the period of low prices and the period of high prices, are 
essentially the authoritarian nature of Russia‟s political regime, the source of rents in Russia‟s 
patrimonial society, the extent of state control over the natural gas industry, and the 
importance of Turkmen natural gas production and exports. 
Case Studies and Evidence 
A mechanisms based approach to Russian natural gas pricing policy formation is 
necessary to provide an explanation that links together important events at the individual, 
state, and system levels of analysis prior to and following the 2006 price increase.  Events are 
clearly taking place at all of these levels of analysis which affected the Russian government‟s 
decision to raise prices in 2006, and a full explanation requires that they all be addressed. 
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By engaging in thorough examination of the Russian natural gas industry between 
1995 and 2008, the situational, individual action, and transformational mechanisms discussed 
above can be illustrated and it can be shown that a variation in the situational mechanism can 
be specifically linked to the Russian government‟s decision to raise natural gas prices for 
Ukraine. 
 This project will proceed using a case study methodology.  Given the limited scope of 
the question being answered and the mechanisms based approach outlined earlier, this is the 
best way to move forward.  An examination of Russian politics from 1995-1999 will illustrate 
the relatively less authoritarian nature of the Russian regime and the prevalence of rent 
distribution in the form of cheap property.  This discussion will rely on several studies of the 
privatization process that took place under Yeltsin.  These studies include David E. Hoffman‟s 
The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia,
84
 Chrystia Freeland‟s Sale of the 
Century: Russia‟s Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism,
85
 and Boris Kagarlitsky‟s 
Russia Under Yeltsin and Putin.
86
  Evidence will also be drawn from news sources and a 
number of academic articles.  Further, the limited value of natural gas over this period will be 
demonstrated through references to global oil prices and Russian natural gas prices acquired 
from the Index Mundi commodity price data base.
87
   
 The transformational mechanism will be illustrated by an examination of the effects 
that property distribution had on the state‟s control over the natural gas industry.  Evidence of 
this is provided from news articles detailing the privatization of Gazprom, details from the 
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 information gleaned from the aforementioned studies of Russia‟s 




 The role that Turkmen gas plays in the regional natural gas trade will be illustrated by 
means of an examination of British Petroleum historical data on natural gas production and 
consumption.
90
  Further, the role Turkmen gas played in the Ukrainian natural gas mix will be 
gleaned from news articles published at the time detailing negotiations between the two states.  
The reaction of individual rent seekers to the limited importance of Turkmen gas can be 
gleaned from a number of news sources reporting on natural gas deals signed between Russia, 
Ukraine, and Turkmenistan.  Finally, the transformational mechanism can be further shown 
through an examination of Russia‟s natural gas prices for Ukraine.  The price which the 
Russian government charged Ukraine for natural gas during this period will be determined 
using news articles which detail the natural gas contracts the two states signed over this 
period. 
 The second case study presented here, dealing with the time period 2000-2004, will 
draw on studies which have detailed Vladimir Putin‟s rise to power and the nature of his 
regime.  These include Lilia Shevtsova‟s Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin 
Legacies,
91
 Andrew Jack‟s Inside Putin‟s Russia,
92
 Stephen White‟s edited volume Politics 
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and The Ruling Group in Putin‟s Russia,
93
 and Marshal Goldman‟s Petrostate: Putin, Power, 
and the New Russia.
94
   To illustrate the changing value of natural resource rents during this 
period, historical trends in oil and gas prices presented in Index Mundi will again be used.
95
 
 To illustrate the transformational mechanism (the increased state capture of natural 
resource rents), tax reform information provided by Jonathan Stern‟s The Future of Russian 
Gas and Gazprom
96
 will be used.  This work, along with those mentioned above, as well as 
journal articles and business publications, including Gazprom‟s web site, will provide the 
basis for demonstrating increasing state control over natural gas rents and the natural gas 
industry. 
 To make clear the pattern of rent distribution during this period, information on 
Russian employment and wage statistics will be drawn from the Russia‟s Federal State 
Statistics Service and Labrosta‟s internet service.
97
   Statistics found here will illustrate the 
growth of the state bureaucracy and the wages these employees were paid from 2000-2004.  
Information regarding increases in Russia‟s international reserve position and Russia‟s state 




 The same BP historical data used in the first case study will be used here to illustrate 
the role Turkmen gas played in the regional natural gas trade.  This case study will also draw 
on news articles, and several academic publications, to further illustrate individual actions 
with regard to the role of Turkmen gas in the region.  Finally, price data for Russian exports to 
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Ukraine over this period, further exemplifying the transformational mechanism, are provided 




 Most of the data used in the final case study covering 2005 to 2008 will be drawn from 
the same materials as the previous case study.  The aforementioned studies detailing the nature 
of politics in Putin‟s Russia will be used to illustrate increasingly authoritarian trends as well 
as increased state control over the natural gas industry. The Mundi Index, detailing historical 
oil and natural gas prices, will again provide evidence of the increasing rent generating 
potential of natural gas.  Gazprom‟s web site will also be used to illustrate increased tax 
revenues for the state.  Labrosta labour market statistics will be used to illustrate the growth of 
Russia‟s legislative and executive class, and Russia‟s Federal State Statistics Service for 
information on salaries.  These statistics will demonstrate the state controlled pattern of 
resource rent distribution.  The role of Turkmen gas in the region will be shown using BP 
historical data, and increased competition for these supplies demonstrated by referring to a 
number of news reports.  Individual rent seeker‟s reactions to this increased importance and 
competition can be determined by using of information available on Gazprom‟s website and 
other news and business publications.  To further illustrate the transformational mechanism, 
natural gas prices for Russian exports to Ukraine will be drawn from news articles and Simon 
Pirani‟s “Ukrainian Gas Sector.” 
Summary 
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In this chapter the quest for the identification of the social mechanisms which brought 
about increases in the Russian government‟s gas prices for Ukraine have been discussed.  The 
situational, individual action, and transformational mechanisms identified in this project‟s 
explanation have been discussed.  It has been shown that many theories of international 
relations provide a clue concerning what is important when formulating an explanation.  
Further, it has been shown that while international relations theory may provide road signs to 
guide this explanation it is the logic of methodological individualism which maps out the 
route that integrates these theories of international relations.  Finally, the case studies that 
make up the majority of the remainder of this thesis have been discussed.  Before moving on 
to the first case study, the next chapter will cover the academic literature which relates to the 
















The theoretical foundation for this study, and the literature it is based on, has been 
discussed in the previous two chapters.  For this reason this literature review section will focus 
on works that have attempted to explain the Russian government‟s decision to increase natural 
gas prices for Ukraine, and other works which do not purport to offer an explanation, but none 
the less throw light on the factors which this project highlights as important.  There is a large 
and ever growing literature on Russia‟s energy resources, some of which considers the 
implications of these resources for the country‟s foreign policy, but there have been few 
attempts to explain the Russian government‟s decision to increase export prices to Ukraine.  
The attempts that have been made tend to focus on specific causes of the event, especially 
changes in Ukrainian foreign policy, and fail to link multiple possible causes together for a 
complete account for the price increases. Further, there is literature that focuses on the factors 
bringing about the price increases that this project draws on, specifically Russia‟s patrimonial 
society, the role of individuals in the decision to raise prices, the increased capabilities of the 
Russian state in the natural gas industry, and the growing importance of Turkmenistan‟s 
natural gas reserves.  These accounts, however, tend not to provide an explanation of the 
Russian government‟s decision to raise natural gas prices for Ukraine.    
Competing Explanations 
The Orange Revolution 
43 
 
 The media has probably been the biggest proponent of the explanation that price 
increases in 2006 were the result of Ukraine‟s foreign policy shift after the Orange 
Revolution.  A number of accounts of the 2006 crisis highlight this as the main cause.  A WPs 
report in late 2005 suggests that there were “big-time politics” behind the price increases.  The 
report goes on to suggest that against the backdrop of the Orange Revolution the move looks 
like punishment.
100
  The Washington Post ran an article in December 2005 quoting „industry 
analysts‟ as suggesting the price increases were punishment for seeking closer ties to the 
West.
101
  Commentary from a Financial Times article run prior to the cutoff also links price 
increases to the Orange Revolution, and compares this situation to that of Belarus which, 
through concessions not mentioned in the article, was able to retain a lower price.
102
 
 The above examples are only a small sample of news articles which paint the entire 
price increase issue as a form of political punishment or coercion.  As has already been stated 
it is impossible to rule this out as an explanation altogether; however, to limit the explanation 
to this is an oversimplification of a very complex issue.  There have been, however, media 
representations of the conflict which delve a little deeper into the issue and highlight other 
contributing factors.  A good example of this is the January 2006 article in Gas Matters where 
the role of control over Turkmen gas, and increased prices for Turkmen gas, are reported to 
have influenced the Russian government‟s decision to raise prices.  Further, the article 
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questions the impact of price increases, suggesting that overall the increases are small and 
would hardly be felt in the first year of the new pricing scheme.
103
   
 The mass media may be the most obvious proponent of the punishment explanation, 
but more academic assessments have yielded similar interpretations.  Lilia Shevtsova in her 
2007 work Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, suggests that after the 
2005 CIS summit the Kremlin began to categorize its neighbours as either loyal or disloyal.  
Being on the disloyal list, as Ukraine was, simply meant natural gas price increases.
 104
  This 
clear example of  the same sort of punishment explanation for the crisis as the previously 
discussed media reports.  Shevtsova appears to contradict her own assessment, however, when 
she goes on to highlight the fact that by 2007 all Russia‟s neighbours, loyal or otherwise, were 
being asked to pay market prices.
105
  Shevtsova‟s explanation for the conflict is mirrored by 
other Russia watchers as well. 
When addressing the issue of Russian natural gas prices in his book Petrostate: Putin, 
Power, and the New Russia Marshal Goldman makes reference to comments made by Putin at 
a meeting among Putin, himself, and others suggesting a link to Ukrainian President 
Yushchenko‟s Western oriented foreign policy.  The passage reads “As Putin told a group of 
us in September 2004, Yushchenko was welcome to seek a closer alliance with the West [. . .] 
but he should understand that if he did so, Russia was under no obligation to continue to 
subsidize its exports to Ukraine.
106
”  This statement contradicts many public statements about 
the price hikes made by Putin, and Goldman‟s followup comparison to Belarus‟s continuation 
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of subsidized prices demonstrated a misunderstanding of the Russia-Belarus pricing issue, 
where low prices were contingent on the sale of Belarusian transit infrastructure to Gazprom, 
and resulted only in delayed price increases.   
Energy as a Weapon 
Bertil Nygren offers an insightful account of the Russian government‟s use of its 
“energy weapons” in a summer 2008 article entitled “Putin‟s Use of Natural Gas to 
Reintegrate the CIS Region.”
107
  In this work Nygren is careful to differentiate between two 
types of „energy weapons‟ used by Russia and other states.  He first identifies the „tap 
weapon‟ which is essentially “do as I tell you or I shut off the tap or pay my price or I shut off 
the tap.”
108
 Nygren considers that this weapon was used in the 2006 dispute between the 
governments of Russia and Ukraine over pricing.  While the “pay my price or I shut off the 
tap” tactic is evident in Russia‟s dealing with Ukraine, Nygren offers little in the way of 
evidence, aside from the timing of the cutoff, to support the “do as I tell you or I shut off the 
tap” argument.   
 The second weapon identified by Nygren is the „transit weapon‟, which is essentially 
pressure to “Sell me your natural gas for the price I offer, or Pay me the transit price I 
want.”
109
  The use of this weapon is highlighted in the Russian government‟s dealings with 
Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan in particular.  Nygren argues that the fact that a trans-
Caspian gas pipeline has failed to materialize has left the Russian government free to set the 
price level for Turkmen gas, and the Turkmen government can either accept it or export no 
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  This hardly appears to be the case as will be seen in the forthcoming case studies, as 
Russia has actually become reliant on Turkmen gas supplies and become vulnerable to the tap 
weapon wielded by Turkmenistan.  This reality has led the Russian government to concede to 
paying not only higher but global prices for Turkmen gas. 
 Nygren concludes that Russia is well on its way to establishing control over the 
regional natural gas industry.
111
  This assessment is difficult to disagree with, however, on the 
whole Nygren‟s article does not delve into the nature of domestic politics in Russia that makes 
this a desirable goal, and he appears to overstate the Turkmenistan‟s willingness to acquiesce 
to the Russian government‟s demands along with the success of the transit weapon to coerce 
Turkmen policy makers into agreements favourable to the Kremlin.  
Market Pricing 
The most focused attempt to explain the 2006 Russia-Ukraine natural gas crisis is that 
of Andreas Heinrich.  Heinrich highlights the role that Ukraine‟s Orange Revolution may have 
played in the Russian government‟s decision to increase prices for Ukraine, along with 
Gazprom‟s desire to control transit infrastructure in energy dependent states, but does not 
consider these issues to be at the heart of the price increases.
112
  Heinrich suggests that the 
price increases represent a paradigm shift in Russia‟s energy relations with Ukraine, moving 
from political to market pricing.
113
  While this appears to at least partially capture the truth of 
the matter, Heinrich does not endeavour to explain what has brought about this shift, nor does 
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he seek, in any substantial way, to link the state of Russia‟s patrimonial political system, the 
growing importance of Turkmen gas, or the state‟s increased control over the natural gas 
industry to his explanation. 
The Role of Patrimonialism and Rents 
In his article entitled “Rents, Rights, and Service: Boyar Economics and the Putin 
Transition” Stephen Hedlund touches on a number of points that are highlighted in this work‟s 
explanation of the Russian government‟s natural gas price increases for Ukraine.  The crux of 
Hedlund‟s argument is that the renationalization of Russia‟s energy resources was undertaken 
to ensure Kremlin control over the rents which it generates.  Further, he argues that these 
developments are rooted in Russia‟s history, dating back to the late1600‟s and early 1700‟s.  
The two characteristics of this system highlighted by Hedlund were the complete lack of 
accountability constraining those in power, and the absence of enforceable property rights.
114
 
This fostered a tradition in Russia “that rests on the rule of men rather than on the rule of law, 
rules and regulations will always be trumped by personal friendships and loyalties.”
115
  
Hedlund concludes by suggesting that the lasting outcome of the systemic change that took 
place in Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union is a return to a traditional pattern of rule 
whereby individuals fight over seats close to those in power, and receive remuneration for 
their services via a host of informal channels.
116
   
Hedlund makes no attempt to extend his interpretation of Russia‟s political economy 
to the issue of the Russian government‟s natural gas price increases for Ukraine, but his 
approach informs this work‟s interpretation of Russia‟s patrimonial situational mechanism.  
                                                          
114
 Stefan Hedlund, “Rights, Rents, and Service: Boyar Economics and the Putin Transition,” Problems of Post-Communism, 55 







Further it highlights three factors that are of great importance to this project: increased state 
control over the Russian natural gas industry; the role that desire for rent capture plays in this 
increasing control; and the role that Russia‟s patrimonial state system plays in bringing about 
the first two factors. 
 Another work focusing on patrimonialism in Russia and natural resource rents which 
this project‟s interpretation draws on is Celestial Wallander‟s “Russian Transimperialism and 
its Implications.”  In this article Wallander, though not directly addressing natural gas prices 
for Ukraine, endeavours to explain and describe what she sees as the true nature of Russian 
foreign policy under Putin.  Wallander highlights the newly assertive nature of Russian 
foreign policy in the second half of this decade, citing Russia‟s engagement in „frozen 
conflicts‟ in Georgia and Moldova leveraged on international norms based on the principle of 
self determination, Russia‟s ability to block Western advances into states such as Belarus and 
Uzbekistan by forging partnerships with the leaderships of these countries, and Russia‟s 
support for Iran‟s nuclear program.
117
  Wallander is of the opinion that this new assertiveness 
is a result of high energy prices, but emphasises that Russian policy makers must and indeed 
do have a play to capitalize on this good fortune.
118
  Wallander concludes that the Russian 
strategy defies the general discourse centered on whether Russia is a post-imperialist state or a 
neo-imperialist one.  She then puts forward an interpretation of Russian actions that links 
domestic political conditions in Russia with foreign policy, which she terms 
Transimperialism.
119
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 In the same vein as this paper Wallander characterizes Russia‟s domestic political 
system as patrimonial authoritarianism.  This is, as discussed earlier, a system based on 
centralized control of the elite, patron client relationships, and rent seeking and distribution.
120
  
Given this domestic state of affairs Wallander views Russian action internationally as “the 
extension of Russian patrimonial authoritarianism into a globalized world.”
121
  This means 
creating “patron client relations, dependency, and rent seeking and distribution at the 
transnational level.”
122
  This includes a focus on creating transnational elite networks which 
allow the state to access rents internationally.
123
 
 Though not directly addressing the issue of price increases to Ukraine Wallander‟s 
work can provides clues to the answer being sought here.  By making the link between 
patrimonial authoritarianism and rent seeking on an international level explicit, it is only a 
short step to see the end of subsidized prices for Ukraine as an attempt to capture more 
resource rents for the state.  
Individuals and Russian Gas Policy 
 Much of the literature concerning individuals and Russian policy, both foreign and 
domestic, has revolved around the Siloviki and the Liberal-Technocrats.  These two groups 
have been identified as clans competing for influence within the Kremlin by a number of 
authors.
124
  While the former consists of former and current military and security service 
personnel, the latter are drawn from the ranks of more liberal-minded individuals who worked 
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with Putin in St. Petersburg in the mid 1990‟s.
125
  The two groups, and the individuals who fill 
their ranks, have been differentiated only by the more liberal leanings of the Technocrats 
versus the more authoritarian heavy handed tendencies of the Siloviki.
126
  This project does 
not require differentiation between the policies of the two groups, especially where natural gas 
policy is concerned, as it is assumed that individuals from both groups seek to maximize the 
rents they control through support for the president.  Further, where natural resources as a 
whole are concerned, while there has been some variance between the tactics of the two 
groups while seeking to renationalize the nation‟s energy infrastructure, this variance has been 
limited, and in some instances appears not to exist at all.   
It is true that Rosneft, which is chaired by Igor Sechin (a member of the Siloviki clan), 
has appeared in some instances to act more coercively and in a heavy handed fashion when 
attempting to regain state control over the oil industry (the Yukos case is a good example).  
Dmitry Medvedev and Alexei Miller (two Liberal-Technocrats) have in some instances looked 
more liberal (e.g. paying close to market price for Sibneft), but in others appeared very 
coercive (e.g. restricting pipeline access for competitors).   Because of these inconsistencies 
the differentiation between these two groups and the resulting implicit policy differentiation 
are not a focus of this project. 
 Research on individuals and their role in Russian foreign policy formation has been 
conducted by Jorgan Staun.  In a 2007 report to the Danish Institute for International Studies 
entitled the “Siloviki Versus Liberal-Technocrats: The Fight for Russia and Its Foreign 
Policy” Staun looks at the individuals brought into top positions by Putin and seeks to 
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differentiate their actions based on their background as either Siloviki (military, KGB/FSB, 
police) and Liberal-Technocrats (more liberal minded appointees, many of whom worked with 
Putin in St. Petersburg).  Staun concludes that “Russia‟s foreign policy is best described as the 
outcome of varying overlapping bargaining games among players arranged hierarchically 
inside and outside government structures.”   Guiding these games are individual and 
institutionalized interests and foreign policy strategic thinking.
127
 
 Staun also offers an explanation of the Russian government‟s natural gas price 
increases, suggesting two possible scenarios.  One, the price increases could be the result of 
the private interests of those who control Gazprom and two, it could be part of a neo-imperial 
strategy designed to consolidate interests in the former Soviet space.
128
  These two 
possibilities are somewhat contradictory; however, Staun goes to great lengths in this work to 
discuss multiple possible answers for a number of questions.  Regardless, Staun‟s work is 
relevant to a core feature of this project, that being the role of individuals in the decision to 
eliminate natural gas subsidies for Ukraine.  Staun does not, however, delve specifically into 
the role that state organizations played in determining individual interests surrounding gas 
prices to Ukraine, or the regional supply and demand pressures facing Gazprom at the time of 
the decision.    
Increased State Capabilities in the Russian Natural Gas Industry 
As highlighted by Hedlund the Russian state, since Putin became president, has gained 
substantial control over Russia‟s oil and natural gas supplies.  This has been highlighted as a 
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major theme in many works dealing with Russia and its energy resources.  Marshal Goldman 
in an article entitled “The New Imperial Russia,” and in his previously mentioned book, has 
highlighted the role that “national champion” companies advocated by Putin have played in 
the exploitation of Russia‟s natural resources.
129
 In Petrostate he also provides an outline of 
many of the actions of Putin, and those he put in charge of potential national champions, 
which increased state control over the energy sector.
130
   
In their fall of 2002 article “Fuelling the Future: The Prospects for Russian Oil and 
Gas” Fiona Hill and Florence Fee address the issue of increased state involvement in the oil 
and gas sectors.  Though their final assessment suggests that excessive optimism concerning 
Russia‟s role as an energy super power is misplaced
131
, they refer to a “creeping 
renationalization” of Russia‟s energy sector.  They suggest that Russian energy firms will play 
a greater role on the international stage, and that they will become a tool for promoting 
Russian foreign policy.
132
   
 This project does not intend to fully discuss all of the literature that makes reference to 
increased state control over Russia‟s oil and gas resources, but the above examples provide a 
representative sample of what is found throughout the literature.  The following case studies 
will explicitly illustrate the transition of Russian gas industry to privatization and back.  For 
now it is worth mentioning that while many works make reference to the increased 
nationalization of Russia‟s energy resources, few link this to natural gas price increases for 
Ukraine. 
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Turkmen Gas and The Great Game 
There is a growing literature dealing with global competition for the natural resources 
of Central Asia.  A precursor to this literature is H. J. Mackinder‟s 1904 article “The 
Geographical Pivot of History” in which he identifies a major portion of modern day Russia 
and Central Asia (the pivot point or heartland), as vital geopolitical territory which may tip the 
balance of world power in favour of the civilization that controls it.
133
  This is the thinking 
that led Mackinder to advise the allies, during the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, 
“Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the 
World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World.”
134
 
 While the modern literature on geopolitics rarely refers to the Ukrainian-Russian gas 
price dispute, Mackinder‟s ideas can be modified to take into account the growing importance 
of the fossil fuel resources in the region, and provide some insights into this topic.  Thus in her 
article “Great Game or Grubby Game?  Struggle for Control of the Caspian,” Sarah L. O‟Hara 
argues that the underlying desire to control the heartland is being played out through a 
competition for control of the region‟s energy resources.
135
  Her idea is essentially that “who 
controls the export routes, controls the oil and gas [in the region]; who controls the oil and 
gas, controls the heartland.”
136
  Whether control over the oil and gas of the Caspian region 
implies control over the region itself remains unclear, but as has been suggested, and will be 
further illustrated in the coming case studies, it has become the policy in Moscow to control 
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these energy resources as they grow in importance and this, along with other factors, has led 
to sharp price increases for natural gas exported to Ukraine from and via Russia. 
 Adam N. Stulberg, in his article “Moving Beyond the Great Game: The Geoeconomics 
of Russia‟s Influence in the Caspian Energy Bonanza” plays down the uniformity of the 
Russian government‟s approach and influence in the competition for Caspian energy 
resources.  He suggests that Russia has been influential in some areas, but not on a consistent 
basis, and further that the policy followed by Moscow in the region has been somewhat 
inconsistent.
137
  Analysis over time suggests that this assessment is correct.   He does note 
however, that “. . . Russia retains geoeconomic levers of regional influence, especially in the 
gas sector, that cannot be matched at low costs by other states . . .”
138
  Stulberg also highlights 
the success the Russian government has had in using Gazprom‟s economic power in its 




 Though neither Stulberg nor O‟Hara directly link price increases for Ukraine to the 
contest for Turkmen/Caspian energy riches, they highlight pipeline policies and gas purchase 
policies which are consistent with evidence in the following case studies.  Further, it is easy to 
link their ideas, along with Mackinder‟s, to issues surrounding Ukrainian gas supplies, as 
Ukraine has consistently and increasingly found more of its natural gas coming from 
Turkmenistan, but has had less control over the terms under which this gas is supplied.  
Summary 
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 It can be seen in this brief literature review that many of the explanations for the 
Russian government‟s decision to raise natural gas prices for Ukraine focus on the role that 
Ukrainian foreign policy may have played.  Those works that do not accept this as an adequate 
explanation tend to focus on individual factors that likely played a role in the price increases, 
and do not seek to link these singular factors together to provide a more complete explanation 
of the event.  While there is a growing literature focusing on the factors highlighted by this 
project as components of an explanation for the price increases, the authors rarely venture to 
extend their analysis to the specific event of concern to this project.  This being the case, there 
is surely a need to draw together these fragments of a possible explanation for the price 
increases.  As laid out in the previous chapter, this project‟s purpose is to use a mechanisms 
based approach based on methodological individualism to shed light on how the four factors 












Factors Determining Russian Natural Gas Prices for Ukraine 1995-1999 
Introduction 
 The following chapter will detail the mechanisms identified in the previous chapter 
and illustrate how these mechanisms brought about low prices for natural gas exported from 
Russia to Ukraine.  The time frame under consideration is 1995-1999.  The chapter will begin 
by illustrating the situational mechanism, in other words, the distribution of rents in the form 
of state property in Russia‟s patrimonial political system.  The patrimonial character of the 
privatization of the Russian economy, and specifically the privatization of Russia‟s natural gas 
industry, will be underlined.  Next, the individual action mechanism, individuals‟ actions 
based on rent seeking and distributing preferences, will be explored given the existence of 
large rents in the form of property.  Following this, the transformational mechanism--the 
collective action of individual rent seekers--will be explored.  The results of this collective 
action for the state‟s control over Russia‟s natural gas industry will then be covered.  An 
examination of the importance of Turkmen natural gas (contributing to the situational 
mechanism) in the regional natural gas trade will follow. Finally, the impact of all these 
factors on Russia‟s natural gas export prices for Ukraine will be examined. 
The Patrimonial the Situational Mechanism and Rents in The Form of Property 
The patrimonial nature of Russian society in the 1990‟s can be clearly illustrated by 
examining of the post-Soviet privatization process.  The period of privatization that followed 
the collapse of the Soviet Union is often referred to as chaotic.  Even in the early years of 
economic reform, however, a distinctly patrimonial pattern can be discerned.  The earliest 
57 
 
round of the privatization of the Russian economy began before the dissolution of the Soviet 
empire (pre-1991).   During this early privatization, directors of state enterprises were given 
property rights to their enterprises, and were often able to capture the profits of these 
enterprises for themselves.
140
  This early system of privatization showed some of the first 
signs of patrimonialism in the form of property handouts.  As the chief architect of reform, 
Yegor Gaidar, frankly put it, “his government saw one of its tasks as being precisely „the 
exchange of nomenklatura power for property.‟”
141
 Policy makers at the top simply declared 
that property rights would be granted to well-placed industrial directors within the communist 
party.  Oleg Smolin, a deputy of the State Duma at the time, stated that in order to speed up 
privatization, create a base of social support, and guarantee their own material interests, those 
who organized privatization privileged those who were part of the managerial apparatus both 
officially and unofficially.
 142
  The results of this “spontaneous privatization” amounted to 
what the head of the drive for privatization in Russia, Anatoly Chubais, called the “theft of 




 After the collapse of the Soviet Union it was the intention of Chubais‟, then Minister 
responsible for the Committee on State Properties, that privatization of state assets be 
conducted in as fair a fashion as possible; however, it soon became clear that in order to 
ensure that the privatization process continued, compromises with industrial insiders would 
have to be made.  The term „insiders‟ is prevalent in the literature regarding the privatization 
of the Russian economy and for all intents and purposes it refers to the Soviet-era managers of 
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industry and the workers who worked in the factories they managed.
144
  The first step in 
promoting insider privatization was the formulation of a legal basis under which privatization 
could take place.  It was impossible for the interests of insiders to be ignored while attempts 
were made to create a legal framework for privatization, as Soviet era managers (red directors) 
still dominated the Supreme Soviet (parliament) which would have to approve any legislation 
on privatization.   
In an attempt to purchase the support of the insiders Chubais offered a deal which 
guaranteed „red directors‟ and workers a 40% stake in their companies, while the rest could be 
sold off to outsiders.
145
   The Supreme Soviet then tabled a counter-offer which guaranteed 
insiders a 51% stake in their enterprises.  Recalling later that “there would be no privatization 
if the directors didn‟t support it,” as these bosses were still strong and the government 
relatively weak, Chubais relented, and on June 11 1992,
  
with the blessing of President Boris 
Yeltsin, the Supreme Soviet approved a bill on privatization which, among other things, 
guaranteed insiders a 51% stake in their enterprises.
146
  The most profitable post-Soviet 
enterprises were divided up in a manner that ensured the best assets for insiders.
147
 This is a 
clear example of how property, or at least access to it, was used to gain support for the broader 
goals of the Yeltsin administration, exemplifying the situational mechanism.
 
 What followed the period of „spontaneous‟ privatization and the creation of a legal 
framework to move privatization forward was the 1992 formulation of a voucher program to 
facilitate the mass privatization of state assets.  Under this plan a voucher would be given to 
each Russian citizen, and this voucher could then be traded at an auction for a stake in a 
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company.  The merits of this type of program are not of importance here, but this program lent 
at least the trappings of a market solution to the privatization issue.    
When the voucher auctions got under way one thing was clear; state assets were being 
sold off cheaply.
148
  One stark example of this was the auctioning off of the Bolshevik Biscuit 
company.  As dictated by the Supreme Soviet‟s law on privatization, 51% of the company was 
sold to management and workers while the other 49% was offered to the public in exchange 
for vouchers.
149
  Ultimately Bolshevik Biscuit was sold for $654,000. In contrast, a similar 
cookie company in Eastern Europe was sold to Pepsi for $80 million.
150
  
While low enterprise valuations may seem misplaced there is evidence to suggest that 
privatization by other means, at this early stage in Russia‟s transition to a market economy, 
could not have taken place.
 151
 The argument here is that the available capital for the purchase 
of productive industries in the Russian Federation at this time did not exceed 150 billion 
Rubles, while the assets available for privatization were valued at 2 trillion Rubles.
152
  
Essentially, for privatization of the Russian economy to take place those assets up for sale had 
to go cheap or there would be no capital with which to purchase them.  What this system of 
privatization amounted to was a “giant programme of gift giving.”
153
  The need to sell assets 
well below their market value essentially equated the large but limited pool of state assets to 
rents which could be distributed.  This is another sign of a patrimonial political economy in 
Russia whereby rents in the form of cheap property were distributed to ensure support for 
Yeltsin from workers and managers.   This was far from the end of property distribution in 
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return for political support. As we will see in the following section, the next round of mass 
privatization took on a much more distinctly patrimonial nature. 
Privatization in 1995-Rent Capture and Distribution under Yeltsin 
 The first two rounds of Russia‟s industrial privatization, spontaneous privatization and 
voucher privatization, exhibited a patrimonial nature.  Insider support for Yeltsin‟s economic 
reforms had been purchased through the distribution of rents and state assets at extremely low 
prices to managers and workers, and the scraps were left for those with the skill and foresight 
to take advantage of them.  The second round of mass privatization, beginning in 1995, would 
assume an even clearer patrimonial nature whereby the Yeltsin administration gained quick 
and badly needed cash and political support in exchange for some of Russia‟s most prized 
industries. 
 It is important to note the time frame and context within which this round of 
privatization took place.  At this point voucher privatization was almost complete, though 
some companies were still in state hands, and the Russian macroeconomic outlook was bleak.  
Inflation was up, the ruble‟s value was down, and the government was in desperate need of 
cash.
154
  Further, parliamentary (Duma) elections where scheduled for late 1995, and 
presidential elections were set for the middle of 1996.  Yeltsin was in great danger of losing 
these elections to a revitalized communist party leader, Gennady Zyuganov.  There was fear 
throughout Yeltsin‟s administration, the newly developing capitalist class, and western 
capitals, that if Zyuganov was to win, Russia‟s move toward a market economy would not 
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only be stalled, but sent hurtling in reverse.  It was in these circumstances that Russia‟s 
infamous loans for shares auctions/scams were hatched. 
 The loans-for-shares scheme was essentially an exchange of property in return for 
political support.
155
  The plan dictated that a number of powerful bankers and businessmen, 
including Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Potanin, and Boris Berezovsky, would furnish the 
government with loans and support in the upcoming elections.
156
  The government for its part 
would put un-privatized state assets up as collateral for these loans, and after the loans ran out 
the government would be left with two options.  The first option was to pay back the loans and 
reclaim the shares put up as collateral, an option broadly understood to be impossible;
157
 the 
second was to default on the loan and sell off the shares that were put up as collateral.  The 
second option also stipulated that the lender would become the sales agent for the auctioning 
off of the collateral.
158
 In order to ensure the loyalty of the lenders throughout the 1996 
presidential election a “dual key system” was introduced.  Under this part of the plan the 
lenders were given their enterprises in trust prior to the elections, and only after the elections 
were they given formal control of the state assets. 
159
   Assuming that if the Communists were 
to win the presidential elections this second part of the plan would be cancelled, the lenders 
had ample motivation to help ensure a Yeltsin victory. 
 In August 1995 President Yeltsin signed a decree authorizing the loans for shares 
scheme.
160
  Foreign lenders were deterred from bidding by the intentionally vague rules which 
                                                          
155
Christya Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Buisness, 
2000), 169. 
156
 Ibid., 170. 
157
 Neela Banerjee, “Russia’s Communist Exploit Loan Plan,” Dow Jones International News, February 13, 1996. 
158
 Christya Freeland, Sale of the Century: Russia’s Wild Ride From Communism to Capitalism (New York: Crown Buisness, 
2000), 180. 
159





governed the auctions, presenting a risk that in the event of a disagreement they would be 
unable to retain their shares. 
161
  Though a facade of competitiveness was maintained up until 
the auctions, in reality the government picked the winners and Khodorkovsky, Potanin, and 
Berezovsky won their desired prizes quite easily.  This outcome was greatly facilitated by the 
fact that the banks which were organizing the auctions were also bidding on the shares being 
auctioned off.  For example, Menatep Bank (owned by Khodorkovsky) organized the auction 
for Yukos (the largest of Russia‟s oil companies) for which it was the chief bidder and 
eventual winner.
162
   
The loans for shares auctions took place between November 3 and December 28, 2005. 
The majority of auctions, like the Yukos auction, were won by the banks that organized 
them.
163
  Further, the shares were traded for loans which were barely greater than the initial 
asking price at the auction, and a fraction of the enterprise‟s actual value.  A 38% stake in 
Norilsk Nickel was auctioned off for 170 million one hundred thousand dollars USD to 
Vladimir Potanin; the initial asking price was 170 million USD.  This was paltry sum for a 
company which recorded profits in 1995 of 1.2 billion USD.
164
   Khodorkovsky, bidding 
through a front company called Laguna, won a 45% stake in Yukos by offering $9 million 
USD more than the $150 million USD starting bid, and acquired 33% of Yukos shares by 
winning an investment tender offering $125,000 USD more than the $150 million USD 
starting price.
165
  Boris Berezovsky, with the help of fellow tycoon Alexander Smolensky, 
captured a substantial share in another Russian oil company, Sibneft, with a bid of just 
$300,000 above the initial asking price of $100 million.  Sibneft had a market capitalization of 
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over 1 billion dollars just a few years later.
166
  These results were typical of the loans for 
shares program and amounted to Yeltsin‟s purchase of a constituency which could gain him 
re-election in 1996. 
1996 Election – Supporting The Patron  
 The 1996 presidential election was preceded by parliamentary elections in late 1995.  
The latter underlined the possibility of a return to communist rule in Russia.  The Communist 
Party of Russia won 99 of 225 seats in the Duma.  Determined to secure that which they had 
gained from the loans for shares program, the “winners” of the early rounds of privatization, 
including Potanin, Khodorkovsky, and Berezovsky, resolved to ensure that Yeltsin would be 
re-elected.  This was no small task.  It required an end to old rivalries and the formation of a 
new alliance among a number of Russia‟s new business tycoons, reformers from the Yeltsin 
administration, and Yeltsin himself.   
The major role the new Russian business elite played was that of banker for the 
campaign.  The tycoons hired Anatoly Chubais to oversee Yeltsin‟s re-election and provided 
him with 3 million dollars to pay his salary and set up an election team.
167
  Further, they 
ensured that throughout the campaign bills were paid on time.
168
  In addition to their role as 
financers these businessmen, particularly Berezovsky and Vladimir Guzinsky, used their 
media holdings to provide positive coverage for the president and blocked many of his rivals, 
including the Communists, from gaining access to fair media coverage.  In the end Yeltsin 
was re-elected, garnering 53% of the vote in the second and final round of the election.  This 
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was three times the support he had at the beginning of the campaign, before the assistance of 
the new Russian business elite.
169
 
 The 1996 election illustrated the rent-seeking behaviour of Russia‟s business elite, the 
President‟s willingness to trade rents (cheap property) for support, and the support of 
Presidential clients for their patron.  It would not take long, however, for cracks in this tactical 
alliance between economic wealth and political power to show.  What was not anticipated by 
Yeltsin or his administration was the weakening effect that the short-term purchase of support 
with state assets, of great value over the long term, would have on the Russian state and 
economy.  It was impossible to create a stable patrimonial system which would serve the 
interests of the state with such a limited pool of rents to distribute.  Once property was given 
away or sold off, there was no way to control the business elite, aside from threatening to take 
away its gains and thus reverse privatization.  This patrimonialism in Russia‟s natural gas 
industry resulted in a period of unchecked wealth accumulation by a few through the 
privatization of state profits, the selloff of some of the richest natural gas assets in Russia, and 
other concessions to those well connected to the individuals who basically ran the Russian 
natural gas industry during this period. 
The Individual Action Mechanism and Privatization of the Natural gas Industry 
 While many state oil companies were broken up and sold off to private individuals 
during voucher privatization and the loans-for-shares program, the fate of the state natural gas 
monopoly, Gazprom, was different.  Two key differences were evident.  First, while the state 
oil industry was broken up into several different companies including Sibneft, Lukoil, Yukos, 
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and Rosneft, the structure of Russia‟s natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, remained intact with 
production, processing, and transit fused within one company.  Second, no components of the 
Russian natural gas industry were distributed through the loans for shares program, and they 
did not fall into the hands of Russia‟s new business elite.  The portion of Gazprom that was 
privatized was privatized through voucher auctions and piecemeal selloffs by the state, leaving 
Soviet-era managers in a powerful position. 
The “Privatization” of Gazprom 
 In 1989 then Soviet gas minister and future prime minister of the Russian Federation 
Viktor Chernomyrdin organized the entire Soviet natural gas industry into one large company.   
Chernomyrdin was its chairman until he became prime minister in 1992. At that point he 
handed the company‟s reins over to his former deputy Rem Vyakhirev, who oversaw the 
privatization process.
170
  In accordance with a November 1992 presidential decree Gazprom 
was transformed into a joint stock company in 1993.
171
 The privatization of the company 
began in 1994 as part of the first round of voucher privatization.  Roughly 28% of Gazprom 
was reserved for residents of 60 oil and gas producing regions in Russia.  These auctions were 
held regionally, and a passport indicating residency in the respective region whose portion of 
the shares was on offer was required to participate.  A 15% stake was earmarked for gas 
industry employees, 10% was reserved for individuals employed directly by Gazprom, and 
just over 5% was reserved for individuals living in the Yamal Nenets region of western 
Siberia where many of Gazprom‟s gas extraction activities take place. About 40% of the 
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company was retained by the state.
172
  While the initial privatization was relatively successful 
in some respects, putting close to 60% of the company into private hands, it was individual 
Soviet „red directors‟ in powerful positions, such as Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev, who 
benefited the most.  
 Gazprom‟s path to privatization was similar to that of the many other enterprises 
auctioned off during the period of voucher privatization, and was indicative of the situational 
mechanism described in Chapter Two.  The main beneficiaries of the rules governing the 
company‟s privatization were the company‟s management, and individuals with direct ties to 
the Russian natural gas industry.  Jeffery Sachs, world-renowned economist, characterized the 
privatization of Gazprom as theft from the Russian people.
173
  What took place followed the 
same patrimonial pattern as the rest of the privatization drive--the distribution of property in 
exchange for short-term support for reform initiatives.  The effects of this type of 
patrimonialism on individual action can be illustrated through an examination of some of the 
actions taken by those who controlled Gazprom, and therefore the industry, throughout the 
1990‟s. 
Individuals at Gazprom - Chernomyrdin 
It has been suggested by many that Viktor Chernomyrdin, a close friend of then 
president Boris Yeltsin, used his clout in the natural gas industry to enrich himself and his 
close associates rather than the state or the Russian people.  It is rumoured that Chernomyrdin 
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made between a billion and five billion dollars through the privatization of Gazprom.
174
 These 
allegations were never proven, but the fact that he did not sue over the reports lends support to 
the rumours.
175
  Further, during the mid and late 1990‟s Gazprom and Vyakhirev 
(Chernomyrdin‟s close associate and successor at Gazprom) benefited from generous tax 
concessions including exemptions from export taxes, some import tariffs, and Russia‟s VAT, 
which were made possible by Gazprom‟s close connections to Chernomyrdin‟s cabinet.  
These concessions amounted to billions in lost revenues for the state.
176
 
  Giving tax breaks to Gazprom and promoting friends within the company may appear 
unseemly and patrimonial, but these examples fail to fully illustrate the individualistic rent 
seeking and distribution pattern discussed in Chapter Two.  The case of the companies Horhat 
and Interprocom provide an even more glaring example.  In 2001 documents obtained by the 
Moscow Times showed that during the 1990‟s directors at Gazprom transferred valuable 
assets to their family members in a series of opaque transactions.
177
  At the center of these 
allegations was Interprocom, a company registered in Hungary.   
Formerly a partially state-owned enterprise, Interprocom was registered in 1989 and 
became a fully private firm in the 90‟s with majority stakes owned by former Soviet gas 
executives Mikhail Rakhimkulov and Oleg Veinorov.
178
 Gazprom transferred a 10% stake in 
Panrusgas, a Gazprom-Hungarian company, a 1.5% stake in Gazprom‟s telecommunications 
subsidiary, and a stake in Intergazkomplekt, an importer of gas distribution equipment, to 
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  Then in October of 1997, 100% of Interprocom was transferred to a company 
called Horhat (KhorKhat, or ChorChat).  Initially Horhat was registered to Rakhimkulov‟s 
wife, and a woman with the same address as Veinorov.   
In November 1998 18% stakes in the company were sold to Rakhimulov‟s son Ruslan, 
Chernomyrdin‟s son Vitaly, Vyakhirev‟s daughter Tatyana Dedikova, and his deputy‟s 
daughter Yelena Dmitriyeva for 8.1 rubles per 18% stake.  In total the 90% stake in Horhat 
was sold off for $2.50.
180
 Interprocom and its owners further benefited from loan guarantees 
from Gazprom totalling 524 million dollars.
181
  These are clear examples of asset stripping 
and privileges which benefitted the families of Gazprom management, who through 
privatization had been given control of one of Russia‟s largest companies at the expense of 
Russia‟s state capabilities. They also represent good examples of patrimonialism through the 
capture and further distribution of state assets and property. 
Vyakhirev 
Rem Vyakhirev took the reins at Gazprom in 1992 after Chernomyrdin‟s ascent to the 
position of Prime Minister of Russia.  In his role as Gazprom Chairman Vyakhirev managed 
the 40% government stake in Gazprom with few restrictions.
182
   Accused by Forbes magazine 
of running the company like “his own personal fiefdom,” Vyakhirev was counted as one of 
the richest men in Russia by 2004, with a net worth of 1.2 billion dollars.
 183
  Vyakhirev 
presided over some of the most questionable business dealings in Gazprom‟s relatively short 
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history.  During his time with the company Gazprom offered domestic consumers gas at prices 
less than one tenth of world levels, making the domestic gas market utterly unprofitable for 
the company, but provided the government with domestic support.
184
  This fails, however, to 
fully illustrate the destructive nature of Vyakhirev‟s tenure at the head of the company.  For a 
clearer illustration of Vyakhirev‟s rent distributing during his time at Gazprom one must take 
into consideration his aforementioned ties to Horhat, and examine his relationship with the 
independent U.S. registered company Itera.   
The relationship between Gazprom and Itera during the 1990‟s was unusually close for 
supposed competitors.  Itera began participating in the export of Turkmen and Russian gas in 
1994 and within a few years became a major natural gas supplier to Ukraine, Belarus, 
Georgia, parts of Russia, and the Baltic states.
185
  This is the result of a series of very dubious 
concessions made to Itera while Vyakhirev was the head of Gazprom.  These concessions 
included granting access to Gazprom‟s usually fiercely protected gas transmission network, 
the transfer of a Gazprom subsidiary, Purgaz, to Itera‟s control for a fraction of its actual 
worth ($1,200 rather than $566 million),
186
 and the transfer of licences to exploit the New 
Urengoi and East Urengoi gas fields on the Yamal peninsula. 
187
 In total, under the watch of 
Vyakhirev, Gazprom sold off 5.805 billion dollars worth of assets for just 325 million dollars 
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to Itera, turning it into one of the largest natural gas companies in the world.
188
  Vyakhirev 
also lobbied the government during his time at Gazprom to reduce its ownership share in the 
company from roughly 40% to 25%, perhaps seeking more rents to distribute.
189
   
Further, a 2001 state audit found that Gazprom, under the management of Vyakhirev, 
was guilty of selling gas produced in the Yamal-Nenets region at a notably reduced price to 
Itera, amounting to low prices benefitting a non-affiliated company.
190
   This sale of gas took 
place through a three-way transaction involving Gazprom, Itera, and the Yamal-Nenets 
regional government.  Essentially Gazprom offered the government of the Yamal-Nenets 
region gas valued at 2-4 dollars per 1000 cm as compensation for unpaid taxes.  The regional 
government then sold the gas to Itera for the same price.  Itera went on to sell the gas on the 
open market for between $30 and $90 dollars per 1000 cm.  Sold on the open market, just 5% 
of the gas given to the regional government could have provided Gazprom with enough 
revenue to pay its tax bill.
191
 All of this amounts to policies, during Vyakhirev‟s reign at 
Gazprom, which distributed state assets he gained control of during privatization to Itera, and 
served to weaken the state‟s control over Gazprom, as well as Gazprom‟s control over the 
Russian natural gas industry. 
The Transformational Mechanism and the Russian State’s Declining Control Over the 
Natural Gas Industry 
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The period between 1994 and 2000 saw the Russian state lose a relatively large 
amount of control over Gazprom and consequently the Russian natural gas industry.  Relative 
to many other states Russia‟s control over the natural gas industry remained large; however, 
this period sticks out as an anomaly in the brief history of Gazprom.  From its inception until 
the beginning of voucher privatization in 1994, Gazprom was a wholly state-owned enterprise.  
After the initial rounds of privatization the state‟s share of Gazprom was reduced to 40%.  
This is significant as it gave the state only 5 seats on the 11 seat board of directors, and thus 
no majority.
192
  Further weakening the state‟s position was the 1997 agreement which allowed 
Rem Vyakhirev to manage the state‟s share of the company.
 193
 The reassertion of state control 
over Gazprom and the Russian natural gas industry will be further discussed in the next 
section of this case study, but for now it will suffice to say that under President Vladimir Putin 
the state took back control of the company and increased its share to 51%, giving state 
representatives a majority on the board of directors. 
 Beyond the obvious decrease in the Russian government‟s share of ownership in 
Gazprom, the asset stripping by company management discussed earlier reduced Gazprom‟s 
monopoly position in the natural gas industry.  First, the sale and/or transfer to Itera of 
Rospan, Purgaz, Tarkosaleneftegaz, Sibneftegaz, Achimneftegaz, Vostokgaz, and 
Severneftegazprom, along with the rights to New Urengoi and East Urengoi gas fields by 
Vyakhirev, which took place between 1997 and 2001, amounted to a 10% reduction in 
Gazprom‟s proven reserves.
194
  When one considers the size of Gazprom‟s reserves, 25% of 
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global reserves, this number is striking.  Second, Gazprom conceded its monopoly over export 
pipelines to and from CIS states and granted access to gas traders and gas producers including 
Itera.  This allowed independent companies access to Central Asian gas which they could then 
export through Gazprom pipelines to states in Eastern Europe.  Hermitage Capital estimates 
that between 1996 and 2002 Gazprom gave up more than 50% of the FSU gas market to 
Itera.
195
   
 A great deal of controversy has surrounded Gazprom‟s dealings with Itera, but nothing 
illegal was ever discovered in audits (the audits were conducted by Gazprom‟s accounting 
agency, Price Waterhouse Coopers).  It is not necessary, however, to prove illegal activities to 
show the effect the relationship had on Gazprom‟s control over the natural gas industry.  
Access to gas reserves was given away or sold at extremely low prices, and market share was 
ceded to Itera, leaving Gazprom in a position weaker than its position in the early 1990‟s.  
This is typical of the transformational mechanism, whereby individual rent seeking and 
distribution lead to a collective outcome weakening the state‟s control over the industry. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Russian state had difficulty gaining any 
benefits from Gazprom‟s gas sales due to a weak and inefficient tax system.  Prior to 1998 
Gazprom ran up unpaid federal and regional tax bills that totalled over 2.8 billion dollars.
196
  
Eventually the government took action and began to freeze Gazprom‟s assets, demanding that 
its arrears be paid.  Since the state owed an almost comparable debt to Gazprom for gas used 
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by state-controlled companies, an eventual compromise saw Gazprom getting tax breaks, 
essentially for holding government debt.  
 The total sum of the state‟s losses are difficult to evaluate, but what is clear is that over 
the period 1994-2000, under the management of Chernomyrdin and Vyakhirev, Gazprom 
lost/gave away 10% of its natural gas reserves, its monopoly over gas transit in and out of 
Russia, and over 50% of the FSU natural gas market.  Further, over this period the state lost 
majority control over the company, and proved incapable of collecting taxes from the 
monopoly.  All this amounts to a loss of state capability to control the natural gas industry.  
Next we examine the ability and resolve of the Russian government and Gazprom to maintain 
a monopoly position over natural gas exports to Ukraine given individual preferences for rent 
seeking and distribution, and structural shifts in the regional natural gas trade. 
 Eurasian Natural Gas Trade in the 1990’s 
 This section examines the roles Russia and Turkmenistan played as suppliers of 
natural gas to Europe and Eurasia from 1995 to 1999.  Specific reference will be made to 
natural gas consumption and production in the entire region, Russia‟s and Turkmenistan‟s 
respective shares of regional production, their consumption relative to their production, and 
the role each played in exporting gas to Ukraine.  This will produce a picture of a regional gas 
market that could, and was, forced to rely heavily on Russian production and export while 
Turkmen production and exports dwindled due to Russia‟s restrictions on pipeline access.   It 
also highlights the increasing role Turkmenistan played in exporting natural gas to Ukraine 
over this period and suggests reasons for this.  
74 
 
 Concerning production and consumption of natural gas, European and Eurasian 
production decreased between 1990 and 1995 by 71.5 bcm, from 973.5 bcm to 902.2 bcm.
197
  
At the same time, Russia‟s share of regional production decreased from 64.1 % to 61.5%.  
Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production decreased from 9.1% to 3.3% during the first five 
years of the decade.  Over this same period total European and Eurasian consumption shrank 
by 64.7 bcm from 994.1 bcm to 929.4 bcm. 
198
 This reduction was largely the result of 
decreased consumption in states of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia and Ukraine, 
which accounted for 42.3 bcm and 51.6 bcm of decline respectively. 
199
 Consumption 
increased notably over this period in Germany, which increased consumption by 14.5 bcm per 
year, and Great Britain, which saw an increase of 18.1 bcm per year.
200
 Needless to say, over 
this period Turkmen gas played a minor role in the European and Eurasian natural gas mix. 
 During the period from 1995 to 1999 the trends evident in the first half of the decade 
seemed to persist in some areas while in other areas they were reversed.  Total natural gas 
production for Europe and Eurasia increased by 30.6 bcm from 904.2 bcm in 1995 to 934.8 
bcm in 1999.  This was a reversal of the trend evident in the first half of the decade, but it 
failed to bring consumption back to the levels of 1990.
201
  Meanwhile, Russia‟s share of 
regional production continued to decrease, from 61.4% of production in 1995 to 56.8% in 
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  Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production continued to decrease during the first 
four years of this period, from 3.3% in 1995 to 2.3% in 1999.
203
   
 On the consumption side, total regional consumption increased by 52.4 bcm from 
929.4 bcm in 1995 to 981.8 bcm in 1999.  Russia‟s total consumption over this period 
remained close to constant.  There were slight increases in 1996 and 1998, matched by small 
decreases in 1997 and 1999.  In the end, 1995 figures over 1999 figures show a decrease in 
consumption of 14.2 bcm.
204
  Meanwhile Turkmen consumption increased by 3.3 bcm 
between 1995 and 1999.  Increased consumption was driven by small increases across most 
Western and Central European states as well as small increases in Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan.  Italy showed the largest increases over this period, from 49.9 bcm in 1995 to 
62.2 bcm in 1999.
205
 
 Arguably the most important figure that can be discerned from the data available is 
Russia‟s share of consumption relative to its production.  The period of concern in this 
section, 1995 to 1999, showed a decrease in the amount of production Russia consumed from 
68% - 65.9%.
206
  Turkmenistan‟s total consumed production in 1995 was 26.5%, while this 
share increased to 53% by 1999.  While Russia‟s exportable gas volumes remained relatively 
constant over this period, Turkmenistan‟s fell sharply.   The decrease in Turkmenistan‟s 
production was due in large part to two factors.  One, Turkmenistan had difficulties collecting 
payments from states such as Ukraine and Georgia during this period leading to supply 
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cutoffs, and second, prolonged difficulties in arranging transit agreements with Gazprom left 
Turkmenistan with few export channels for the gas it produced.  Regardless of the reasons 
behind Turkmenistan‟s decreased production and exportable volumes, these numbers illustrate 
that Turkmen gas played a minor role in the European and Eurasian gas market between 1995 
and 1999.  
 Another important structural consideration is that while on a regional level natural gas 
exports from Turkmenistan appeared to play a minimal and decreasing role, Turkmen exports 
were also playing a decreasing role in Ukraine‟s natural gas balance, falling from 29.5% in 
1996 to 11% in 1999.  This was in large part due to Gazprom‟s reluctance to provide pipeline 
capacity to transit gas to Ukraine.  It is also important to note that over the period in question 
trade between Ukraine and Turkmenistan in the area of natural gas was governed by direct 
agreements between the governments of the two respective states and private trade 
intermediary Itera, which controlled the export of Turkmen gas to Ukraine from 1994 to 2002.  
Separate arrangements for the transit of the gas over Russia‟s territory were worked out 
between the three governments and the independent gas trader.  This was not always a smooth 
process, as can be seen by cutoffs of Turkmen supplies to Ukraine in 1994, carrying over into 
1995,
207
 further cuts in March of 1997 lasting until early 1999,
208
 and supply cuts in mid 1999 
as well.
209
 These cutoffs originated in Ukraine‟s inability to pay for the gas it was importing, 
leading to multimillion dollar debts.  During these cutoffs Russia increased the volumes of gas 
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it exported to Ukraine to make up for some of the shortages
210
; however, during the 1997-
1999 cutoff Ukraine was forced to decrease its domestic consumption due to lack of supplies.  
Rent Seeking and the Marginalization of Turkmen Gas 
 While it seems that Russia may have played a constructive role during these supply 
disruptions, a closer examination shows that while the cutoffs were due to Ukraine‟s inability 
to pay Turkmenistan for the gas it imported, cutoffs were prolonged by disputes between 
Turkmenistan and Russia over transit prices for gas across Russian territory.
211
  A glaring 
example of this was the meeting on the resolution of the March 1997 cutoff which took place 
in January of 1998 and guaranteed Ukraine 20 bcm of gas a year until 2005. The resumption 
of supplies was delayed for another year due to disagreements between Russian and Turkmen 
officials over the price to be paid for transit across Russian territory.
212
   
 This lengthy negotiation process saw an attempt by Russia to purchase Turkmen gas 
outright at $32 per 1000 cm and sell it to Ukraine for a profit, while Turkmenistan was 
unwilling to sell at a price lower than $42 per 1000 cm, a price which Ukraine had agreed to 
pay.
213
  Further, during this period both Turkmenistan and Ukraine called for a decrease in 
their reliance on Gazprom to facilitate trade between the two countries, and discussed the 
creation of a joint trading house which would facilitate the transit of gas between the two 
countries through Gazprom pipelines, and fulfill the debt clearing function that Itera had been 
facilitating.
214
  This surely would have hurt Itera, as the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine was 
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its main business function.
215
  Gazprom, and Vyakhirev, eventually relented and agreed to 
ship Turkmen gas through Gazprom pipelines to Ukraine, citing the commercial advantages of 
the arrangement.
216
  In sum, the nature of this dispute underlines three important points: first, 
Russia was in a position to increase its exports to Ukraine by preventing the transit of 
Turkmen gas across its territory; second, Russia had an interest in purchasing Turkmen gas at 
low prices in order to sell it to Ukraine for an increased profit; and third, when Itera‟s interests 
were in a position to be damaged, Vyahkirev was willing to compromise. 
 This illustrates the rent seeking and distributing nature of Vyakhirev‟s policies, and 
also the declining role for the Russian state in natural gas transit with respect to Turkmen 
exports.  This is also an example of the relative power which Russia enjoyed in the European 
and Eurasian natural gas market, as it was able to deny Turkmenistan access to export 
pipelines while still meeting its domestic consumption and export obligations and actually 
selling more gas.  Next, it is important to examine the impact that this trade structure, Russia‟s 
diminished state capabilities, and individuals‟ preferences for rent seeking and distribution 
had for the prices Ukraine paid for its natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. 
The Transformational Mechanism-Gas Prices for Ukraine 1995-1999 
 Beginning in 1995, Ukraine actually paid more for its natural gas imports from Russia 
than most European states did, an average of between $80-$90 per 1000 cm.
217
  These prices 
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persisted throughout 1996 and 1997,
218
 although the situation began to change in 1998.  An 
agreement reached in late 1997 saw Ukraine decrease its transit tariff for Russia‟s gas exports 
headed to Europe from $1.75 per 1000 cm per 100 km to between $1.01 and $1.09 per 1000 
cm per 100 km.  In return, Russia decreased the price Ukraine paid for deliveries of 50 bcm of 
natural gas to $50 per tcm.
219
  Gas outside of this contract, such as the gas supplied as a 
supplement for undelivered Turkmen gas, was still sold at $80 per tcm.  This arrangement 
remained constant throughout 1999 and into 2005. 
 While the substantial decrease in Russia‟s natural gas export prices to Ukraine 
coincided with a decrease in Ukraine‟s transit tariffs, and a sharp decline in global oil prices, 
the fact that Ukraine was actively seeking to diversify its gas exports away from Russia should 
not be overlooked.  Although Turkmen gas was cutoff to Ukraine when the agreement to 
reduce prices was made, this was largely due to the inability of Turkmenistan and Ukraine to 
reach a gas transit deal with Russia‟s Gazprom.  Further, Itera, a favourite location for Rem 
Vyakhirev‟s rent distribution, as discussed above, would have lost substantially if it was no 
longer able to participate in the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine.   
 In sum, over the period from 1995 to 1999 Russia and individuals at Gazprom lacked 
the desire to maintain a monopoly of exports of natural gas to Ukraine.  This allowed 
Turkmen and Ukrainian officials to reach their own accords on pricing, and allowed for some 
competition with respect to export pricing.  It is therefore probable that it was not only 
decreasing world energy prices and tariff concessions from Ukraine that led to this price 
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decrease, but also the rent distribution impulse of Vyakhirev at play in the price negotiations, 
and the resulting level of competition presented by Turkmen exports. 
Summary 
 Thus it appears that the exchange of state property for short term political support had 
a weakening effect on the Russian state as a whole and on the state‟s control over the natural 
gas industry specifically.  Such a conclusion can be derived from an examination of the 
actions of the individuals who were conditioned by these types of exchanges.  Individuals who 
were given control over Russia‟s natural gas industry by the state may have furnished the state 
with some support. However, through their own rent seeking and distribution they began to 
enrich themselves and their clients at the expense of the state‟s capabilities.  Actions which 
amounted to decreasing state control of Gazprom, and Gazprom‟s control over Russia‟s 
natural gas industry as a whole, provide evidence of the pattern discussed in Chapter Two.  
Further, when faced with competition in the export of natural gas to Ukraine individuals at 
Gazprom, specifically Rem Vyakhirev, chose to protect the interests of their clients rather than 
those of the government, which may have had plans for a monopoly over gas exports to 
Ukraine.  This pattern of rent seeking and distribution, combined with falling global energy 
prices, the limited regional importance of Turkmen gas, and favourable transit agreements 
with Ukraine, appear to have brought about a drop in the price of Russian gas exported to 







Factors Determining Russia’s Natural Gas Prices for Ukraine 2000-2004 
Introduction 
This chapter will begin by detailing the variation in Russia‟s patrimonial political 
structure, making specific reference to the greater role played by natural resource rents and the 
increasingly authoritarian nature of Vladimir Putin‟s regime.  The actions of individual rent 
seekers, specifically President Putin and those he appointed to head Gazprom, will be 
discussed next.  Attention will be paid here to increased resource rent capture by the state, and 
rent distribution to state employees.  The effects of these individual actions on collective 
outcomes will then be addressed, highlighting the increased control by the state over Gazprom 
and the Russian natural gas industry as a whole.  This will be followed by a discussion of 
Turkmen natural gas production and exports in the regional and Ukrainian contexts, along 
with an examination of Gazprom management‟s reaction to the importance of these 
production and export volumes.  Finally, the impact of changes in Russia‟s patrimonial 
society, individual rent seeking actions, greater state control of the natural gas industry, and 
the still limited role of Turkmen gas in the regional natural gas trade on the price of Russian 
natural gas exports to Ukraine will be considered. 
Variation in Russia’s Patrimonial System, the Situational Mechanism, and Natural 
Resource Rents 
 
 A brief look at the evolution of energy prices during Putin‟s first term in office shows 
a large increase in the rent generating potential of Russia‟s natural resources, specifically oil 
and natural gas.  Recall that world oil prices bottomed out just before Putin took power in 
early 1999, and by the end of his first term in office they had increased nearly fourfold (see 
82 
 
figure 2.2, Chapter Two, World Oil Prices 1994-2008).  The price of Russian natural gas at 
the German border followed a similar trend over the same period.  Russian natural gas export 
prices to Europe hit their 1990‟s low in April of 1999 and then moved upwards, increasing 2.5 
times by the end of 2004 (see Figure 2.1, Chapter Two, Russian Natural Gas Prices at the 
German Border 1994-2008).   
Determining what this means for the rent generating potential of Russian oil and 
natural gas is in some ways simple, and in others more complicated.  If one holds the cost of 
production constant, any increase in the price of oil or natural gas leads to an increase in the 
rents they generate.  In reality the costs of production, both natural (perfectly competitive) and 
reported costs of production (costs actually incurred) vary, and it is difficult to provide good 
estimates.  Gaddy and Ickes, whose definition of natural resource rents was discussed earlier, 
provide an estimate of the rents derived from Russia‟s oil and gas production between 1970 
and 2005.
220
  When making this estimate it was necessary for the two authors to make 
simplifying assumptions, holding the cost of production at a constant $8 per barrel of oil and 
$18 per 1000 cubic meters of natural gas.  Using a mixture of EIA data and Ural blend crude 
prices for oil, and net-back prices for Russian exports to Western Europe, they produced a 
graph illustrating estimates for the total rents derived from oil and natural gas: 
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Figure 5.1 Total Oil and Natural Gas Rents 1970 -2005
221
 
With the darker portion of the graph representing oil rents and the lighter natural gas 
rents, these data show an unmistakable rise in both oil and gas rents after 1999.  This increase 
in rents combined with Putin‟s preference for state, as opposed to private, capture of rents 
conditioned the individuals Putin put in control of the natural gas industry to seek greater state 
control of the industry and a greater share of rents for the state.  Before this issue is discussed, 
it is important to explore the rise of Putin and the marginalization of influential political 
groups which were prominent during the 1990‟s.  These events illustrate the power of Putin as 
president, and the somewhat more authoritarian nature of his rule. 
Yeltsin Leaves the Scene – A Trend Toward Authoritarian Rule 
 Yeltsin began to speak of early retirement by mid 1999.
222
  With his health 
deteriorating, his reform agenda discredited by the previous year‟s economic turmoil, and 
growing public disillusionment concerning corruption scandals within his administration, it 
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was obvious to most that power over the country was slipping through his grasp.  The main 
concern of Yeltsin and his inner circle was the loyalty of the individual who would take 
Yeltsin‟s place.  They were not in search of a fall guy, but someone who would ensure their 
physical and economic safety once they left office.  They found their loyal man in a relatively 
unknown individual, Vladimir Putin. 
 Putin‟s rise to the Presidency was swift and interesting in its own right; however, it is 
not the intent of this case study to detail the intricacies of that rise.  What is of concern here is 
the nature of Putin‟s regime once he took office.  When discussing Yeltsin‟s regime, Lilia 
Shevtsova of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterizes it as “evolv[ing] 
into a neo-patrimonial regime that was based on a leader that holds all power and delegates its 
functions and authority to an entourage and to competing clans.”
223
  Though the competing 
clans have changed under Putin, some becoming more powerful and some less, what appears 
to have remained constant is individual preferences for rent seeking and distribution, as well 
as the tendency of these individuals to support their patron.  Before discussing the specific 
issue of rent capture and distribution, the evolution of authoritarian rule under Putin should be 
briefly explored.  
Restoration of the Vertical 
 There is little doubt that Vladimir Putin‟s regime was distinctly more authoritarian 
than that of Yeltsin.  A brief examination of how the powerful, and often dissenting, groups 
Putin inherited when he came into office were dealt with provides evidence of this. 
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 Putin came to power with a relatively fractured political elite system in place.  There 
were no fewer than five power groups vying for control over Russian politics.
224
  These 
groups consisted of Yeltsin‟s „Family‟, the Oligarchs, regional leaders, the Siloviki (power 
ministries--the FSB, internal affairs, military), and reform-minded bureaucrats from St. 
Petersburg (liberal technocrats).
225
  The „Family‟ was the term used to refer to Yeltsin‟s inner 
circle, which consisted of his heads of the Presidential Administration Valentin Yumashev and 
Alexander Volshin, his daughter Tatiana Dyachenko, and wealthy oligarchs Roman 
Abramovich and Boris Berezovsky.
226
  Other oligarchs who were still powerful at the time of 
Putin‟s ascendance include Vladimir Gusinsky, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Vladimir 
Potanin.  These two groups were essentially holdovers from the Yeltsin period.  The leaders of 
Russia‟s federal districts, who were still popularly elected at the time, were at first the only 
power group which did not see Putin as an agent of their personal interests.
227
  The Siloviki 
and the Liberal Technocrats rode Putin‟s coattails to power.  Putin, needing to create his own 
power base, appointed these individuals to the top levels of his administration. This was not 
necessarily because of their security or reform backgrounds, but because Putin knew them 
personally from his days with the KGB and his time in the St. Petersburg Mayor‟s office, and 
he trusted them.
228
   Putin bemoaned the decentralizing trends in Russian politics throughout 
the 1990‟s, and believed that the vertical chain of command had to be restored.
 229
  
Subsequently, he spent his first term in office chipping away at the political power of Yeltsin 
period holdovers.    
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Putin began reconstructing Russia‟s vertical power structure by stripping political 
power away from Russia‟s new business elites.  In late July 2000, a meeting was arranged 
between the newly inaugurated President of Russia and a number of the so-called business 
oligarchs who made their wealth during the 1990‟s privatization.   This meeting was presaged 
by a series of actions taken by the Putin administration whereby businesses, controlled by 
some of these very elites, had inquires launched against them concerning tax evasion, 
irregularities in the manner in which the enterprises fell into the hands of their current owners, 
and accusations of illegal sales of shares to foreigners.
230
  Vladimir Gusinsky, media mogul 
and critic of the President‟s revived war in Chechnya, was brought under investigation and 
detained for three days prior to the meeting.
231
   At this meeting the President offered 21 of 
Russia‟s wealthiest businessmen a truce.  The authorities would not review the outcomes of 
the privatization of the Russia‟s economy in the 1990‟s provided all of the businessmen stayed 
out of opposition politics.  
While no official transcripts are available from the meeting, the President‟s press 
release stated that the President made it clear that “it was unacceptable for competing 
companies to use state structures and law enforcement agencies to achieve their goals.”
232
  
Nor is it likely that an explicit deal was offered.  As Kakha Bendukidze, who was present at 
the meeting, put it, “I do not think this meeting draws any line.  The President asked us 
whether we were prepared to abstain from installing our people into the government 
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structures, and then he himself answered – no, you are not ready.”
233
  Moscow-based financial 
commentator Peter Ekman described the meeting in more cynical terms, suggesting “It was a 
play produced for public consumption, not necessarily a reflection of reality.  Many questions 
remain [such as whether] the show was just a cover for installing new, more Putin-friendly, 
oligarchs[. . .]”
234
  It seems likely in retrospect that the deal was implicit rather than explicit, 
but that the message was relatively clear: if you (oligarchs) want to keep your ill gotten gains, 
start paying your taxes and do not oppose the Kremlin.  Further, Ekman does not appear far 
off the mark as the oligarchs, with no power to oppose the President, provided at least implicit 
support to him.  As Hoffman, author of The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in New Russia puts 
it, “Putin‟s approch to oligarchic capitalism during his first year was not to change the system.  
He just wanted to get control of it.”
235
 
It is not the intention of this section to suggest who was guilty and who was innocent 
in the contest between Putin and the oligarchs.  It appears that those who Putin targeted had 
committed indiscretions during privatization in the 1990‟s; however, the selective nature of 
the attacks, and the questionable legal means employed, reflect negatively upon the Russian 
legal system and President Putin‟s intentions.   
The intricacies of Putin‟s assault on the oligarch‟s power are too significant to be dealt 
with fully here.  For now it should suffice to say that those business elites who threw their 
support behind the President and the state were able to keep their ill-gotten spoils from the 
1990‟s while those like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Boris Berezovsky 
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who were critical of the President and his policies were investigated, charged, and forced into 
exile (Gusinsky and Berezovsky) or imprisoned (Khodorkovsky).   
What is clear is that Putin, upon assuming office, did issue a warning of some kind to 
Russia‟s new business elite requesting they stay out of opposition politics and begin acting in 
what Putin saw as the interests of the state.  What is also clear is that those who took 
instructions from the Kremlin were generally spared investigation by the state, while those 
who criticized Putin and his policies had their assets seized, and were arrested or forced to flee 
the country.   
The examples made of Khodorkovsky, Gusinsky, and Berezovzky soured other 
oligarchs to the taste of politics, and as Boris Nemetsov, the man credited with coining the 
term oligarch in the Russian context, put it, “The oligarchs do not want to be oligarchs 
anymore, they just want to be respected and fairly patriotic businessmen.”
236
  Sending the 
state‟s two most prominent media moguls, and architects of his rise to power, into exile, and 
imprisoning Russia‟s richest, and at one time most powerful businessman, signalled the end of 
the oligarchs as an opposition political force in Putin‟s Russia.  This was a stated goal of Putin 
at the outset of his time in office, and it appears he was successful.  It was clear to all that 
opposition to Putin would bring the heavy hand of the state security and legal apparatus to 
bear upon the offender.  This certainly signalled a more authoritarian turn in Russian politics 
under Putin, but the „oligarchs‟ were not the only group that Putin sought to marginalize. 
Governors  
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A second step in the recentralization of power, and the recreation of a vertical power 
structure in the Russian Federation, was the reform of Russia‟s upper house of parliament, the 
Federation Council.  The 1993 Russian constitution provided for popularly elected regional 
governors in Russia‟s 89 regions, and throughout the 1990‟s these governors acted rather 
independently from the state.  Immediately upon taking office Putin moved to weaken the 
power of these regional leaders.  First, he created 7 regional districts to which the President 
appointed leaders and to whom the 89 elected regional leaders were to report.
237
  In August of 
2000 another law was passed limiting the powers of regional governors by removing them 
from the upper chamber of parliament, and stripping them of their immunity from 
prosecution.
238
  Putin‟s final act was to put an end to the popular election of regional 
governors.  A bill passed in September of 2004 stipulated an end to popular elections for 
regional leaders from the beginning of 2005, and also stipulated that the appointment of 
regional leaders would become the purview of the Kremlin.
239
 This more or less put an end to 
the regional governors as a force independent of the President. 
The „Family‟ 
While Putin moved quickly to neutralize the power of the Oligarchs and the regional 
governors, aside from Berezovzky, Yeltsin‟s ruling circle, the „family‟, retained some power 
and influence within the Kremlin during the first few years of Putin‟s administration.  Putin‟s 
first act as President was to grant Yeltsin immunity from prosecution, protecting him from 
legal action that some believed might be taken against him and his inner circle for corrupt 
dealings throughout the 1990‟s.  Further, Alexander Voloshin was kept on as head of the 
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Presidential Administration and Valentin Yumashev, another member of Yeltsin‟s inner 
circle, was allowed to keep his office in the Kremlin for most of Putin‟s first term.
240
  These 
remnants of the past would also fall by the wayside, however, and the formal powers of this 
group became greatly diminished during the final years of Putin‟s first term. 
Siloviki and the Technocrats 
While the early years of Putin‟s rule were characterized by a clampdown on some of 
the more powerful groups that carved out niches in the 1990‟s, it was also characterized by the 
rise of two groups within the Kremlin, the Siloviki and the Liberal Technocrats.  Loosely 
defined, the term Siloviki refers to the heads of Russia‟s „power‟ ministries, generally those 
with a background in the security services, police, or the military.  The second group, known 
as the Liberal Technocrats and/or the St. Petersburgers, consists of friends of Vladimir Putin 
with whom he worked in the St. Petersburg Mayor‟s office under Anatoly Sobchak.  While 
broadly stated these loosely defined groups agree that Russia should be governed by a strong 
and centralized executive, the Liberal Technocrats are more sensitive to the importance of the 
rule of law and the impact that forced renationalization has on the investment climate in 
Russia.
241
  Both of these factions were brought to power by Putin, and as we will see in the 
next section the Liberal Technocrats have come to dominate Russia‟s natural gas industry. 
Liquidation of the “Gasoviki” – Changing Individuals 
In a fashion similar to that of his predecessor, Putin placed individuals loyal to him in 
high level positions in the natural gas industry.  While Viktor Chernomyrdin was already a 
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well positioned manager within the Russian natural gas industry when Yeltsin came to power, 
it was nonetheless with presidential approval that he and his predecessor Rem Vyakhirev 
managed Gazprom throughout the 1990‟s.  Putin, upon entering office, was faced with the fact 
that it was Yeltsin‟s men who were running Gazprom.  Further, considering the asset 
stripping, non-payment of taxes, and cosy relationships with non-state gas companies that 
these men fostered when at Gazprom, it was never likely that they would retain their positions. 
Chernomyrdin 
Chernomyrdin oversaw the creation of Gazprom and managed it as CEO until he 
assumed the post of Prime Minister in 1992.  After his term as Prime Minister ended, 
Chernomyrdin was appointed Chairman of the company in 1999.  Only three months into 
Putin‟s first term as president Chernomyrdin resigned his newly acquired post at Gazprom.  
Analysts suggested at the time that Chernomyrdin had lost his influence over the company 
when Putin took office.
242
  Chernomyrdin suggested as much when after his resignation he 
stated that he was unhappy with his role as “advisor.”
243
  Speculation that Chernomyrdin was 
in fact fired
244
 was likely fuelled by the fact that he had a closed door meeting with Putin the 




When Chernomyrdin first left Gazprom in 1992 he had the pleasure of appointing his 
own successor.  This time, however, his successor would be chosen by Putin.  
Chernomyrdin‟s replacement was, at the time, a relative unknown--Dmitry Medvedev.  
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Medvedev was elected Chairman of the Board of Directors of Gazprom at the end of June 
2000.  Prior to taking the post Medvedev was deputy head of the presidential administration 
and worked closely with Putin at the St. Petersburg mayor‟s office under Anatoly Sobchak.  
This was one of the first steps taken by the Russian state to reign in the Soviet-era managers 
who controlled Gazprom throughout the 1990‟s.  The move was seen as a decrease in the 
power of Soviet-era management on the board of directors, as their representation shrank from 
five seats to four.  The number of seats held by state representatives increased from four to 
five.
246
  This advantage would soon come in handy when Putin began further attempts to 
reform the company and its relationship with the state. 
Rem Vyakhirev 
While Chernomyrdin appeared to leave Gazprom with little in the way of a fight, his 
protégé Rem Vyakhirev was less willing to be pushed aside.  Apart from his attempts to block 
independent shareholders from voting with regard to his future position
247
, there has also been 
some credible speculation that Vyakhirev attempted to further strip Gazprom of assets before 
his contract expired at the end of May 2001.
248
  Prior to the May 30
th
 Board of Directors vote 
there were attempts by both management and independent share holders to block one another 
from participating.  It is widely speculated that Gazprom management initiated legal 
proceedings which attempted to block roughly 2% of the company‟s voting shares, held by 
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minority share holders, from being represented at the meeting.  Further, old management 
attempted to block minority shareholder‟s nominations to the board.
249
     
In similar proceedings minority shareholders attempted to block Gazprom 
management‟s 5.5% of voting shares, and ban their six candidates for the Board of Directors 
elections.  In the end the government stepped into the dispute and essentially decreed that all 
voting shares would be represented and that no nominees would be banned from the 
elections.
250
  While the government eventually mediated the situation this conflict illustrates 
two things: first, the hostility that each side held for the other, and second, that some 
representatives of management at Gazprom were in no hurry to see the departure of 
Vyakhirev. 
In hindsight, the future of Vyakhirev at Gazprom appears to have been sealed when in 
mid-May 2001 Russia‟s Federal Securities Commission denied an application for the 
extension of the trust agreement that saw Vyakhirev manage the government‟s shares in the 
company from 1998 onwards.
251
  In the end voting was unanimous and Vyakhirev also voted 
to terminate his contract and step „upstairs‟ to a largely ceremonial position.
252
  One should 
not put too much stock in the unanimous decision to oust Vyakhirev as, with the government 
holding five of the eleven seats and independent shareholders hostile to current management 
holding two more, there was no point to showing dissent and displeasing Putin or the new 
CEO.   
Alexey Miller 
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Vyakhirev‟s replacement was voted on at the same May 30
th 
2001 meeting, and just as 
Chernomyrdin was replaced, a close associate of Putin‟s was voted into the vacant CEO 
position.  Alexey Miller, Putin‟s apparent choice to succeed Vyakhirev, was born in 
Leningrad and worked on the public relations committee at the St. Petersburg Mayor‟s office 
from 1991-1996, alongside Putin and under Sobchak.  After Sobchak was voted out of office, 
Miller worked as the director for development and investment at the St. Petersburg Sea Port 
from 1996 to 1999.  From 1999 to 2000 he was the general director of the Baltic Pipeline 
System, and from 2000 until his move to Gazprom he was Russia‟s deputy energy minister.
253
  
He has been reported to be a close confidant of Putin.  A closer look at Putin‟s opinions on the 
Russian natural resource sector, and the state‟s role in it, provides a starting point for what 
should have been expected from the individuals he appointed. 
The Putin Thesis 
Putin‟s views on the state‟s role in the Russian energy sector might have been 
inconsequential had it not been for the sharp increases in the price of energy at the turn of the 
century.  Putin‟s accession to the position of Prime Minister took place in August of 1999, and 
oil prices bottomed out in December of 1998 at $10.40 per barrel and began an eight year 
upward trend.  As a result Putin‟s perception of the government‟s role in Russia‟s increasingly 
profitable gas sector assumed considerable importance.  Putin sketched a rough road map for 
the role of the state in exploiting Russia‟s energy and mineral wealth even before taking 
office.  In a thesis submitted to the St. Petersburg Mining Institute in 1997, and in a 
subsequent article, Putin outlined how he saw the relationship between the state and natural 
resources.  Essentially, Putin linked the future of the Russian economy to harnessing its 
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natural resource extraction potential.
254
  He viewed state control over these resources as 
necessary to ensure that the benefits they bring could be harnessed by the state and put to 
work for it.
255
  The centerpiece of this plan was the concept of national champion companies 
which, with state support, could compete internationally.
256
  Gazprom and Rosneft are two 
good examples of Russian national champions.  An analysis of rent seeking and distributive 
actions taken by Putin and his team, along with Medvedev‟s and Miller‟s support the of Putin 
thesis from 2000 to 2004, will illustrate a change in the situational mechanism away from 
distributing property rents to the capture and distribution of resource rents.  This change, and 
its implications, will be the next subject of discussion.  
The Individual Action Mechanism – Rent Seeking and Distribution in a New 
Environment  
The close relationship among Medvedev, Miller, and Putin cannot be understated.  
Both were brought from obscurity into the halls of power by Putin and as a result it was 
unlikely that their interests would diverge significantly from his.  This general trend can be 
seen even in their statements upon assuming their positions.  Medvedev, upon taking on the 
position of Gazprom‟s Chairman, noted that his role would be to “fulfill the laws of the 
company and protect the interests of shareholders, first and foremost the government.”
257
  
Miller was also reported to have told gas industry officials prior to assuming Gazprom‟s top 
job that the Government was to play a stronger role at Gazprom.
258
 
The commitment these two men demonstrated to the Putin thesis is underlined by their 
actions.   While Vyakhirev‟s control of Gazprom was characterized by the sale of assets to 
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companies outside government control, pipeline concessions to private companies, and tax 
evasion, Miller and Medvedev‟s first years at the helm were characterized by the reversal of 
these trends.  This was true in the domestic market, and in European and CIS export markets. 
Rent Capture for The State 
 In line with Gaddy and Ickes‟ division of rents discussed earlier in this chapter, an 
examination of the policies of Putin, Medvedev, and Miller shows a trend towards increasing 
the natural gas rents captured by the state.  This was accomplished by gaining control over the 
Gazprom board of directors, tax reform, regaining lost market share, and the renationalization 
of productive assets lost in the 1990‟s.  These moves increased the state share of formal taxes, 
its control over excess costs of production, and its share of after tax profits. 
Control of Gazprom 
Though between 2000 and 2004 the state‟s share of Gazprom shares remained constant 
at just over 38%, this number does not take into account the state‟s increased representation 
on the company‟s board of directors (from 4-5 of 11 directors) or the acquiescence of the 
board‟s independent members to Gazprom‟s moves to recapture as much production capacity 
and market share as possible.  Interestingly over the first few years of the new millennium 
independent shareholder interests and state interests appear to have coincided nicely.  While 
increasing the government‟s ownership share in Gazprom was the easiest way to increase the 
after tax profit share of rents generated through the extraction and export of natural gas, 
increasing the state‟s representation on the board of directors gave the individuals representing 
the state a much freer hand in determining Gazprom policies and more control over the 
creation and distribution of rents, including channelling excess production costs to benefit 
97 
 
Putin‟s goals.  This greater control can be seen through other policies that further increased 
the state‟s control over natural gas rents.  
Control of Pipelines 
 While throughout the 90‟s most of Russia‟s low-pressure domestic distribution system 
remained outside the control of Gazprom, after new management took over Gazprom gained 
control of over 90% of this network.
259
  By 2003, Gazprom controlled, or had a stake in, over 
75% of all domestic distribution organizations which served over 70% of the Russian 
domestic market.
260
  Further, while in the 1990‟s these gas distribution organizations were 
able to profit from the difference between the price at which they purchased gas from 
Gazprom subsidiaries and the price they received from consumers, by 2003 they were forced 
to pay this portion of their profit margin to the subsidiary from which it purchased the gas, 
thus capturing more after tax profit for the individuals controlling the state and Gazprom.
261
  
Throughout his time as CEO Miller fought to keep the production and distribution units of the 
company together, arguing that any such division would endanger domestic supplies.
262
   In 
the face of declining Gazprom production at the beginning of the century, Gazprom 
management began allowing independent producers access to Gazprom pipeline capacity; 
however, these concessions only extended to the domestic market, and were contingent on the 
amount of excess capacity in the system.
263
 
Recapturing Lost Assets 
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In what appears to have been an effort to stem this decline in production, almost 
immediately after Miller‟s and Medvedev‟s ascent to Gazprom‟s top spots the Board of 
Directors began a crusade to recapture assets lost to independent producers under the previous 
management team.   A year later, in 2002, Gazprom and Itera reached an agreement which 
saw Itera sell 32% of Purgaz back to Gazprom, and swap 52% of Severneftegazprom for small 
shares in companies already controlled by Itera.  Further, Itera lost its share of the Rospan 
production unit and Severneftegazprom parent company Zapsibgazprom.
264
  Itera‟s losses 
between 2001 and 2004 amounted to over 1 trillion cubic meters in natural gas reserves, much 
of which was captured by Gazprom.
265
  
Recapturing Market Share 
Aside from regaining production assets that were lost in the 1990‟s, Miller and 
Medvedev also set out to recapture the share of the CIS export market Gazprom gave up to 
Itera in the 1990‟s.  Through the denial of pipeline access and the repatriation of some of 
Itera‟s productive assets, Gazprom successfully squeezed Itera out of the CIS export market.  
In 2002 Gazprom increased its share of Russian gas deliveries to Estonia from 75% to 100%, 
its share of deliveries to Lithuania from 78% to 92%, and its share of deliveries to Latvia from 
74% to 84%.
266
  In 2003 Gazprom also returned to the abandoned markets of the south 
Caucusus, launching deliveries to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan at the same time that it 
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Interestingly, while Gazprom executives were able to remove Itera from the European 
CIS market, they were unable to capture Itera‟s entire market share for themselves, 
specifically in the Ukrainian market.  In November 2002 Gazprom began to limit the 
quantities of gas Itera was allowed to supply to Ukraine.  The deputy chairman of Gazprom 
suggested that “the transit contract of Central Asian gas to Ukraine may be fulfilled by 
Gazprom itself.”
268
  Eventually the Itera contract was terminated altogether.  This appeared to 
leave the door open for Gazprom to take full control over Central Asian gas exports to 
Ukraine; however, that did not turn out to be the case, as will be seen later.   
Tax Reform 
Further, while not tied directly to the new management of Gazprom, those controlling 
the state took steps to increase the share of revenue they received from the increasingly 
profitable export of natural gas.  In 2004, the methods of taxing the natural gas industry 
changed substantially.  Excise duties on natural gas were abolished while the mineral 
extraction tax was changed from 16.5% to a flat tax of 107 rubles per 1000 cubic meters 
produced.  The tax on exports was drastically increased from a mere 5% to 30%. 
269
 Complete 
figures on the government tax revenues for natural gas production export and sale are not 
readily available; however, Gazprom produces some statistics on the subject.   
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Figure 5.2 shows a large increase in the taxes Gazprom reports to have paid between 2000 and 
2004, having paid 213.4 billion rubles of taxes in 2000 and increasing this sum to 363.7 
billion rubles by 2004.
271
  This is perhaps the clearest indication of increased rent capture by 
those controlling the Russian state. 
It is not difficult to determine from the information provided above that, although not 
wholly successful in monopolizing natural gas rents, Gazprom‟s new management took an 
approach to Gazprom‟s role in the Russian natural gas industry that differed greatly from that 
of Soviet holdovers of the 1990‟s.  Whereas Chernomyrdin‟s and Vyakhirev‟s period at the 
helm of the company saw Gazprom lose market share and productive assets through 
concessions to supposed rival Itera, Miller‟s and Medvedev‟s first years at the helm saw much 
of this process reversed.  Further, this new assertive approach at Gazprom was directly in line 
with Putin‟s strategy of the state controlling the industry.  Putin placed individuals close to 
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him at the head of Gazprom and they fulfilled his strategy seemingly to the letter, engaging in 
resource rent capture for the state. 
Rent Distribution by the State 
 While tracking the distribution of natural resource rents is more difficult than tracking 
the distribution of property, some statistics show that a greater share of rents which were 
captured by the state were distributed to state employees.  Statistics from Russia‟s Federal 
Statistics Service show sizable increases in the salaries of individuals working in public 
administration, defence, and receiving social security payments.  From 2000 to 2004 the 
average monthly nominal accrued wages in this sector increased almost threefold from 2.712 
million rubles to 7.898 million rubles.
272
  Further, this sector‟s share of the overall Russian 
workforce fell from 7.4% in 2000 to 6.9% in 2004.
273
 The wages of educators, and health and 
social workers followed a similar trend, each growing by roughly 3.4 times over this period,
274
 
while their representation in the work force increased from 15.8% to 16.3%.
275
  Assuming 
these wage increases were made possible by increased revenue from natural resources, and it 
is hard to see where else they may have come from, this shows that at least some of the rents 
captured by the those controlling the state and Gazprom through the extraction of natural 
resources, including natural gas, were used to increase the salaries of state employees.   
Though illustrative of the pattern of resource rent distribution which characterized 
Putin‟s first term, the above statistics fail to illustrate the growth of Russia‟s bureaucracy 
                                                          
272
Russian Federal Statistics Service, “Average Monthly Nominal Accrued Wages of Employees of Organizations by Kinds of 
Economic Activities,” http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/07-07.htm, Accessed April 28 2009.  
273
Labrosta Internet, “Russia - Total Employment by Economic Activity 1997-2007,” http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest, 
Accessed April 27 2009. 
274
Russian Federal Statistics Service, “Average Monthly Nominal Accrued Wages of Employees of Organizations by Kinds of 
Economic Activities,” http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b08_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/07-07.htm, Accessed April 28 2009.  
275
Labrosta Internet, “Russia - Total Employment by Economic Activity 1997-2007,” http://laborsta.ilo.org/STP/guest, 
Accessed April 27 2009. 
102 
 
characterized by Shevtsova in one of her most recent works, Russia Lost in Transition: The 
Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, as “burgeoning officialdom.”
276
  Moving away from pensioners 
and public administrators into more specifically defined occupational categories, the trend 
highlighted by Shevtsova becomes more evident.  The share of the Russian workforce made 
up of legislators, senior officials, managers, including senior government officials, corporate 
managers, and general managers increased from 4.3% in 2000 to 6.7% in 2004.
277
  These 
numbers more clearly illustrate the growth of the bureaucracy during Putin‟s first term, and 
the pattern of resource rent distribution that would be expected from individuals operating 
under the Putin thesis.     
Interestingly, individuals employed in electricity, gas, and water supply occupations 
grew as an absolute number by over 500,000 from 2000 to 2004, and as a share of the Russian 
working population from 2.5% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2004.  The increase in the number of 
individuals working in these occupations is less stark than that of legislators and managers, 
but still demonstrates the growth in rents distributed to these industries, and hints at an 
increase in rent distribution in the industry through an increase in the cost of production, 
another destination of resource rents highlighted by Gaddy and Ickes.  
Russia‟s Foreign Reserves 
While rent distribution to state officials and employees is apparent between 2000 and 
2004, all of the rents were clearly not distributed.  In fact, a good deal were saved in the form 
of international financial reserves including foreign exchange and gold.  Russia‟s reserve 
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position stood at 27.9 billion U.S. dollars at the end of 2000.
278
  This figure increased 
substantially by 2004, reaching a level of 123.5 billion U.S. dollars by year‟s end.
279
  That 
represents more than a fourfold increase in Russia‟s international reserve position in only four 
years.  If we go back to the late 1990‟s this increase looks even sharper as Russia‟s reserve 
position stood at 17.7 billion U.S. dollars in 1997, 12.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1998, and 12.4 
billion U.S. dollars in 1999.
280
  Thus, from a low in the late 90‟s of 12.2 billion in 
international reserves, Russia saw a more than tenfold increase in its international reserve 
position by 2004.   
Stabilization Fund 
Though it was not a direct product of natural gas rents the Russian government set up a 
stabilization fund in early 2004.  This fund accumulates the revenues gained from oil export 
duty and the tax on oil extraction operations when the price of Urals blend crude oil exceeds 
27$ U.S. per barrel.
281
  This fund is essentially designed to capture and save oil rents for 
distribution at a later date.   By the end of 2004 the fund reached a level of 522.2 billion 
Rubles.
282
  The government would not set up the National Wealth Fund, which would also 
draw on natural gas revenues, until 2008.  While the increase in the number of state officials 
and their pay is funded by more than just natural gas rents (a greater share can probably be 
attributed to oil revenues), as were the increases in Russia‟s international reserve position and 
the creation of a stabilization fund, natural gas rents did play a role, and this is more evidence 
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that the state has been able to capture natural resource rents and use them, or save them, for its 
own purposes. 
Summary of Individual Action 
Three results of the situational mechanism (patrimonialism through the distribution of 
resource rents) have been illustrated in the preceding section.  First, the President has sought 
to maximize the state‟s share of increasing natural resource rents as outlined in the Putin 
thesis.  Second, individuals appointed by Putin have sought to maximize the rents they 
control, in this case by controlling Gazprom and natural gas rents, by supporting Putin‟s 
policy of increasing the state‟s role in the industry, and further by directing the execution of 
policies aimed at this end.  Third, the rents that have been captured by the state, at least in 
part, have been redistributed to public administrators, government officials, corporate 
managers (often appointed and controlled by the state), lower level managers, gas industry 
workers, and pensioners.  This is in stark contrast to the position of business elite and Soviet 
era managers who were the main beneficiaries of Yeltsin‟s patrimonialism.  Further, some of 
these funds have been placed in government controlled coffers for use at a later date.  The 
impacts of these individual actions on macro level outcomes will now be discussed.  
The Russian States Increasing Control Over the Natural Gas Industry 
 
Miller and Medvedev were successful in regaining a large portion of the reserve base 
Gazprom lost through the 1990‟s, regaining the portion of Purgaz essentially given to Itera in 
the late 1990‟s along with Severneftegazprom and its parent company Zapsibgazprom.  
Management at Gazprom was also able to gain control over a larger share of the domestic low 
pressure gas transport system and limit the use of this system, as well as the high pressure 
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high capacity export system, by non-state parties.  As far as market share is concerned, though 
in the early years of the decade Itera controlled over 50% of the total gas exported to the CIS, 
this changed sharply in 2003.  In 2002 Gazprom exported 42.3 bcm to the CIS and Itera 
exported 44.9 bcm.  In 2003 Gazprom exported 44.1 bcm to the CIS while Itera only 14.08 
bcm.  This drop in Itera‟s market share is reflective of its loss of the contract to export 
Turkmen gas to Ukraine, and its lost market share in the Baltic states and the Caucusus.  As 
discussed above this did not translate into a direct gain of Ukrainian market share for 
Gazprom, as it did not take over the contract directly, leaving UralTransGas with a share of 
around 20 bcm for 2003 and 2004, in accordance with the deal reached by Ukraine and 
Turkmenistan in 1998. 
In sum, from 2000 – 2004 Gazprom management was able to wrestle back a large 
portion of the reserve base that was lost in the 1990‟s, gain greater control of Russia‟s natural 
gas transit system, and individuals controlling the Russian state were able to increase their 
influence substantially within the company.  This put Gazprom in a better position to fulfil 
domestic and export demand, but did not translate directly into a drastically increased share of 
the Ukrainian market.  The company still maintained a monopoly over exports to Europe 
during this period which, given the rising price of natural gas in that market, translated into a 
sizable increase in profits, and with a large increase in export taxes the state was able to 
capture a much larger share of the spoils.  This allowed for the swelling of Russia‟s foreign 
reserve holdings, the start a new stabilization fund, and an increase in the number of and 
salary paid to government officials.  Before moving on to the transformational mechanism‟s 
effect on natural gas prices for Ukraine, the next question that must be addressed is the role 
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that Turkmen natural gas played in the regional natural gas trade, and specifically in Ukrainian 
imports. 
Eurasian Natural Gas Trade and the Role of Turkmenistan 2000-2004 
In the year 2000, European and Eurasian natural gas production reached 959.5 bcm, its 
highest level since 1989.
283
  This was an increase of close to 25 bcm over 1999.  The increases 
continued throughout the first half of the decade, reaching 1055.6 bcm by 2004.
284
 Over four 
years this constituted an increase of 96.1 bcm of production, more than three times the 
increase seen from 1995 – 1999.
285
  Russia‟s share of regional production, which stood at 
56.8% in 2000, continued its slow decline, falling to 55.9% by 2004.
286
  Turkmenistan‟s share 
of regional production grew slightly over this period, from 4.6% in 2000, up from 2.3% in 
1999, to 5.1% in 2004.
287
 
As far as consumption is concerned, European and Eurasian natural gas consumption 
increased from 1013.5 bcm in 2000 to 1101.2 in 2004, making for an increase of 87.7 bcm, 
the biggest five year jump since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
288
  Russian domestic 
consumption saw a much greater increase than it did over the previous four years, moving 
from 377.2 bcm in 2000 to 401.9 bcm in 2004, an increase of 24.7 bcm.
289
  Turkmenistan‟s 
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domestic consumption grew as well over this period, beginning in 2000 at 12.6 bcm and 
ending in 2004 up almost 3 bcm at 15.5 bcm. 
290
 
Consumption relative to production in Russia stood at 69.2% in 2000, an increase over 
1999 numbers, and decreased slightly to 68% by 2004.
291
 Turkmenistan‟s share of production 
consumed fell sharply between 1999 and 2000 from 53% to 28.7%.
292
  Between 2000 and 
2004 Turkmenistan‟s consumption of production decreased ever so slightly to 28.4%.
293
  
What is clear from these numbers is that while the late 1990‟s saw Turkmenistan consuming 
more than half the gas it produced, the onset of the new century saw that number decrease 
substantially, leading to an increase in the volumes of gas Turkmenistan had to export, and 
increasing its overall contribution to the European and Eurasian gas balance.   
Russia‟s contribution to the overall regional balance remained close to stagnant, and 
actually decreased slightly.  With an increase in regional consumption of 63 bcm, when 
Russia is removed from the equation
294
 it becomes clear that Turkmenistan, with an increased 
share of regional production and increased export capacity, becomes more important to 
fulfilling increasing regional demand.  This is in sharp contrast to the 1995-1999 period that 
saw Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production shrink along with its export capacity.  
Russia, though still a major producer and exporter in absolute terms was, between 2000 and 
2004, unable to increase its export capacity and unable to capture a larger market share in the 
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face of growing demand.  For example, in 2001 Gazprom was forced to import natural gas 
from Turkmenistan to fulfil its supply contract with the Netherlands.
295
 
While it is apparent that Turkmenistan gas exports became a larger part of the 
European and Eurasian natural gas trade, the importance of these volumes can be overstated if 
they are not examined in the context of pre-Soviet collapse numbers.  In 1989, for example, 
Turkmen natural gas production made up 8.7% of regional production, a much greater share 
than that attributed to it in 2004.
296
 Further, Turkmenistan‟s consumed share of production in 
1989 was 17.4%, much less than the 28.7% consumed in 2004.  This means that even by 2004 
Turkmenistan had less gas to export than it did in 1989, as part of the Soviet Union. 
In sum, production and consumption numbers for 2000 to 2004 show an increase in 
Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production, and an increase in the volumes it had available 
for export.  While this suggests a growth in the importance of Turkmen gas regionally, a 
comparison of 2004 numbers with 1989 numbers shows that while Turkmenistan‟s share of 
production and exports increased by 2004 they still remained below their levels in 1989.  Thus 
although increasing in importance, Turkmen gas supplies were still of small, albeit growing 
importance for the region as a whole. 
Turkmen-Ukraine Bilateral Gas Deals-Business as Usual 
As in the late 1990‟s, the early 2000‟s saw Turkmenistan and Ukraine signing deals 
over pricing and supply, and a reliance on Gazprom and intermediary companies for the 
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transit of the gas.
297
  In 2000 Ukraine‟s non-payment for gas from Turkmenistan once again 
forced the latter to cutoff supplies.  During this supply disruption Gazprom management once 
again agreed to supply Ukraine with more gas than originally contracted, 5 bcm, at $80 per 
1000 cm.
298
  Agreements on Ukrainian debt were reached in July of 2000, and Turkmenistan 
and Ukraine struck a deal that would resume the shipment of 20 bcm of natural gas to Ukraine 
at a price of $42 per 1000 cm.  This agreement also envisioned an increase in the amounts 
exported to Ukraine over the next 10 years to 50 bcm per year.
299
 
There is not enough space here to provide a full account of the negotiations that took 
place between Russia, Ukraine, and Turkmenistan regarding Turkmen exports to Ukraine 
from 2000 to 2004, but what is important is that during the 5 years in question in this section 
Ukraine still purchased gas through direct talks with Turkmenistan and third party 
intermediary companies, and did not buy all of its gas directly from Gazprom. 
The bilateral structure of Ukrainian Turkmen gas negotiations did not change over the 
period of time in question, but the intermediary that handled the transportation of this gas did.  
In November of 2002 Gazprom reduced the amount of gas Itera could supply to Ukraine and 
at the end of this month Gazprom official Aleksandr Ryazanov is quoted as saying “the transit 
contract of Central Asian gas to Ukraine may be fulfilled by Gazprom itself.  We will supply 
Turkmen gas to Ukraine on the same terms as Itera, and maybe even better. . . Why should 
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Itera make super profits using the facilities of Gazprom?”
300
  This was the end of Itera as the 
intermediary between Turkmenistan and Ukraine. 
While Ryazanov‟s statement appeared to indicate Gazprom‟s desire to more closely 
control Turkmen exports to Ukraine from 2002-2004 this did not materialize.  Instead, another 
intermediary, EuralTransGas, was set up.  This company was supposed to be a 50-50 joint 
venture between Gazprom and Naftohaz Ukrainy, however, these companies‟ involvement 
never materialized.
301
  Once again the profits from the transit of Turkmen gas to Ukraine were 
being captured by a private company with an unclear ownership structure, and were not being 
directly returned to either Ukraine or Russia.  While there is little evidence to indicate why 
Gazprom and Naftohaz were unable or unwilling to take control of this intermediary, what is 
clear is that while Gazprom management was able to increase the rents it captured from the 
export of natural gas between 2000 and 2004, they were not able, or did not care to capture the 
rents generated by the sale of Turkmen gas to Ukraine.  Of course, in Russia‟s corrupt 
business climate there is always a chance that those controlling Gazprom were benefitting 
personally in some way.  Further, given the still limited importance of Turkmen gas 
regionally, dominating the Ukrainian-Turkmen gas trade may have been less of a priority than 
the recapture of productive assets and pipeline control. 
Another interesting trend that revealed itself during this period was the Turkmen 
government‟s desire to raise the prices at which it exported natural gas to both Ukraine and 
Russia.  Throughout most of the period from 2000 to 2004 both states purchased Turkmen gas 
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for between $42 and $44 per 1000 cm.  At the end of 2004 Turkmenistan sought to raise this 
price to $60 per 1000 cm.
302
 Ukraine and Russia both demanded that the price remain the 
same for 2005, and Gazprom actually sought at one point to see the price decreased to $25 per 
1000 cm.
303
  These disputes triggered a brief cutoff of Turkmen gas to Ukraine and Russia in 
the early days of 2005.  The dispute was settled on the Ukrainian side when Ukraine agreed to 
pay $58 per 1000 cm.
 304
  On the Russian side there were no such concessions over pricing, 
and Russia saw no Turkmen supplies into mid 2005.
305
 
One other point of consequence over this period was the signing of a long term gas 
supply contract between Turkmenistan and Russia.  Under the terms of this 2003 contract, by 
2007 Gazprom would purchase all Turkmen gas bound for Russia and Europe.  Under the 
contract Russia would import 5-6 bcm in 2004, 6-7 bcm in 2005, 10 bcm in 2006, and 60-70 
bcm in 2007.
306
  This contract was likely the final nail in the coffin of Ukraine‟s direct 
purchase of natural gas from Turkmenistan, but this did not become apparent until after 2004. 
The Transformational Mechanism and Gas Prices for Ukraine 2000-2004  
While Turkmen gas, at a price of $44 per 1000 cm, was playing a much larger role in 
Ukrainian consumption, Russia sold gas to Ukraine at an average price of $50 per 1000 cm 
from 2000 to 2004.
307
  The gas Ukraine received over this period, totalling between 26 and 28 
bcm per year, was paid for by the transit of Russian gas to Europe through Ukrainian 
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  Any gas in excess of this, including gas illegally siphoned off during transit 
across Ukrainian territory and increased amounts supplied by intermediaries above and 
beyond the contracted quantities, was sold for the same price per 1000 cm as in the late 1990‟s 
($80 per 1000 cm). 
Russia‟s gas pricing for Ukraine from 2000-2004 seems somewhat anomalous 
considering Putin‟s, Miller‟s, and Medvedev‟s preferences for rent capture for the state.  All 
other things being equal one would expect that these individuals would have sought to 
increase the rents that Gazprom and the state received from the export of gas to Ukraine by 
eliminating subsidies.  Over this period all other things were not equal, however, and Ukraine 
and Turkmenistan had existing deals which prevented Russia from monopolizing the 
Ukrainian market for imports.  Also, while natural gas prices rose substantially over this 
period, these increases would be dwarfed by skyrocketing increases over the next four years.  
Further, the unexplainable role that UralTransGas played in the transit of Turkmen gas to 
Ukraine prevented Gazprom‟s management from controlling the intermediaries which shipped 
Turkmen gas to Ukraine, and capturing the rents this trade generated.  Finally, although 
Turkmen gas was becoming more important regionally it had still not regained the share of 
regional production and export that it enjoyed during the late Soviet period.  This limited 
importance likely played a role in Gazprom management‟s decision not to disrupt the bilateral 
nature of Ukrainian-Turkmen natural gas agreements. 
Summary 
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 Major changes took place in Russia between 2000 and 2004.  These changes altered 
the patrimonial situational mechanism identified in Chapter Two to a great degree.  Increasing 
global energy prices increased the rent generating potential of Russia‟s natural resources, and 
the new Russian President Vladimir Putin, inclined to rule in a more authoritarian manner, 
sought to capture and distribute these rents in order to strengthen the state, in return for 
political support.  While Yeltsin had a vast pool of state property to distribute through 
patrimonial networks, Putin was blessed with increasing resource rents which could be 
distributed.   
Putin himself outlined the role he believed the state should play in the extraction and 
sale of these resources quite clearly, and he appointed clients who supported this vision to 
positions at the head of Gazprom.  These clients, Miller and Medvedev, sought to increase the 
rents they controlled and supported their patron‟s goals by recapturing assets and  the market 
share Gazprom and the Russian state lost during the 1990‟s, and by increasing taxes charged 
on natural gas extraction and export activities. Theoretically this is what should have been 
expected given the change in the situational mechanism from patrimonialism based on 
property distribution to one based on natural resource rent distribution.  One result of these 
individual actions was an increase in the rents those in charge of the state were able to control, 
distribute, and save.  A second result was an increase in the state‟s control over Gazprom and 
the Russian natural gas industry. 
 What did not change over this period was the price that Ukraine paid Russia for natural 
gas exported by the latter.  Prices, for both contracted and extra volumes, remained the same 
from 1998 to 2004.  This can be at least partially attributed to the continuation of Ukrainian-
Turkmen bilateral gas trade agreements, and Gazprom‟s continued reluctance to pay what was 
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necessary to purchase all of Turkmenistan‟s exportable gas volumes. One can only surmise 
that Russia and Gazprom allowed these bilateral agreements to continue, and refused to pay 
higher prices for Turkmen gas, due to the still relatively minor role Turkmen gas played in 
European and Eurasian regional trade, and the still relatively low, though growing, prices for 
natural gas in Europe.   
 While price increases were not seen directly after the aforementioned changes in the 
situational mechanism, the individual action mechanism (the rent seeking and distribution 
preferences of individuals) was apparent and did result in macro level changes in the state‟s 
capabilities relating to the natural gas industry, and also altered the flow of rents away from 
powerful private business entities toward state employees and bureaucrats.  What will be seen 
in the next chapter is that with further increases in global energy demand and prices, along 
with increased interest in Turkmen gas exports from European nations--constituting a change 
in the situational mechanism--the actions of those who controlled Gazprom changed once 
more, and capturing rents generated by Turkmen gas export and extractions became a higher 











Factors Determining Russia’s Natural Gas Prices for Ukraine 2005 - 2008 
Introduction 
 This chapter will begin with a discussion of the further variation in Russia‟s 
patrimonial political structure between 2005 and 2008; specifically, the increasing value of 
resource rents which the regime relies on and the increasingly authoritarian nature of Putin‟s 
regime.  This will be followed by an examination of the actions taken by Gazprom 
management to increase the rents which the company and the state controls, and will be 
followed by a discussion of the  impacts these actions had on the state‟s control over the 
Russian natural gas industry. Further, reference will be made to rent distribution to state 
employees through increased wages, and the channelling of some of these rents into state 
savings accounts.  All of this will be followed by a discussion of the increasing role of 
Turkmen gas in the regional energy mix, and moves by Ukraine and European states to 
wrestle control of this gas from Russia and Gazprom.  Gazprom management‟s reaction to 
these moves will then be highlighted, followed by an examination of the effect that the above-
mentioned developments had on the price of gas exported through Russia to Ukraine. 
Further Variation in Russia’s Patrimonial System, The Situational Mechanism, and Natural  
Resource Rents   
The trends influencing the core features of Russia‟s patrimonial system did not change 
during Putin‟s second term.  Global oil prices, and natural gas prices tied to them, spiked more 
sharply than during the previous four years, and the increasingly authoritarian nature of 
Putin‟s leadership was unmistakeable.  In this section we will begin with a brief discussion of 
116 
 
global energy prices over this period and then discuss authoritarian trends in Russia between 
2005 and 2008. 
Natural Resource Bonanza 
From 2000 to 2004 world oil prices and Russian natural gas export prices at the 
German border increased substantially; however, these increases pale in comparison to 
increases from 2005 to 2008.  By the end of 2004 Russian natural gas prices at the German 
boarder reached 156.24 USD per 1000 cm, this number shot upward in January 2005 to 
182.16 USD per 1000 cm.
309
  This spike, rather than representing a temporary increase, 
marked the trend for the following four years.   By the beginning of 2006 the price of Russian 
gas at the German border reached 275.76 USD per 1000 cm, reaching 302.40 USD per 1000 
cm by the beginning of 2007, and topping out at 576.72 USD per 1000 cm by the end of 
2008.
310
  While the period from 1999 to 2004 saw roughly a 2.5 fold price increase, the much 
shorter period from the end of 2004 to the beginning of 2006 (the onset of Russian price 
increases to Ukraine) saw prices increase by 1.75 times (see figure 2.1 Chapter Two).
311
 
Further, by the end of 2008 the 2004 price had increased by almost 3.7 times.  This shows that 
while natural gas was growing in monetary value between 2000 and 2004 these increases were 
small compared to the increases seen from 2005 to 2008. 
The increases in natural gas prices were largely due to the fact that global oil prices 
were also on the rise over this period, and Russian natural gas sales to Western Europe are tied 
to oil prices.   From the end of 2004 to the middle of 2008 world oil prices ballooned by 
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nearly 3.4 times (see figure 2.2 Chapter Two).
312
  These were the sharpest increases since the 
late 1970‟s and the early 1980‟s.  Analysis of these increases illustrates the increasing value of 
oil and natural gas exports from Russia, and also suggests a large, even larger than 2000-2004, 
increase in the rent generating potential of these natural resources.   
Rents and Natural Gas 
While Gaddy and Ickes provide an estimate for natural gas rents up until 2005, no such 
estimates exist for 2006 onwards.  It is beyond the scope of this project to rigorously estimate 
these rents, but it can be safely assumed that from 2005 until 2008 the potential rents 
generated by the extraction and sale of Russian natural gas increased substatially.  This 
assumption is lent weight by the increase in revenue Gazprom received from foreign and 
domestic gas sales, which essentially doubled between 2004 and 2007.
313
  It must be stated 
that some of these increases are likely due to price increases for Ukraine and other former 
Soviet states that took place over this period, but it is prudent to remember that these increases 
brought prices for these states in line with those in the rest of the region.  This has been the 
Kremlin‟s justification, from the outset, of the increases, and without global and regional 
energy price increases, justifying the price increases would have been even more difficult. 
Authoritarian Trends in Putin‟s Russia 
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 As Shevtsova has aptly stated, “Russia‟s post communist evolution can serve as a 
textbook case of failed democratic transition.”
314
  Shevtsova goes on to label Russia an 
imitation democracy in which a facade of democratic institutions shield from view the 
authoritarian, bureaucratic, or oligarchic tendencies that are present.
315
  This assessment 
appears to capture the reality of Putin‟s regime quite well.  
 The marginalization of powerful political groups including the business elite, regional 
governors, and Yeltsin-era confidants was covered in the previous chapter.  Authoritarian 
trends evident in Putin‟s dealings with these groups continued into his second term and are 
exemplified by the strategic modifications he made to the parliamentary electoral system over 
this period.  Most of the modifications made between the 2003 and 2007 parliamentary 
elections were encapsulated by a package of reforms passed by the Duma in early July 
2005.
316
  Under the new rules, which were proposed by the president and passed by the Duma, 
independents were barred from running for Duma election and the minimum membership that 
a political party required to participate in elections was raised from 10,000 to 50,000.  Further, 
all deputies were now to be elected by proportional representation, rather than partly through 
proportional representation and partly through direct election, as provided for in the 1993 
constitution.
317
   
It is in some ways counterintuitive to point to increased proportional representation as 
an authoritarian trend.  Proportional representation is often associated with more 
representative government and the fractionalization of political party systems.  The question 
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then lingers, why did Putin believe a purely proportional electoral system would serve his 
interests?
318
  In a 2005 paper entitled “More Proportional But Less Fair: Electoral System 
Reform in Putin‟s Russia” Bryon Moraski argues that “the answer could be that Putin [who 
benefits from one party rule] believes it will further weaken the political influence of regional 
politicians and create a more institutionalized party system.”
319
  He further qualifies this 
answer, suggesting that although United Russia won a clear majority in the 2003 
parliamentary elections, its future success would be more certain under a totally proportional 
system.  Moraski goes on to offer evidence that shows gaps in support for United Russia in the 
2003 elections, and points to Putin‟s electoral reforms, specifically the elimination of single 
member districts, as a strategy for closing these gaps.
 320
   
Putin‟s party, Untied Russia, was created following Putin‟s first election victory in 
2000.  In the 2003 parliamentary elections United Russia won 120 proportional seats and 106 
single member district seats.
321
  This secured the party a majority in the Duma, while the 
Communist party of the Russian Federation, United Russia‟s next closest competitor, gained 
just 52 seats in total.
322
 Further, victorious independents and members of smaller parties 
joined United Russia after their election.  This gave United Russia two thirds of the seats in 
the duma, and enough votes to change the constitution.
323
  This appears to be an 
overwhelming victory and surely raises questions of why would the President change the 
electoral system when his party is performing so well under it?
324
  The answer that Moraski 
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points to is that in the case of Russia single member district seats, increase rather than 
decrease the plurality of electoral results.
325
  He further suggests that rather than simply 
increasing the quantity of seats for United Russia, Putin was interested in a qualitative change 
favouring consistently loyal representatives, rather than political opportunists.
326
  In the end 
Moraski concludes that while in the short term Russia‟s electoral reform may increase the 
disproportionate nature of election results, the removal of single member districts should 
eventually lead to party consolidation and alleviate the disproportionate nature of outcomes.
327
  
Moraski, however, also points to other electoral reforms beyond the switch to a completely 
proportional system which may institutionalize United Russia as the party of power in 
Russia.
328
  These other reforms will be the next subject of discussion.  
The package of laws passed in 2005 outlined other changes.  These changes included 
banning the formulation of blocs within the Duma, and forbidding legislators from switching 
parties after the election.  The threshold for parliamentary representation was increased from 
5% to 7% and rules on party and election financing were changed increasing state funding for 
registered parties, and also increasing the restrictions placed on external party funding.   
Whereas in 2003 anonymous donations and donations from foreign entities were allowed, 
these provisions were removed.  Donations from foreigners were banned, and the 
identification of all donors became a requirement. 
329
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The registration process for elections changed as well over this period.  Under the new 
rules, parties already in the Duma automatically qualify for the election, while those not 
represented are required to gather 200,000 signatures, or make a cash deposit.  The cash 
deposit requirement increased from 35 million rubles in 2003 to 60 million rubles in 2007.  
Further, it has been suggested by some that the new registration process involves so much 




Finally, rules on the conduct of elections changed from 2003 to 2005.  In the 2005 
elections “negative information” regarding other parties was not allowed to be televised.  New 
legislation also broadened the definition of extremist statements, and toughened the 
punishment for those convicted of making such statements.
331
  
These changes, combined with the state‟s increasing control over television media, 
state crackdowns on opposition party protests
332
, the assassinations of journalists
333
, and 
elections which have failed to meet the standard for fair and free elections by many 
accounts
334
, point to the increasingly authoritarian nature of the Putin regime since 2004.  This 
assessment should not, however, be confused with the assumption that the Putin or post Putin 
regimes are or will be stable.  Many authors point to the inherent instability of Russian 
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politics, highlighting the increasing power of the bureaucracy,
335
 backroom infighting 
amongst Russia‟s political elites,
336
 the failure of capitalism to satisfy the needs of the Russian 
people,
337
 the rise of right-wing nationalist forces,
338
 and Russia‟s reliance on high natural 
resource prices
339
 as factors possibly leading to growing instability in Putin‟s vertically 
integrated power structure.   It is not the intent of this brief section to question the possibility 
that these factors could destabilize Russia‟s political situation. This section points to the short 
term effects this authoritarian trend has on the pattern of rent capture and distribution in 
Russia, regardless of the long-term prospects for instability it almost surely sows.   
Summary of the Situational Mechanism 2005-2008 
The preceding section has illustrated two trends which affected the patrimonial nature 
of Russian society from 2005 to 2008.  First, with rapidly increasing global energy prices the 
rent generating potential of oil and natural gas increased substantially between 2005 and 2008, 
in many instances outpacing the growth seen during the previous four years. Second, it has 
been seen that Putin‟s regime has become more authoritarian by increasing the dominance of 
the Kremlin-backed party United Russia, and through a series of electoral reforms.  These 
reforms were designed to block or hamper independent forces from competing in 
parliamentary elections, and to increase the costs associated with forming a new political 
party.  Next it is important to provide more details about how Putin and the individuals he 
                                                          
335
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2007), 53-54. 
336




Lilia Shevtsova, Russia Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2007), 286. 
339




appointed to top positions at Gazprom acted to capture an even greater share of these 
increasing rents. 
Individual Action – Rent seeking and Distribution in Resource Rich and Authoritarian 
Russia   
Recapturing Gazprom 
The drive for rent capture exhibited by individuals in the Russian natural gas industry, 
specifically Vladimir Putin, Alexei Miller, and Dmitry Medvedev, changed little during the 
period from 2005 to 2008.  If one difference could be discerned it would likely be the intensity 
with which they sought to increase the state‟s, and therefore their own, share of the spoils.  
The first step taken to this end was the purchase of just over 10% of Gazprom‟s shares from 
independent share holders in mid 2005.  The deal saw Rosneft (Russia‟s state owned oil 
company), headed by Putin appointee and loyal friend Igor Sechin with the support of Miller 
and Medvedev, purchase a 10% stake.  With that the state captured a 51% majority share of 
the company.
340
  This stake was also purchased at a discount as Rosneft paid 7.15 billion 
USD, while independent share holders appraised the stake at 10.5 billion USD, and Morgan 
Stanley, Gazprom‟s advisor on the matter, pegged the price at 8.5 billion USD.
341
  This 
acquisition not only increased the state‟s voting rights on the company‟s board; since 
dividends are paid out per share they were also able to capture a greater share of Gazprom‟s 
after tax profits. 
Gazprom‟s New Acquisitions 
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The trend between 2000 and 2004 was for Gazprom to reassert control over assets lost 
to Itera during the 1990‟s.  Beginning in 2005, Miller and Medvedev set out to further 
reacquire assets lost to independent companies, as well as acquire new assets.  The first of the 
new assets came in the form of a 51% stake in NorthGas, a formerly independent Russian gas 
producer.   Gazprom lost control of NorthGas and its licence to exploit the 330 bcm Severo-
Urengoi field in northern Siberia in 1999, but 51% of the company was given back to 
Gazprom in 2005 after a lengthy legal battle.
342
  This would be just the first of many 
acquisitions by Gazprom between 2005 and 2008.   
Gazprom‟s biggest acquisition during this period was an oil company rather than a 
natural gas producer.  In November of 2005, a deal was finalized between Gazprom and 
Roman Abramovich under which Gazprom acquired a 72.6% share in the oil company Sibneft 
for a reported 13 billion USD.
343
 It appears that Abramovich‟s initial intention may have been 
to sell the company to a foreign firm, but a visit from the state tax authorities brought about an 
abrupt change in his plans.
344
 
Removing Foreign Enterprises from the Equation: Sakhalin I, Sakhalin II,TNK-BP   
 Prior to 2005 foreign enterprises were able to participate in the development of, and 
export of gas from, a number of projects in Russia‟s Far East.  Sakhalin Island, off Russia‟s 
eastern coast, was one of these projects.  Owing to the technical challenges posed by the 
location of the island off the east coast of Russia (see map below), the Russian government 
brought in foreign partners to assist with the Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II natural gas projects.  
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Under the production-sharing agreements signed in the 1990‟s the Russian government would 
not see any profit from the projects until the companies involved had recoup the initial fixed 
costs of the projects.
345
  As the costs of each project rose, along with the value of the oil and 
natural gas that was to be extracted, the Russian government began to second guess the deals.  
Figure 6.1 Sakhalin Natural Gas Projects346 
 I = Sakhalin I project  
II = Sakhalin II project 
  
The Sakhalin II project was initially to be a joint enterprise between Royal Dutch 
Shell, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi.   After cost overruns in the initial stages of the project to the 
tune of over 10 billion USD, and apparent environmental regulatory infractions, the Russian 
government and Gazprom managemet pressured Shell and its partners into rewriting the 
production sharing agreement (PSA) they had signed in the 1990‟s.  Shell and its partners 
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eventually sold half of the plus one share of the project to Gazprom for 7.45 billion USD.
347
  
This was about 3.55 billion USD less than had already been invested in the project by the 
original partners.
348
 This put Gazprom at the helm of the project, and served to increase the 
company‟s share of the growing East and South East Asian markets. 
 Similarly, Exxon Mobil has faced pressure to renegotiate its PSA for the Sakhalin I 
project after the authorities accused the company of not adhering to environmental 
regulations.  Further, Exxon has also been accused of cost overruns which effect profits for the 
government.  At the heart of the still ongoing negotiation is the destination of the project‟s 
gas.  Originally, Exxon, its Russian partner Rosneft, and Japan‟s Itochu had signed an 
agreement with the Chinese government to supply 8 bcm independent of Gazprom.  Citing the 
need for those gas volumes domestically, Gazprom management has been fighting to purchase 
all of the gas produced by the Sakhalin I project, and block independent sales to China.  As of 




 British Petroleum (BP) found itself in a similar situation with regards to its joint 
project with Tyumen oil (TNK), an independent Russian oil producer.  The two companies, 
which joined forces in a 2003 deal in which BP purchased 50% of TNK, creating BP-TNK, 
acquired the licence for the Kovykta natural gas field in Eastern Siberia.   By 2007 the field 
was not producing the agreed-upon 870 million cubic feet a day, and the Russian authorities 
were threatening to revoke the licence without any compensation.  The cause of the 
                                                          
347
 Guy Faulconbridge, Mikhail Yenukov, “Gazprom, Shell agree $7.45 bln Sakhalin-2 deal,” Reuters, December 21, 2006, 
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L21838009.htm, Accessed April 15 2009. 
348
Marshal Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2008), 131. 
349
 Vladimir Soldatkin, “Russia’s Sakhalin-1 2009 budget totals $2 bln,” Thomson Reuters, April 16, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/04/16/afx6299957.html, Accessed May 4 2009. 
127 
 
production shortfall however was Gazprom management‟s refusal to allow TNK-BP access to 
its export pipeline network.  Subsequently, TNK-BP could only sell gas to a neighbouring 
community, which could only consume roughly 240 million cubic feet per day.
350
  To meet 
the production quota set by the government TNK-BP would have had to flare the rest of the 
gas.  In addition to wasting an increasingly valuable resource, this would have put the 
company in direct violation of Russian law.
351
  Rather than lose the licence without 
compensation TNK-BP relented and sold a controlling share of the Kovykta project to 
Gazprom for a mere 900 million USD.  This price is a far cry from the estimated 12 billion 
USD value of the stake.
352
  BP has been put under further pressure to relinquish control of its 
stake in TNK-BP to the state, a battle that is ongoing.
353
 
The moves by Gazprom management and individuals heading the Russian state to 
limit or eliminate foreign and independent participation in the Russian natural gas industry 
have further increased the control that Gazprom has over Russian natural gas, especially 
exports.  Also, by increasing Gazprom‟s and therefore the state‟s share in these projects, the 
rents which they generate are more easily captured and redistributed by individuals controlling 
Russia‟s natural gas industry and the state.  The moves have also made clear the difficulties 
that face foreign companies when they do business in Russia. 
Taxation 
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 As has been seen in the previous chapter shows the amount of tax paid by Gazprom to 
the state increased substantially between 2000 and 2004.  These increases continued and 
became more significant between 2005 and 2007. 
Figure 6.2 Taxes Paid By Gazprom 2000 - 2007354 (Billions of Rubles)
 
As the above graph illustrates, while the increase between 2004 and 2005 was minimal, less 
than a billion rubles, the increase in 2006 was a substantial 130.3 billion rubles, and the 
increase in 2007, though modest, amounted to a little over 10 billion rubles.  In total these 
increases amount to a 141.5 billion ruble increase in taxes paid by Gazprom from 2004 to 
2007, and clearly illustrates an increase in the rents captured by those controlling the Russian 
state through formal taxes.  Data are not yet available for 2008. 
Rent Distribution    
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 For evidence of rent distribution by individuals heading the state and Gazprom through 
state structures, information on employment and salaries will once again be used.  As during 
the preceding four years, from 2005 to 2007 the wages of individuals working in public 
administration and defence, and those receiving social security payments, increased 
substantially.  While at the end of 2004 the average monthly accrued wages of workers in 
these sectors stood at 7.898 million rubles, by 2005 this number increased to 10.985 million 
rubles.   Increases continued through 2006 and 2007, reaching 13.477 million rubles and 
16.899 million rubles respectively.
355
  This shows a more than two-fold increase in wages paid 
to this sector from 2004 to 2007.  While this sector shrank slightly as a share of the Russian 
working population between 2000 and 2004, it remained constant between 2004 and 2007.  In 
2004 public administrators, defence officials, and pensioners made up 6.9% of the total work 
force. This number grew to 7% in 2005 and 2006 before retreating back to 6.9% in 2007.
356
  
The wages of those working in the education and health sectors more than doubled between 
2004 and 2007,
357
 while their representation as a portion of the total workforce remained 
virtually the same.
358
  These figures are indicative of resource rents being distributed to 
individuals who work for and rely on the state.    
 Turning to more specific occupational categories, the portion of the workforce made 
up of legislators, senior officials, and managers increased in absolute terms from 4,531,000 in 
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2004 to 4,868,000 in 2007, but they did not increase as a share of the total workforce.
359
  As 
far as workers in the natural gas, water, and electricity occupations are concerned their 
numbers showed only minor absolute increases from 2004 to 2007 and showed minor 
decreases as a share of the total working population.  These workers did, however, experience 
substantially increased wages over this period.  Average monthly accrued wages for natural 
gas electricity and water supply workers increased from 8.642 million rubles in 2004 to 
15.664 million rubles in 2007.
360
  This once again illustrates an increase in the share of the 
spoils for those who work in the largely state-controlled natural gas and electricity sectors, and 
much like the data presented in the previous chapter, hints at rent distribution via increased 
costs of production. 
Russia‟s Foreign Reserves 
 As outlined in the previous chapter, all of the resource rents captured by the state from 
2000 to 2004 were not distributed.  Some of the rents captured were saved by the state for 
future use in the form of international currency and gold reserves.  While this trend continued 
from 2005 to 2007, there was a sharp increase in the volume of funds saved.  At the end of 
2004 Russia‟s reserve position stood at 123.5 billion USD.
361
  By the end of 2005 this number 
had increased to 168.3 billion USD.
362
  This was a large increase of more than 40 billion USD 
but is small in comparison to the increases of the following years.  By the end of 2006 
Russia‟s reserve position increased to 289 billion USD, an increase of over 120 billion 
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  In 2007 this number larger to 463.5 billion USD, an even larger increase than seen in 
2006, and totalling 174.5 billion USD.
364
  Russia‟s reserve position grew further still in the 
first three quarters of 2008, peaking in August at 582.2 billion USD.
365
  From this point on 
Russia‟s reserves began to decline as the central bank attempted to support the ruble in the 
face of the mounting global economic crisis.  Though forced to burn through a large portion of 
its currency reserves in late 2008 and 2009, the sharp increases in Russia‟s reserve position 
before August of 2008 provides a good illustration of the extent of the increased rents 
captured by individuals controlling the state, as Russia has few alternative sources of foreign 
currency. 
Stabilization Fund 
 Russia‟s Stabilization Fund, designed to capture oil rents, increased between 2005 and 
2006 as well.  While at the end of 2004 the fund stood at 522.2 billion rubles, by the end of 
2005 that number had increased to 960.6 billion rubles.  Since the Russian government used 
the fund to pay down 524.6 billion rubles in foreign debt over this period, the amount of rents 
captured by this fund in 2005 is striking.
366
  After 2005 the government began channelling 
most of the inflows to the fund into foreign currency investments, and the fund was reduced to 
zero by the end of each subsequent year.
367
   A similar pattern was followed with regard to the 
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National Wealth Fund, which was set up in 2008 and also accumulates revenues from natural 
gas sales.
368
  This goes some way to further explain the huge increases in Russia‟s reserve 
position from 2006 on, and also more clearly illustrates resource rent distribution to national 
savings accounts by individuals controlling the state.   
Summary of the Individual Action Mechanism – Rent Capture and Distribution 
 As during the period from 2000 to 2004, from 2005 to 2008 three patterns, which 
would be expected in a patrimonial system based on resource rents, can be observed.  First, 
Putin has sought to increase the state‟s control over natural gas rent producing projects and 
enterprises.  Second, Putin‟s appointees, Alexei Miller and Dmitry Medvedev, have sought to 
maximize the rents they control by supporting their patron‟s goal and directing Gazprom and 
state policies to this end.  Third, some of the rents captured have been further distributed 
through increased wages for legislators, bureaucrats, managers, gas industry workers, and 
other state employees, while another portion has been saved by those in power for future use.   
As suggested at the outset, the intensity of these actions likely is responsible for the greatest 
variation between these two time periods, although this reflects an evolutionary rather than 
revolutionary process.  Next, the influence of these individual actions on macro level 
outcomes will be discussed. 
Further Increased in the Russian States Control Over the Natural Gas Industry 
 It is clear, after the description above of the actions of those who control Gazprom, 
that these actions resulted in a Russian natural gas industry dominated even more extensively 
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by the state and the individuals that control it.  Moreover, under these terms these individuals 
were able to gain a controlling share of Gazprom, and Gazprom was able to gain controlling 
shares in natural gas projects and companies throughout Russia on terms that were generally 
quite favourable.  After Rosneft‟s purchase of a 10% stake in Gazprom the Russian state, for 
the first time since the privatization of Gazprom, held a majority stake in the natural gas 
monopoly.  With the purchase of Sibneft by Gazprom the Russian state was able to gain 
control of 30% of Russia‟s oil production, to match its almost total control over oil transport 
infrastructure.
369
  Furthermore, the reacquisition of North Gas gave Gazprom control over an 




 Individuals controlling Gazprom and the government not only bullied Russian 
companies into submission, but in a departure from previous trends, they also took on major 
western oil and gas companies.  While gaining and regaining assets from Russian companies 
has clearly given Gazprom even more control over the Russian natural gas industry, the 
increased intensity of these individuals‟ drive for resource rent capture is illustrated by its 
willingness to take on some of the largest energy companies in the world.  Gaining control of 
the Sakhalin II project from Royal Dutch Shell gave Gazprom control over 518 million tonnes 
of oil reserves, and over 634 bcm of natural gas.
371
  The Kovykta project, in which Gazprom 
gained a controlling share, at the expense of TNK-BP, contains reserves of over 2 trillion 
cubic meters of natural gas.
372
  Furthermore, by blocking the sale of gas produced by the 
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Sakhalin I project to China, part of the original agreement, the individuals controlling 
Gazprom have been able to maintain a virtual monopoly over gas exports to East Asia, and the 
rents they generate.   
 The rent-seeking actions of the individuals controlling Gazprom have had a clear 
impact on the Russian state‟s capabilities in the natural gas industry.  Through the purchase 
and takeover of previously private enterprises, Gazprom was been able to significantly 
increase its reserve levels between 2004 and 2008.  As of 2004 Gazprom‟s natural gas reserve 
base stood at 28.92 trillion cubic meters.
373
  This number increased to 29.131 trillion cubic 
meters in 2005,
374
 and 29.854 trillion cubic meters in 2006.
375
  While 2007 showed a small 
decrease in reserves to 29.785 trillion cubic meters,
376
 by the end of 2008 Gazprom‟s reserves 
increased by 11.1% to 33.1 trillion cubic meters.
377
  Given that the reserve numbers take into 
account depletion due to production over these years a 4.18 trillion cubic meter increase is 
impressive, and is illustrative of the increased control over the Russian natural gas industry 
that the individuals controlling Gazprom and the Russian government enjoyed between 2005 
and 2008.   
Gazprom also increased its control over the Turkmen-Ukraine natural gas trade by 
once again changing the company which acts as the intermediary for this trade, and this time 
taking some control of it.  UralTransGas, the company which had been serving as 
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intermediary between 2002 and 2004, lost its contract to do so in 2005.
378
  RosUkrEnergo had 
already been created by the time UralTransGas lost its contract, and became the intermediary 
for Russian sales to Ukraine in 2005.  Unlike the intermediaries before it, RosUkrEnergo was 
half owned by Gazprom.  The other half of RosUkrEnergo is owned by CentraGas Holding, 
which in turn is owned by Swiss company Raiffeinsen Investment.  Raiffeinsen claims that it 
is managing the company on behalf of “a consortium of Ukrainian businessmen and 
companies,” and has refused to divulge further information on the company‟s ownership.
379
  
There has been speculation that CentraGas Holdings has ties to the former intermediary 
UralTransGas, as well as to a number of British businessmen; however, these links have been 
denied by those accused of involvement.
380
  As was stated at the outset, it is not the goal here 
to untangle the mysteries surrounding intermediaries who facilitate the transit of natural gas 
from Turkmenistan to Ukraine. However, the 50% ownership Gazprom enjoys in the newest 
intermediary company, which took control in 2005, is a clear indication of the increased 
control over the Ukrainian gas market that Gazprom management attained prior to the 2006 
dispute.  Further, since Gazprom holds 50% of RosUkrEnergo‟s profits on its books, it is clear 
that Gazprom has been able to capture some of the rents created through the roundabout 
intermediary schemes which have characterized the Ukrainian Turkmen gas trade for the last 
decade.  This is important since 2005 saw for the first time an intermediary which was partly 
controlled by Gazprom, and from which Gazprom has been able to profit.  
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Before moving on to the outcomes, the impact of the collective actions of individual 
resource rent seekers on natural gas prices for Ukraine, the importance of Turkmen gas for the 
European and Eurasian natural gas market, and for Ukraine specifically, over this period, must 
be addressed. 
The Eurasian Natural Gas Trade and the Role of Turkmenistan 2005-2008 
 
 Total European and Eurasian gas production reached 1055.2 bcm in 2004, and 
increased slightly in 2005 to 1060.6 bcm.
381
  In 2006 total regional production increased to 
1076.3 bcm, before falling slightly in 2007 to 1075.7 bcm.
382
  Russia‟s share of regional 
production, which amounted to 55.9% in 2004, increased slightly to 56.3% in 2005.
383
  This 
figure increased slightly in 2006 as well, reaching 56.8% of the regional total, before falling to 
56.4% in 2007.
384
  On the whole, between 2004 and 2007, Russia‟s share of regional 
production remained close to constant.  The story was entirely different for Turkmenistan, as 
2005 saw its share of regional production increase from 5.1% in 2004 to 5.5% in 2005.
385
  
Turkmenistan‟s share continued to increase over 2006 and 2007 to 5.7% and 6.2% 
respectively.
386
  Turkmenistan‟s 2007 percentage share increase was the largest in the region 
between 2006 and 2007, and between 2004 and 2007. 
 Regional consumption of natural gas also increased between 2004 and 2005, growing 
from 1104.3 bcm to 1128.3 bcm.
387
  From 2005 to 2007 this number increased by 27.4 bcm to 
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  This is a smaller increase than that seen between 2000 and 2004, but still 
illustrates growing natural gas demand throughout Europe and Eurasia.  From 2004 to 2007 
Russia‟s domestic gas consumption continued growing, increasing from 401.9 bcm in 2004 to 
438.8 bcm in 2007, an increase of 36.9 bcm.
389
  This is a larger increase than was seen 
between 2000 and 2004.  Turkmenistan‟s domestic consumption increased over this period as 
well, growing from 15.5 bcm in 2004 to 21.9 bcm in 2007.
390
 
 Russia‟s consumption relative to production decreased slightly between 2004 and 
2005, from 68% to 67.7%.
391
  In 2006, however, this number increased to 70.5%, and 
increased again in 2007 to 72.2%.
392
  These numbers illustrate quite clearly that in the face of 
increasing domestic consumption and decreasing production Russia had less gas available to 
export by 2006 than it had in previous years.   Turkmenistan‟s consumed share of production, 
which stood at 28.4% in 2004 showed a minor decrease in 2005 to 28.2%.
393
  In 2006, 
however, this figure jumped to 30.3%, and in 2007 the number edged up again to 32.5%.
394
   
Russia’s Gas Deficit 
 It is often assumed that Russia, with its huge natural gas reserves, has to rely little on 
outside sources of gas to meet domestic consumption needs and export requirements, but an 
examination of BP production and consumption figures, along with Russian Central Bank 
figures regarding exports, paints a different picture.  These data taken together show that 
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throughout the last decade Russia has been running a gas deficit, where domestic production 
does not meet combined domestic consumption and export numbers.   
Table 6.1 Russia’s Natural Gas Balance in BCM 
Russian 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Production bcm
395




 377.2 372.7 388.9 392.9 401.9 405.1 432.1 438.8 
Exports bcm
397
 193.9 180.9 185.5 189.4 200.4 209.2 202.8 191.9 
Natural Gas Balance bcm -26.1 -11.2 -19 -3.7 -11.3 -16.3 -22.8 -23.3 
 
The above table shows that between 2000 and 2007 Russia consistently consumed and 
exported more natural gas than it produced.  Although the deficit begins to shrink over the 
early part of the decade, bottoming out in 2003 at -3.7 bcm, it begins a steady rise after 2003, 
reaching – 23.3 bcm in 2007.  This is a clear indication that Russia has relied on gas imports 
to meet its needs over the past decade, and further that leading up to the decision to raise 
natural gas export prices to Ukraine, Russia‟s gas deficit appears to have been growing. 
Regardless of Turkmenistan‟s increased consumption of production, its exportable 
volume of gas increased over this period.  This fact along with the above numbers provide an 
indication that Turkmenistan‟s natural gas became a more important part of the European and 
Eurasian natural gas trade between 2005 and 2007, increasing as an overall share of regional 
production and export capacity.  The threat that, in the face of rising regional demand, Russia 
might lose its control over Turkmen gas begining in 2007, is highlighted by two proposals 
made by potential Turkmen gas consumers, Ukraine and the E.U. 
 Ukraine and Turkmenistan- Extending Cooperation? 
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 As noted in previous chapters, from the early 1990‟s until 2004 Turkmenistan and 
Ukraine signed intergovernmental agreements on natural gas supplies.  The purchase and 
transit of gas over this period was arranged with Russia and Gazprom by one or both sides, 
and intermediaries controlled by private entities (often clouded in secrecy).  In March of 2005, 
during a summit with his Turkmen counterpart, the President of Ukraine Victor Yuschenko 
made clear his intention to seek to purchase more Turkmen gas after the deal covering 
supplies until the end of 2005 expired.
398
  This summit coincided with a continuing dispute 
between Russia and Turkmenistan regarding prices that led to a complete cutoff of 
Turkmenistan‟s supply to Russia.
399
  Preliminary discussion of the terms of such a contract 
included the suggestion that Turkmenistan could supply Ukraine with 60-70 bcm of gas per 
year beginning in 2006, at a price of 58 USD per 1000 cm.
400
  Considering Turkmenistan‟s 
yearly production only amounted to 58.8 bcm at the time, this was surely a lofty estimate of 
possible supplies.  If there was no agreement on pricing terms with Russia, however, 
Turkmenistan would be in need of a buyer for any production not consumed domestically.  
These supplies would not likely reach the 60 – 70 bcm level, but they would be substantial, 
approximately of 40 – 50 bcm per year. 
 In the end, no agreement was reached on a new long-term supply contract between 
Ukraine and Turkmenistan; it was decided that Turkmenistan would supply Ukraine with 36 
bcm in 2005 under the existing price arrangement.
401
   Though no agreement was signed, the 
door for a future long term deal was left open.  These developments illustrate a challenge 
Gazprom‟s control over Turkmen gas supplies, as they were becoming more important 
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regionally.  This was not the only challenge Russia faced in 2005 concerning its control of 
Turkmen gas, as increased interest in Europe for an alternative to Russian-controlled gas was 
growing, and plans for a pipeline to carry Caspian Sea supplies of natural gas, including 
Turkmen supplies, bypassing Russia, was building momentum.  
Nabucco Pipeline – Bypassing Russia   
 The idea of a pipeline that could draw on supplies of gas from the Caspian Sea region 
was not new in 2005.  A pipeline had already been constructed that brought gas from 
Azerbaijan through Georgia into Turkey, where it could then be transited to European states 
further west.
402
  This pipeline did not, however, include a plan to access Turkmen gas.  In 
2005 a consortium of companies was set up to begin the construction of a pipeline that would 
eventually see Turkmen gas piped across the Caspian Sea, then through Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Turkey, and on to Europe.  The project is known as the Nabucco Pipeline (see map below).  
Discussion of this pipeline began as early as 2002; however, it did not appear as though it 
would be a reality until 2005 when Turkey, a necessary partner for geographic reasons, signed 
on.
403
  Potential customers for gas transited via this line would include Bulgaria, Romania, 
Greece, the Balkan states, Hungary, and possibly states further west.  Planned capacity for the 
entire project is between 25.5 and 31 bcm.
404
  If this pipeline is built, it would provide 
European states with access to increasingly important Turkmen gas without the use of Russian 
transit pipelines.  Russia would then lose the stranglehold on Central Asian gas supplies that it 
had held since before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  If Russia was the omnipotent 
energy power it was often believed to be this may not have been of concern to its leaders, but 
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as an analysis of Russia‟s natural gas balance over the last decade has illustrated, this was not 
the case. 
Figure 6.1 Nabucco Pipeline’s Possible Routes405 
 
Since the Russian gas deficit has existed since at least 2000, there is no clear indication 
that concerns over the deficit directly caused price increases to Ukraine.  Still if combined 
with the fact that Russia has relied on Turkmen and other gas from Central Asia to fill this 
deficit, and that monopoly access to these supplies was under threat from the Nabucco project, 
then one could see how individuals in Russia‟s natural gas industry and government, 
dependent on natural gas rents, might be alarmed.  If Russia was not able to maintain a 
monopoly over these gas volumes, the rents they generate could be captured by other states 
and private enterprises.  This would also lead to increased competition on the European gas 
market, and possibly price decreases.  Furthermore, Russia would no longer be able to ensure 
Europe‟s dependence on its gas supplies. 
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Rent Seeking and Reaction to Challenges--Individual Action in the Face of Structural Change 
 Individuals at Gazprom reacted swiftly to these two indications of increasing interest 
in Turkmen gas.  Their strategy to maintain control over Turkmen gas was twofold.  First, 
with regards to Ukraine and supplies for the proposed Nabucco project, Russia came to terms 
with Turkmenistan regarding pricing and future supply.  On December 29
th
 2005, during the 
Russian Ukrainian price dispute, and prior to Russia cutting off supplies, Gazprom agreed to 
purchase 30 bcm of natural gas from Turkmenistan in 2006 at a price of 65 USD per 1000 
cm.
406
  This was an increase in the amount of supply agreed upon originally, up from 10 bcm 
dictated by the 2003 deal, and an increase in price, which Gazprom management had 
previously staunchly resisted, from 44 USD per 1000 cm.  The 65 USD price tag was also 
larger than the 60 USD Turkmenistan was seeking to receive from Ukraine.  The increase in 
supply left Ukraine, which had been buying 36-37 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan, with only 
16-17 bcm of Turkmen gas to purchase.  This deal also brought into question the feasibility of 
the Nabucco project, as with Russia purchasing essentially all Turkmen gas supplies, sources 
of gas for the pipeline began to look limited.   
 Further agreements between Gazprom and Turkmenistan were forged in 2006, 2007 
and 2008, and all three dictated price increases.  The price Gazprom paid for Turkmen gas in 
2007 increased to 100 USD per 1000 cm, though the original 2005 agreement did not envisage 
new price negotiations until 2009.
407
  Gazprom management agreed to pay more for gas in 
2008 as well, agreeing in early December to pay 130 USD per 1000 cm during the first half of 
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2008, and 150 USD per 1000 cm during the second half of the year.
408
  The volumes dictated 
by this deal were roughly 50 bcm per year.  In mid 2008, in a prelude to another Russia-
Ukraine price disagreement, Gazprom agreed to pay for Turkmen gas based on average gas 
prices in the European market, and secured the majority of Turkmen gas supplies until 
2028.
409
  This amounted to roughly 340 USD per 1000 cm as of the beginning of 2009.
410
 
 The timing of these contracts, and the large price increases which they dictate, are a 
clear indication of the concern of Russian natural gas and state officials that they may lose 
control over Turkmen natural gas supplies.  By substantially increasing the price Gazprom 
paid for Turkmen gas supplies, management was able to retain control over these supplies, 
and forge new long-term contracts with the Turkmen government that would result in 
Gazprom control of Turkmen gas supplies throughout the next two decades. 
 The second component of Gazprom management‟s strategy to retain control over 
Turkmen natural gas supplies involved wooing potential Nabucco customers into accepting 
Russian gas supplies instead.  The tactics used by Gazprom management involved the 
enlargement of and creation of new pipeline routes through which they could transport 
Russian and Central Asian gas to Europe, serving potential Nabucco customers.  These 
projects include the NordStream pipeline, the SouthStream pipeline, and a new Central Asian 
pipeline. 
 The NordStream project began to take shape in 1997 as a joint venture between 
Gazprom, Finnish company Neste Oil, and German company Rurgas.  Little in the way of 
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solid results materialized until 2005 when E.ON, another German company, BASF, and 
Gazprom agreed to begin construction of the line in 2006.
411
  The pipeline will transit gas 
from Russia to Germany underneath the Baltic Sea, bypassing transit countries in eastern and 
central Europe (see map below). The line was to have a capacity of 27.5 bcm per year by 2010 
and the consortium managing the pipeline signed contracts with Germany, Netherlands, and 
France regarding supply.
412
  In 2006 a further agreement was inked which would see a twin 




Figure 6.3 NordStream Pipeline414 
 
The Southstream project would potentially service many of the same consumers as the 
proposed Nabucco line including Bulgaria, Greece, the Balkans, and Hungary (see map 
below).  A branch is also planned to link Italy to the project.  The off-shore portion of the line 
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has a planned capacity of 31 bcm per year,
415
 while the onshore portions truncate as they pass 
through consuming markets.  This line is seen by many as a direct challenge to the Nabucco 
project as it is unclear, given the limited amounts of natural gas currently consumed by the 
aforementioned states, if there would be enough demand to make both lines feasible.  
Construction has yet to begin on this project, and it is still unclear, given the potential cost of 
the project, whether it will be feasible.   
 
Figure 6.4 Proposed Southstream Pipeline416  
  
In what may have been the final blow to the Transcaspian portion of the Nabucco 
pipeline project Russia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan signed an agreement in May 2007 to 
build a new pipeline from Turkmenistan, through Kazakhstan, into Russia.  The planned 
capacity of the pipeline is 20 bcm per year, and it is expected to operational by 2012.
417
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According to Russian officials this pipeline will increase the amount of gas Russia is able to 
buy from Turkmenistan to 90 bcm.
418
  With this new line in place it is difficult imagine that 
Turkmenistan would be capable of providing gas to both the new Central Asian pipeline and 
the Nabbucco pipeline.  The construction of this pipeline also brings into question the 
availability of Turkmen gas for a proposed export pipeline to China.  
Figure 6. 5 New Central Asian Pipeline Route419
 
 
The response from Gazprom‟s management to the potential loss of Turkmen supplies 
is what one might expect from individuals seeking to maximize the rents they control.  Faced 
with the prospect of losing control over Turkmen gas supplies, Miller and Medvedev 
increased the price they were willing to pay Turkmenistan for gas supplies, and by doing so 
have apparently secured the majority of the country‟s exports for the foreseeable future.  This 
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has brought potential gas supplies for the Nabucco line into question, and ended Ukraine‟s 
purchase of Turkmen gas through bilateral contracts.  Though likely not totally contingent on 
the Nabucco project, new Russian-backed pipelines serving the north and south of Europe, 
and transiting Central Asian gas to Russia, have certainly led to challenges for the Nabucco 
project concerning the volumes of gas available for the pipeline and potential markets for the 
gas it would transport.   The next section will focus on the impacts of these developments, 
when combined with Russia‟s patrimonial social structure, reliance on resource rents, and 
increased state control over the Russian natural gas industry, on Russian natural gas prices for 
Ukraine from 2005 to 2008. 
The Transformational Mechanism and Gas Prices for Ukrainian 2005 – 2008 
 2005 was the last year that Ukraine received Russian gas at a discounted price.  The 
average price for natural gas provided by Russia to Ukraine in kind for transiting gas to 
Europe in 2005 was once again 50 USD per 1000 cm.  This was also the last year that Ukraine 
purchased Turkmen gas under agreements made by the two governments.  
 The period up to and following Russia‟s cutoff of natural gas supplies to Ukraine in 
2006 is often considered one of the most dramatic developments concerning Russian natural 
resources since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As discussed in the first chapter, the 
beginning of 2006 was marked by a complete cutoff of natural gas exports to Ukraine through 
Russia.  The dispute was brought about by a disagreement over the price of exports through 
and from Russia to Ukraine.  Gazprom management initially requested an increase in the price 
of gas for Ukraine to 160 USD per 1000 cm, but after resistance from Ukraine this sum 
increased to 230 USD.
420
   After a brief but dramatic cutoff of supplies, which affected 
downstream consumers in Europe, a final agreement saw the price of a blend of Russian and 
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Central Asian gas (made up mostly but not exclusively of Turkmen gas) being sold to Ukraine 
set at 95 USD per 1000 cm.  This is almost double the average price for Russian gas in 2005, 
and an increase in the cost of Turkmen gas which, after transit fees, was roughly 74 USD per 
1000 cm at the Russia-Ukraine border.  Considering the large increases in global energy prices 
around this time a 21-45 USD increase may appear small, but combined with the increases in 
the years that follow the total increases between 2005 and 2008 are quite large. 
 The price of Russian and Russian-controlled natural gas exported to Ukraine in 2007 
grew from 95 USD per 1000 cm to 130 USD per 1000 cm.
421
  In late 2007 and early 2008 a 
disagreement over Ukraine‟s gas debt, totalling over 1.5 billion USD, saw Gazprom reduce 
Ukrainian gas supplies by 25%,
422
 but an end to the disagreement was reached that saw 
Ukraine‟s debt apparently paid off, and prices for Russian exports increase to 179 USD per 
1000 cm for 2008.
423
 
 Between 2005 and 2008 the price of Russian gas exports to Ukraine grew from 50 
USD per 1000 cm to 179 USD per 1000 cm, but by the end of 2008 Gazprom was once again 
pressing for price increases.  While 2009 is outside the time frame of this case study, it 
deserves some attention as the price increases over this period were the largest in 20 years, 
and the Russia-Ukraine disagreement over pricing lead to prolonged supply disruptions for 
European customers.  Gazprom suspended deliveries to Ukraine on January 7
th
 2009 and 
supplies were not restored until January 21
st 
2009.  The agreement which led to the end of the 
gas cutoff dictated that Ukraine would begin to pay European market prices by 2010, and that 
in 2009 it would receive gas at European prices with a 20% discount.  For the first quarter of 
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2009 this price translated into about 380 USD per 1000 cm.
424
  This amounts to a doubling of 
prices over a one year period, and appears to have marked the end of Russian subsidized 
natural gas prices for Ukraine. 
 In sum, from 2005 to 2009 Ukraine saw large increases in the price it pays for natural 
gas coming from Russia.  This was a stark departure from the previous 10 years of decreasing 
and then stable low prices.  While in 2005 Ukraine received Russian gas in kind at an average 
price of 50 USD per 1000 cm, and Turkmen gas at about 74 USD per 1000 cm, with 
Gazprom‟s purchase of virtually all of Turkmenistan‟s exportable gas Ukrainian prices 
became closely tied to the price Gazprom paid for Turkmen gas.  This factor lead to a total 
price increase over the four years in question of about 330 USD per 1000 cm, and it led to 
disputes over pricing that led to cutoffs in 2006 and 2009. 
 
Summary 
 Some things changed between 2005 and 2008 while other things remained the same.  
Authoritarian trends that emerged in Putin‟s regime between 2000 and 2004 continued, and 
while natural resource rents remained the basis for Putin‟s patrimonial system of rule, their 
increased value led to greater attempts by Gazprom management and the Russian government 
to capture these rents.   The efforts to capture a greater share of the rents created by the 
production and sale of natural gas included: increasing the state‟s ownership of Gazporm; 
taking over gas and oil companies from other Russian companies; and forcing major foreign 
companies to sell portions of their enterprises to the state.  These actions generally reflected 
developments during the 2000 to 2004 period; however, the aggressive dealings with foreign 
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oil and gas companies reflect the increased intensity of Gazprom management‟s rent 
maximizing activates.  These moves led to increased control by Gazprom of the Russian 
natural gas industry, and increased control over Gazprom by the state, outcomes directly in 
line with the goals laid out by Putin.   
Just as during the period from 2000 to 2004, 2005 to 2008 saw increases in the average 
wages paid to public administrators, defence workers, pensioners, and gas and electricity 
industry workers.  Furthermore, the state‟s foreign reserve holdings ballooned during this 
period, out-pacing the increases of 2000 to 2004.  Both of these outcomes are indicative of the 
distribution of rents captured by those controlling Gazprom and the state, through the 
structures of the state to benefit state officials, and to fill state controlled coffers.  
 As far as Russia‟s patrimonial system is concerned little changed other than the 
intensity of the authoritarian nature of the regime and the rent maximizing and distribution 
activities, but there were changes in other areas.  The change most obviously affecting the 
price Ukraine paid for natural gas from Russia over this period was the increasing importance 
of Turkmen gas supplies.  In the face of the growing importance of these gas volumes both 
Ukraine and states of the E.U. attempted to secure access without reliance on Gazprom or 
Russia.  In a move to ensure that rents generated through the transit and sale of Turkmen gas 
were not captured by other non-Gazprom entities, Gazprom management began offering 
increased prices to Turkmenistan for its gas supplies.  This allowed Gazprom to secure the 
majority of Turkmen gas supplies for at least the next two decades, ending the bilateral trade 
deals that had previously governed the Turkmen-Ukrainian gas trade.  Russia and Gazprom 
controlled Turkmen gas supplies from 2006 on henceforth Ukraine purchased its gas from a 
Gazprom-controlled intermediary company, RosUkrEnergo, which purchased the gas directly 
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from Gazprom and Gazprom subsidiaries.  This is in stark contrast to the 2000 to 2004 period, 
when deals on gas supplies were arranged between the Turkmen and Ukrainian governments 
and facilitated by third party intermediaries with no direct ties to Gazprom. 
 The result of these changes for Ukrainian natural gas prices was dramatic.  With 
Gazprom now the sole price setter for Ukrainian imports, and with Gazprom now paying 
much more for Central Asian gas in order to gain control of these supplies, the next logical 
step was increases in the price Ukraine paid for the gas it imports from and through Russia.  
This is exactly what happened, as the years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 all saw large price 
increases for Ukrainian gas imports from Russia.  In the face of resistance to these price hikes, 
Russia and Gazprom cutoff gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. 














The preceding case studies have revealed a great deal about changes in Russian 
politics, the natural gas industry, and the structure of European and Eurasian as well as global 
energy markets.  The impact that these changes have had on Russia‟s natural gas pricing 
policy for Ukraine has also been clarified.  This chapter will summarize these variances, along 
with the mechanisms which translated them into price increases for Ukraine.  One can then 
examine the ability of a mechanisms based approach, using the logic of methodological 
individualism, to bring together these macro level phenomena to provide an explanation for 
the Russian government‟s decision to raise natural gas prices for Ukraine in 2006.  Attention 
will then turn to the ability of this approach to synthesize the three levels of analysis prevalent 
in international relations theory into complete explanations for certain phenomena in 
international politics.  Finally, attention will turn to the implications of this explanation for the 
Russian natural gas industry and its relationship with Russian foreign policy. 
Results 
 From 1995 to 2008 the patrimonial nature of Russian politics and society changed very 
little.  Two key variances do however present themselves.  First, there was a change in the 
object of rent seeking and distribution from property to natural resource rents.  The second 
change was the more authoritarian nature of the Putin‟s regime as compared to the Yeltsin‟s 
regime, and consequently the role the played by the state in rent capture and distribution.     
Variation in the Source of Rents 
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 From 1995 to 1999 energy prices remained relatively low, and reached a 20 year low 
in late 1999.  Furthermore, the state had a large pool of property and a mandate to privatize it.  
This is an important for at least two reasons.  First, although the pool of state property to be 
privatized was large, it was limited in comparison to the rents generated from natural resource 
extraction and sale.  This meant that while the Yeltsin administration was able to distribute 
property rents for political support, once these rents were distributed there was no way to 
replenish the pool of property rents, save renationalization.  Second, the distribution of rents in 
the form of property led to the privatization of some of the state‟s natural resource assets.  
Consequently there was a decrease in the state‟s overall capabilities with respect to the natural 
gas industry. 
 2000 to 2004 saw a large increase in the rent-generating potential of Russia‟s natural 
resources, specifically oil and natural gas.  Global oil prices bottomed out in the late 1990‟s 
and Russian natural gas export prices to Europe fell along with them.  By 2000, however, the 
situation began to change and by the end of Putin‟s first term in office world oil prices had 
increased fourfold.  Russian natural gas exports to Europe followed a similar trend, increasing 
2.5 times by the end of 2004.  When Putin came to power it was clear that he envisioned a 
central role for the state in capturing and distributing these rents.  Those he appointed to top 
positions at Gazprom, Alexey Miller and Dmitry Medvedev, supported Putin‟s vision as good 
clients should, and directed their policies to further this end.   
 Prior to and following the 2006 Russia-Ukraine natural gas crisis the trends apparent 
from 2000 to 2004 increased in their intensity.  Oil and natural gas prices, regionally and 
globally, grew at an even faster rate, increasing their rent generating potential even more 
substantially from 2005 to 2008 than from 2000 to 2004.  From the end of 2004 to the middle 
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of 2008 oil prices continued their upward swing, increasing by nearly 3.4 times.  
Concurrently, Russian natural gas prices at the German border increased 3.7 times.  This is a 
clear indication of the increased rent generating potential of natural gas during this period, and 
underlines the main source of rents in Russia‟s patrimonial society during this period was oil 
and natural gas.  
Varying Degrees of Authoritarianism  
 While it would be inappropriate to suggest that under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin 
Russia was a democracy, during his term of office politics was certainly more pluralistic than 
under President Putin.   As noted in Chapter Five there were no less than four influential 
political groups in Yeltsin‟s Russia.  These groups included Yeltsin‟s inner circle, regional 
governors, Russia‟s increasingly powerful business elite, and the state Duma, which at the 
onset of privatization represented the interests of Soviet-era managers.  What this produced 
over the 1995 to 1999 period was rent distribution to groups outside of the control of the state, 
and a withering of state control over rent capture and distribution, especially in the natural 
resource sector. 
 As was also discussed in Chapter Five Putin set about marginalizing these influential 
groups during his first term in office, and installing to high ranking positions people with 
whom he had worked with during his career with the FSB/KGB and in St. Petersburg.  During 
the first four years of Putin‟s presidency, through selective reviews and reversals of the 
privatization process in the case of those who did not support him politically, Putin was able 
to marginalize Russia‟s business elite as a political force.  Further, by changing election laws, 
restructuring Russia‟s upper house of parliament, and ending the direct election of regional 
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governors, Putin was able to all but eliminate the political clout of regional leaders.  Finally, 
although initially remaining in positions of power, members of Yeltsin ruling circle were 
eventually removed from power prior to 2004.  This resulted in increased rent capture and 
distribution by the state. 
 The 2005 to 2008 period also saw a hardening of the authoritarian nature of Putin‟s 
regime.  Through changes to election laws governing party formation and the formulation of 
blocs within the Duma, the elimination of single-member district seats for Duma elections, 
and increased restrictions on negative campaigning during elections, the dominance of United 
Russia, Putin‟s party of choice, has been solidified in Russia‟s lower house of parliament.  
Given this increasingly authoritarian structure the state once again played a major role in rent 
distribution during this period.   
Consequences for Russian Patrimonialism 
From 1995 to 1999 Boris Yeltsin distributed rents in the form of state property in 
return for political support.  Examples of this include concessions made to prior to the Soviet-
era managers to the first round of privatization and the loans for shares auctions before to the 
1996 election.  In turn, those who were appointed to top positions in the natural gas industry 
further distributed the state property granted to them to their own clients.  Examples of this 
include the involvement of Chernomodryn, Vyakhirev, and their families with Horhat and the 
concessions Vyakhirev made to Itera during his term as the head of Gazprom. 
 From 2000 to 2004 Russia‟s new president Vladimir Putin sought to capture and 
distribute rents generated from the nation‟s natural resources, specifically but not exclusively 
oil and natural gas, and distribute them to state employees, and save them for future use.  His 
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appointees to top positions in the natural gas industry supported and directed these moves.  
Examples of this include the increased taxes demanded of and paid by Gazprom to the state, 
along with moves by Gazprom‟s management to recapture assets lost to private companies, 
specifically Itera, during the late 1990‟s.  Examples of state controlled distribution of rents 
include the increased salaries for state employees and sharp increases in Russia‟s foreign 
currency reserve position. 
 2005 to 2008 saw, overall, a continuation of the resource rent capture and distribution 
patterns evident during the previous four years.  Those heading the state and Gazprom 
continued to ensure that the resource rents generated from oil and natural gas were channelled 
into the pockets of state employees, and state savings accounts.  The rents those controlling 
the state could acquire continued to be maximized by recapturing the assets lost to private 
companies in the 1990‟s, and by squeezing foreign companies out of natural gas projects in 
Russia. 
 While Russia‟s political system remained patrimonial throughout, there were obvious 
differences between the time periods in question, especially 1995 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008.  
Two important differences in Russian patrimonialism present themselves, one being the 
source of rents, and the second being the authoritarian nature of the Putin regime in 
comparison to that of Yeltsin.  According to Katzenstien these kinds of variances in a state‟s 
political structure should bring about variations in its foreign economic policies.  The case 
studies previously presented appear to bear this out.  These two differences also had an impact 




Variance in State Capabilities  
 Beyond the changes in the nature of Russia‟s patrimonial society, differences in the 
Russian state‟s control of Russia‟s natural gas industry over time were highlighted at the 
outset as an important factor affecting natural gas export prices to Ukraine.  As was suggested 
in Chapter Two, a change in a state‟s capabilities should lead to a change in its foreign policy.  
On the whole a decrease in the state‟s capabilities in this area appears to have resulted in 
decreased prices for Ukraine in 1998, while an increase in the state‟s capabilities in this area 
resulted in an increase in prices from 2006 to 2008. 
 From 1995 to 1999 there were many indications that the Russian state was losing 
control over the Russian natural gas industry.  During this period the state‟s stake in Gazprom 
decreased to less than 40%, and its representation on the company‟s Board of Directors to four 
out of eleven.  Gazprom also experienced a 10% reduction in the reserves it controlled during 
this period, allowed independent companies access to the pipeline infrastructure it controlled, 
and gave up about 50% of the FSU gas market to Itera.  Furthermore, the state had substantial 
difficulties collecting taxes from Gazprom over this period.  This was in large part due to the 
fact that individuals controlling the industry were distributing rents in the form of property 
rather than rents generated by natural gas extraction and sale. 
 During the years from 2000 to 2004 a substantial shift in the direction of increasing the 
state‟s control over the natural gas industry.  During this period the state‟s representation on 
Gazprom‟s board of directors grew from four to five on the eleven member board, and for the 
most part the state gained the acquiescence of independent board members to most of its 
policies.  The state also reformed the tax system which governed natural gas extraction and 
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sale.  These tax reforms led to a sizable increase in the taxes paid by Gazprom to the state.  
Furthermore, Gazprom‟s level of control over Russia‟s domestic low pressure natural gas 
distribution system increased to 90% over this period, and by 2003 it had taken control of, or 
gained a stake in, 75% of Russia‟s domestic distribution companies and organizations.  Many 
of the assets Gazprom lost/gave to Itera during the late 1990‟s were also regained, including a 
32% stake in Purgaz, a 52% stake in Severneftegazprom, and stakes in Rospan and 
Zapsibgazprom.  In all, Itera lost over 1 trillion cubic meters in reserves during this period and 
Gazprom captured most of these reserves.  During this period Gazprom was also able to take 
over a greater share of Russian exports to the Baltic states, and in 2003 again began to supply 
the states of the Caucusus.  While successful in regaining much of the CIS market lost in the 
1990‟s, during this period Gazprom did not gain control over the intermediary company 
UralTransGas, which facilitated the sale of Turkmen gas to Ukraine.  These increased 
capabilities can be attributed, in large part, to the increased rent generating potential of 
Russia‟s natural gas resources and Putin‟s resolve to see those rents captured by the state. 
 From 2005 to 2008, prior to and following the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis of 2006, the 
determination of those controlling the Russian state to gain control over Russia‟s natural gas 
industry increased.  The state was able to take over a controlling share (51%) of Gazprom in 
2005.  This move increased the state‟s voting rights on the board of directors and the state‟s 
share of Gazprom‟s after tax profits.  Under even greater state control Gazprom management 
continued to recapture assets lost in the 1990‟s, and gained some new ones.  In early 2005 
Gazprom regained control over 51% of NorthGas and the over 300 bcm of natural gas 
reserves it controlled.  Gazprom also bought into the Russian oil industry during this period, 
purchasing a 72% stake in one of Russia‟s largest oil enterprises, Sibneft.  Possibly the biggest 
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shift in the policies of Gazprom management during this time period could be seen in its 
treatment of foreign companies working in Russia.  Royal Dutch Shell, Mitsubishi, and Mitsui 
were forced to sell a controlling share in their Sakhalin II project to Gazprom, while Exxon 
Mobil was pressured into renegotiating its production sharing agreement with the Russian 
government, and was prevented from selling to China the gas which its Sakhalin I project 
produced.  In a similar fashion, in mid 2007 TNK-BP was force to sell a controlling share of 
its Kovykta project to Gazprom due to its failure to meet production quotas.  These takeovers 
amounted to a 4.18 trillion cubic meter increase in Gazprom‟s reserves from 2005 to 2008, 
and an obvious increase in the state‟s control over the domestic natural gas industry.  
Furthermore, in 2005 Gazprom was able to remove UralTransGas as the intermediary 
company supplying Turkmen gas to Ukraine, and replace it with RosUkrEnergo, in which it 
held a 50% stake.  All of these moves, just as those in the previous four years, can be 
attributed to the increased value of Russian natural resources and Putin‟s resolve to see the 
state dominate the capture of the rents they generate. 
 It is apparent that while the period from 1995 to 1999 saw the Russian state‟s control 
over the natural gas industry decrease substantially, this trend reversed between 2000 and 
2008.  These variances correlate well with price increases and decreases for Ukraine, but 
considering that there were no price increases between 2000 and 2004, while there were 
increases in the state‟s control over the natural gas industry, they cannot serve as the sole 
explanation.  This is not surprising, as it was stated from the outset that a fourth factor played 
a role in the decision of individuals controlling the Russian state and Gazprom to raise natural 
gas export prices for Ukraine.  That fourth factor is the regional importance of Turkmen 
natural gas, a subject that will be revisited in the next section. 
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Varying Importance of Turkmen Natural Gas 
 Much like the other factors highlighted as important to the Russian government‟s 
decision to increase natural gas export prices to Ukraine, especially in 2006, the role that 
natural gas from Turkmenistan has played in the European and Eurasian natural gas trade has 
varied quite substantially during the period under consideration.  While throughout the 1990‟s 
this gas source was relatively insignificant on a regional level, it grew in importance 
throughout the first half of the new millennium‟s first decade, and by the second half of the 
decade the competition for Turkmen gas amongst Russia, European states, and Ukraine began 
to heat up.   
 From 1995 to 1999 Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production shrank from 3.3% to 
2.3%.  Total European and Eurasian consumption over this period decreased as well.  
Furthermore, Turkmenistan‟s share of production consumed domestically increased from 
26.5% in 1995 to 53% in 1999.  While Russia‟s share of regional production decreased over 
this period as well, its share of production consumed domestically fell.  These factors illustrate 
the decreasing role that Turkmen natural gas played in regional trade during this period.  This 
being the case, and given that gas industry officials, specifically Rem Vyakhirev, were 
conditioned to seek and distribute rents in the form of property, it is not surprising that a 
serious attempt by Gazprom to monopolize these supplies was not seen.  It should also be 
considered that Vyakhirev favourite Itera held the contract to transit Turkmen gas to Ukraine.  
It is likely that this is why Gazprom did not attempt to block Turkmen supplies over the long 
term.  Due to these factors Turkmenistan and Ukraine were able to forge bilateral gas deals 
somewhat independently of Russia over this period. 
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 Over the years from 2000 to 2004 Turkmenistan‟s natural gas began to play a greater 
role in the regional natural gas trade.  While regional production grew over this period, so did 
Turkmenistan‟s share of regional production, reaching 5.1% in 2004.  This was a substantial 
increase from the 2.3% share it garnered in 1999.  Regional natural gas consumption was also 
on the increase during this period.  This made Turkmenistan‟s exportable natural gas supplies 
more important regionally.  More than half of Turkmenistan‟s production was consumed 
domestically in 1999 but by 2004 this figure was less than 30%. This fact is illustrative of 
Turkmenistan‟s increased role in the regional natural gas trade, as in the face of increased 
regional consumption Turkmen exportable volumes grew.  Though initial discussion of a 
pipeline which could draw on Turkmen gas and bypass Russia began in 2002, there was little 
hope of the pipeline becoming a reality at that time as the necessary partners (specifically 
Turkey) had not signed on to the project.  Apart from this preliminary discussion of the 
Nabucco pipeline there was no prospect over this period of breaking the virtual transit 
monopoly Russia enjoyed over Turkmen natural gas exports to Europe.  It is quite possible 
that this lack of competition for Turkmen gas is why Gazprom remained reluctant to pay 
increased prices for Turkmen gas, which is a key contributing factor explaining the 
continuation of bilateral natural gas trade relationship between Ukraine and Turkmenistan.  As 
during the period from 1995 to 1999, the bilateral nature of the Ukraine-Turkmenistan natural 
gas trade relationship likely affected Russian export prices to Ukraine.  With continued 
competition from Turkmen gas, more expensive Russian gas would have been uncompetitive 
on the Ukrainian market. 
 From 1995 to 2004, there was little competition for control over the transit of Turkmen 
gas from Central Asia to Europe.  With the increasing importance of Turkmen gas supplies 
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throughout the middle and late 2000‟s, competition for control over the transit of this gas 
began to heat up.   Total regional production increased between 2004 and 2007; however, 
from 2006 to 2007 total production actually decreased.  Turkmenistan‟s share of regional 
production continued to increase over this period, growing from 5.1% in 2004 to 6.2% in 
2007.  Regional consumption also increased over this period.  When increased consumption is 
matched with declining production, it becomes clear that the exportable volumes of gas 
nations have become more important.  Though Turkmenistan‟s share of production consumed 
domestically grew over this period, its total exportable volumes also grew from 39 bcm in 
2004 to 46 bcm in 2007. 
 From 2005 to 2008 the states of the European Union and Ukraine competed with 
Russia for control over these gas volumes.  In 2005, saw Ukraine and Turkmenistan come 
close to a long-term agreement on natural gas supplies.  2005 also saw the potential Nabucco 
pipeline project inch closer to reality with Turkey signing onto the project, and the 
development of a consortium of companies to build the pipeline.  These developments likely 
triggered Gazprom management‟s decision to pay Turkmenistan more for the gas it imports 
from that country.  This concession allowed Russia to ink a long term deal for the majority of 
Turkmen natural gas supplies for the next 25 years.  This undercut attempts to haveTurkmen 
gas flow through the Nabucco pipeline.  It also removed the prospect of bilateral Ukraine-
Turkmen gas deals, and removed competition from the Ukrainian import market.  This tipped 
the scales in Russia‟s favour as Gazprom could now charge Ukraine practically whatever it 
believed Ukraine could pay for its natural gas imports.  Gazprom also launched and expanded 
pipeline plans to serve markets in northern and southern Europe, and to bring more gas to the 
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Russian pipeline system from Turkmenistan.  These moves have dampened hopes for a 
pipeline that could bring Central Asian and Caspian gas to Europe while bypassing Russia. 
 It is now apparent that four macro level factors influence to Russia‟s natural gas price 
increases for Ukraine.  The first two factors can be characterized as changes in Russia‟s 
patrimonial political and social system.  These include a change in the source of rents 
available in the Russian economy, and the increasingly authoritarian and state-centric nature 
of Vladimir Putin‟s regime.  These changes made natural resource rents the object of rent 
seekers, and fixed the state as the lynchpin in the capture and distribution of these rents.  The 
third factor was the growing state domination of the natural gas industry which began in the 
early 2000‟s and reached its zenith in the latter half of the decade.  The increased capabilities 
of the state in this area clearly allowed the individuals who controlled it a freer hand in 
determining policy and shaping it to achieve their desired ends.  The fourth factor, the 
increasing importance of Turkmen natural gas, clearly played a role as it was the elimination 
of bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Turkmenistan over natural gas sales that brought 
an end to competition in the Ukrainian import market, eventually leading to price increases for 
Ukraine.   
As was stated at the outset, it is not enough to point out that these macro level events 
correlate with the Russian government‟s gas price increases for Ukraine.  For a full 
explanation it is important to show how these macro level events interrelate to bring about the 
price increase for Ukraine.  To accomplish that task a mechanisms based explanation which 
relies on the logic of methodological individualism was chosen.  This next section will 




A Mechanisms Based Approach and Methodological Individualism 
 Three mechanisms were outlined at the beginning of this project which explained how 
the macro level events discussed above brought about Russia‟s natural gas price increases for 
Ukraine.  These were the situational mechanism, the individual action mechanism, and the 
transformational mechanism.  These mechanisms deserve some final attention here. 
 The changes in Russia‟s patrimonial society, the source of rents and the authoritarian 
nature of Russian rule, the increased capabilities the state enjoyed in the natural gas industry, 
and the growing importance of Turkmen gas regionally, are all changes in the situational 
mechanism which link social structure to the beliefs, desires, and actions of individuals.   
These variations have been dealt with above and require little further attention; however, it 
should be remembered that these variations bring about changes in the actions of individuals, 
along with changes in the outcomes of the collective actions of these individuals.  Now it is 
time to move on to the individual action mechanism, and the impacts of changes in the 
situational mechanism on individual action.  
Individual Action Mechanism 
 This study chose the logic of methodological individualism to underpin an explanation 
for Russia‟s natural gas price increases for Ukraine in 2006.  This assumes that individuals are 
the causal agents of consequence in the social sciences.  In view of this the most powerful 
explanatory tool this project has is the individual action mechanism.  The purpose of the 
individual action mechanism is to show how individual beliefs and desires bring about 
specific action.  This requires assumptions to be made about individuals and how they 
formulate their beliefs and desires.  For this study three assumptions were made about the 
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actions of individuals, along with the assumption of three main preferences.  First, in the vein 
of rational institutionalism, it was assumed that individuals act to maximize a given set of 
preferences.  Two other assumptions were borrowed from rational institutionalism, one being 
the idea that political decision making is a series of collective action dilemmas and two, that 
institutional rules play an important part in political outcomes.   Beyond these assumptions 
three sets of preferences of individuals were proposed based on the patrimonial nature of 
Russian politics.  These preferences included:  1) Patrons and clients seek to maximize the 
rents they control; 2) Patrons do this by maximizing state control over rent generating sectors 
of the economy; and 3) clients do this by supporting their patron.  These preferences and 
assumptions make up the heart of the individual action mechanism.   
 These assumptions about individuals proved powerful as explanatory tools in this 
study as exemplified by the previous case studies.  Patrons and clients seeking to maximize 
the rents they control by seeking control over rent generating segments of the Russian 
economy and supporting their patron respectively, accurately explain two macro level 
changes.  First it explains the moves by individuals to decrease and increase the state‟s control 
over the natural gas industry throughout the time periods in question; and second, it plays a 
crucial role in explaining the reaction of gas industry officials to the decreasing and increasing 
importance of Turkmen natural gas supplies.  Explaining how the actions of individuals in the 
face of changes in the situational mechanism brought about increased state control over the 





 This mechanism shows how the collective actions of individuals can bring about 
macro level changes such as Russia‟s price increases for Ukraine.  As suggested in Chapter 
Two, this mechanism is dependent somewhat on the situational mechanism as the situational 
mechanism lays out the institutional rules that govern the outcome of collective action 
dilemmas, which then result in macro level change.  When the nature of Russia‟s patrimonial 
ruling regime is less authoritarian and centered around rents as property, as it was from 1995 
to 1999, outcomes will be governed less by the state, and rent seeking and distribution will 
take the form of property seeking and distribution.  When Russia‟s patrimonial regime is more 
authoritarian and is centered around natural resource rents, as it was from 2000 to 2008, 
outcomes are more likely to be dictated by the state, and rent seeking and distribution will take 
the form of resource rent seeking and distribution. 
 With the macro level changes and mechanisms pertaining to the 2006 crisis detailed, it 
can now be suggested that a mechanisms based approach relying on methodological 
individualism captured quite well the relationship between the changes in the situational 
mechanism and Russia‟s natural gas price increases for Ukraine.  The original situational 
mechanism evident during the period from 1995 to 1999, less authoritarian patrimonialism 
based on rents in the form of cheap property, weakened state control over the natural gas 
industry, and Turkmen gas supplies that were of limited importance regionally, produced 
lower natural gas prices for Ukraine.  This was due to the willingness of individual rent 
seekers to forgo less lucrative natural resource rents in favour of capturing and distributing 
property rents and the limited role of the state in distribution of rents, beyond the initial 
property transfer.  
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In the face of changes in the situational mechanism, the core assumptions about 
individual preferences and actions did not change, but the actions individuals took varied quite 
substantially.  From 2000 to 2004 natural resources became much more lucrative and the 
ruling regime in Russia more authoritarian.  This shifted the source of rents which Russia‟s 
patrimonial social and political structure relied on from cheap property to rents generated from 
the extraction and sale of oil and natural gas, and it amplified the role of the state in rent 
capture and distribution.  Putin, who became president at the turn of the century, was quite 
clear in his conviction that the state should play a major role in the capture and distribution of 
these rents.  For this to take place the state would have to increase its control over Russia‟s oil 
and natural gas industries.  Putin installed new individuals at the state natural gas monopoly 
Gazprom, and these individuals supported their patron, in the interests of maximizing their 
share of the rents, directing their policies to achieve the goal of greater state control over the 
natural gas industry.  The collective actions of these individuals resulted in increased state 
control over the Russian natural gas industry; however, this control was not total and given the 
still limited regional role Turkmen gas was playing, price increases for Ukraine did not 
transpire. 
From 2005 to 2008 changes in the situational mechanism increased in intensity.  
Natural resource rents became even more lucrative, and Putin‟s regime even more 
authoritarian.  The state‟s control over the natural gas industry increased even further, and the 
state continued to play a large role in the capture and distribution of these rents.  What 
changed rather drastically was the importance of Turkmen gas in the regional energy trade.  
With increased demand in Europe and Eurasia, and stagnating supply, the competition for 
exportable volumes from Turkmenistan began to heat up.  European states began looking for 
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ways to access Turkmen gas while bypassing Russian territory, and Ukraine sought long term 
contracts with Turkmenistan in order to limit or eliminate its dependence on Russian gas.  The 
Individuals controlling Gazprom and the Russian state saw this competition as a potential 
threat to their control of rents generated by their monopoly over the transit and trade of these 
gas volumes.   
With increased control over Gazprom and the domestic natural gas industry those 
controlling the Russian state had a much freer hand to dictate the policies followed by actors 
in the industry, and they were able to ensure that these policies matched state goals.  The rent 
maximizing actions of these individuals led Gazprom management to concede to 
Turkmenistan‟s request for higher gas prices in order to ensure their monopoly over the transit 
and sale of Turkmen gas.  This meant large increases in the cost of Turkmen gas for Russia, 
and it eliminated bilateral trade deals between Turkmenistan and Ukraine.  This also 
eliminated competition in the pricing of imports in Ukraine and allowed Gazprom‟s 
management to pass on the increased costs of Turkmen gas to Ukrainian consumers in order to 
maximize the rents Gazprom and the Russian state gained from its sale.   
It is evident that the rent-seeking preferences of individuals controlling the Russian 
state and Gazprom served to link changes in the situational mechanism governing their beliefs 
and actions to the increase in natural gas export prices for Ukraine in 2006 and beyond.  While 
each of the changes in the situational mechanism offer insights into the Russian government‟s 
decision to raise prices, it is the assumptions about individual preferences for rent seeking 
which complete the picture, illustrating how the price increases came about.  Before moving 
on to the final section and discussing what this explanation may mean for the Russian natural 
169 
 
gas industry as a whole, methodological individualism‟s ability to synthesize the three images 
of international relations theory deserves some final discussion. 
Methodological Individualism and the Three Images 
In Chapter Two three approaches to the study of international relations and foreign 
policy were discussed.  These approaches were the study of individuals (first image), the study 
of the state (second image), and the study of the structure of the international system (third 
image).  In the same chapter it was suggested that the logic of methodological individualism 
offered an opportunity to synthesize these different levels of analysis into multilevel 
explanations of developments in international politics.  After completion of this mechanisms 
based explanation of the Russian government‟s decision to increase natural gas prices for 
Ukraine in 2006 it would be fair to say that the role that methodological individualism can 
play in synthesizing these approaches is promising.   
This project began by making reference to a number of developments in Russian and 
global politics and political economy which appeared to have had some relation to the Russian 
decision to increase natural gas prices to Ukraine.  These developments correlated well with 
the above mentioned levels of analysis.  There were changes in the individuals who were 
making decisions both in the Russian government and at Gazprom and, furthermore, the 
actions of these individuals varied between times of high and low prices for Ukraine.  This 
obviously falls within the realm of the first image approach.  There were changes in the degree 
of authoritarianism present in Russia‟s patrimonial system, as well as the source of rents 
which this system rested on.  These clearly fall within the second image approach.  Also, the 
state‟s control over the natural gas industry varied between times of high and low prices.  The 
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capabilities of the state as far as the natural gas industry is concerned would also fall under 
issues relevant to a second image approach.  Finally, there were changes in the structure of the 
international and regional system, which included increased global natural resource prices, 
and tightening European and Eurasian supply and demand conditions which led to the 
increasing regional importance of Turkmen gas.  Clearly this would be something of 
importance to a third image approach. 
While it may have been possible to provide an adequate explanation of Russia‟s price 
increases with reference to only one of these levels of analysis, a full explanation requires 
attention to be paid to all of them.  Through the use of methodological individualism the role 
that individual action played in linking all of the aforementioned developments has been made 
explicit.  By assuming that individuals seek to maximize the rents which they control it has 
been shown how macro level events affecting state organization, such as changes in the source 
of rents and the authoritarian nature of Russia‟s ruling regime, have conditioned the actions of 
individual rent seekers.  It has further been demonstrated how changes in the structure of the 
international system have also altered the actions of individual rent seekers.  By referring to 
the transformational mechanism it was then shown how these factors came together to bring 
about price increases for Ukraine.  This is an explanation that takes all the levels of analysis 
into account and is also able to show how they relate to one another.  It is thus fair to suggest 
that methodological individualism can provide a link between multiple levels of analysis in 
international relations theory and produce robust explanations of events in international 
politics. 
Russian Foreign Policy and Natural Gas 
171 
 
 With an explanation for the Russian government‟s decision to increase natural gas 
prices for Ukraine in 2006 based on changes in Russia‟s patrimonial political structure, the 
state‟s increasing capabilities in the natural gas industry, the increased importance of Turkmen 
gas, and the rent seeking nature of individual decision makers laid out, it is worth suggesting 
some implications this has for how Russia‟s natural gas industry can be viewed in relation to 
its foreign policy.  At the outset it was suggested that there was a counterfactual component to 
this explanation.   By holding constant the possibility that it was strained Russian-Ukrainian 
relations after Ukraine‟s Orange Revolution that led Russia to increase natural gas prices to 
Ukraine, we have been able to identify other factors that surely played a large role.  This 
section will suggest what this means for Russian natural gas and foreign policy. 
 The belief that Russia was punishing Ukraine for its drift toward institutions such as 
NATO and the E.U. paints a picture of a coercive Russian foreign policy which uses its vast 
energy resources as blunt tool to beat misbehaving states back into line.  Implicit in this 
argument is that Russia is acting from a position of strength which it gains from its vast 
natural resource wealth and the infrastructure which it controls.  If one subscribes to the 
punishment explanation that is quite prevalent in the literature surrounding the 2006 gas crisis, 
then one is likely to view Russia‟s natural gas industry as a tool controlling those which 
depend on Russian gas.  The explanation provided here paints the relationship between 
Russian foreign policy and Russian natural gas quite differently.  Given this project‟s 
explanation it appears that rather than working from a position of strength, and using natural 
gas resources as a weapon/tool of control, to a great degree Russia is working from a position 
of weakness, and its foreign policy is controlled by the natural gas reserves it holds.   
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With a patrimonial state in which the state must capture and distribute rents in order to 
maintain control, the quest for the rents generated by natural gas sales and extraction has 
become a preoccupation of Russia‟s foreign policy.  The need to control natural gas rents has 
led Gazprom to push private and foreign companies out of Russia‟s natural gas market.  This 
has hurt the investment climate in the entire Russian economy and the natural gas industry 
specifically.  These developments are worrisome because as current natural gas fields decline 
in new fields must be found.  These new fields require technology and knowhow that Russian 
industry experts and companies do not appear to possess, and investment dollars which the 
state and Russian investors cannot furnish.  This presents the very real possibility of a 
widening gas deficit in Russia which may jeopardize its future as a key supplier to the states 
of the European CIS and the E.U.   
The quest to maintain control over the rents generated by Turkmen gas exports has 
caused Russian policy makers to sign deals under which they pay high prices for large 
volumes of Turkmen gas, which if faced with falling demand domestically and in Europe they 
may not even need.  If the Russian government chooses to limit the amount of gas it purchases 
from Central Asian states it may alienate Turkmenistan and other Central Asian gas producing 
states, and drive them out of the Russian sphere of influence.  Also, in order to pay higher 
prices for Turkmen and other Central Asian gas the Russian government may have given up 
one of its best levers of influence it had in former Soviet states, low energy prices.  This runs 
counter to the idea that the Russian government is using its energy resources to rebuild the lost 
Soviet empire.     
Another consideration is that pipeline deals designed to secure Turkmen and Central 
Asian gas supplies my not in the end be economically feasible.  These pipeline proposals have 
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been a major issue on the Russian agenda when dealing with the European Union, and pushed 
legitimate concerns surrounding diverse supply and export channels throughout the region on 
to the Russian and E.U. policy back burners.  Further pipeline deals with Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan, signed to secure access to increased amounts of Turkmen gas, may eventually 
bring more gas to Russia and Europe than the market can bear at times of economic downturn. 
Finally, Russia‟s economic wagon appears firmly hitched to the horse of global energy 
prices.  These global energy prices are determined externally, and this gives Russia little say 
over its economic future.  This suggest that Russian economic success or failure will be tied to 
what other states produce and how they produce it for the foreseeable future.  Granted, 
increases in Russia‟s foreign currency reserves have afforded the government some breathing 
space with respect to international debt and ruble stability, but this does not represent long 
term insulation from energy price variances, and it simply burns through savings while 
attempting to keep the economy afloat.  This reliance on energy resource revenue will ensure 
that capital flight is a recurring problem for the Russian economy, and makes Russia more 
vulnerable than many to external economic shocks.  
This is the relationship between Russian natural gas and Russian foreign policy that is 
implicit in the explanation provided by this project.  This is a relationship where rather than 
controlling and using natural gas supplies to achieve foreign policy objectives, Russia‟s 
foreign policy is controlled by the need to create and capture natural resource rents to the 
eventual detriment of the Russian state, economy, and possibly its broader foreign policy 
goals.  This surely paints a picture of a Russia that is dealing from a position of weakness 
rather than a position of strength, and brings into question the assumed coercive role that 
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